名人演讲 "The Great Silent Majority"
英语课
Good evening, my fellow Americans.
Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.
I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnamis that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding 1 issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.
Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.
How and why didAmericaget involved inVietnamin the first place?
How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration?
What has really happened in the negotiations 2 inParisand on the battlefront inVietnam?
What choices do we have if we are to end the war?
What are the prospects 4 for peace?
Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was beyond [behind] schedule. Five hundred and forty-thousand Americans were inVietnamwith no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Parisand theUnited Stateshad not put forth 5 a comprehensive peace proposal.
The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.
In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate 6 withdrawal 7 of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor 8 was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him -- and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.
But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.
Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war. The great question is: How can we winAmerica’s peace?
Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: Why and how did theUnited Statesbecome involved inVietnamin the first place? Fifteen years agoNorth Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet 9 Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnamby instigating 10 and supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel toVietnamas combat advisers 11. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.
Now many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnamwas wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.
But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?
In January I could only conclude that the precipitate 12 withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnamwould be a disaster not only for South Vietnambut for theUnited Statesand for the cause of peace.
For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably 13 allow the Communists to repeat the massacres 14 which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor 15 camps.
We saw a prelude 16 of what would happen inSouth Vietnamwhen the Communists entered the city of Huelast year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody 17 reign 18 of terror in which 3,000 civilians 19 were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.
With the sudden collapse 20 of our support, these atrocities 21 at Huewould become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled toSouth Vietnamwhen the Communists took over in the North.
For theUnited Statesthis first defeat in our nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asiabut throughout the world.
Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved inVietnamand understood what had to be done.
In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence 22 and clarity said,
"We want to see a stable Government there," carrying on the [a] struggle to maintain its national independence." We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnambut Southeast Asia. So we’re going to stay there."¹
President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.
For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation 23 inSouth Vietnamwithout question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of worlds conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace -- in theMiddle East, inBerlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war.
For these reasons I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war fought on many fronts. I initiated 24 a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.
We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed a cease fire under international supervision 25. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigongovernment has pledged to accept the result of the election.
We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we’re willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnamto determine their own future.
At the Parispeace conference Ambassador Lodge 26 has demonstrated our flexibility 27 and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoihas refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional 28 acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally 29 and that we overthrow 30 the government of South Vietnamas we leave.
We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums 31 and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum 32. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.
Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented 33 step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately 34 and secretly because we thought we thereby 35 might open a door which publicly would be closed.
I did not wait for my inauguration 36 to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Unionfurnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist 37 their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations withNorth Vietnam.
None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock 38 in theParistalks. I spoke 39 directly in this office, where I’m now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive 40 progress toward bringing the war to an end.
Let me read from that letter to you now:
“Dear Mr. President:
I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf 41 of four years of war. But precisely 42 because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnamhas gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people ofVietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic 43 war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings 44 of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture 45 both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."
I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on August 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated 46 the public position North Vietnamhad taken atParisand flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press.
In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met withVietnam’s chief negotiator inParisin 11 private sessions. And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.
But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on January 20th, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.
Well, now, who’s at fault? It’s become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of theUnited States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession 47, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.
There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation 3 depends only on Hanoi’s deciding to negotiate -- to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth -- the bad news as well as the good news -- where the lives of our young men are involved.
Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace -- a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with the major shift in U. S.foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guamon July 25. Let me briefly 48 explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine 49 -- a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnambut which is an essential element of our program to prevent futureVietnams.
We Americans are a do-it-yourself people -- we’re an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy. InKorea, and again inVietnam, the United Statesfurnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression 50.
Before any American troops were committed toVietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling inAsiaas a private citizen. He said: “When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom,U.S.policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.”
Well in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guamthree principles as guidelines for future American policy towardAsia. First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied 51 with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense 52.
After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of thePhilippines, Thailand,Vietnam,South Korea, other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.
The defense of freedom is everybody’s business -- not justAmerica’s business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous Administration, we Americanized the war inVietnam. In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.
The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.
The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird’s visit toVietnamin March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces. In July, on my visit toVietnam, I changed General Abrams’s orders, so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 per cent.
And now we have begun to see the results of this long-overdue change in American policy inVietnam. After five years of Americans going into Vietnamwe are finally bringing American men home. By December 15 over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn 53 fromSouth Vietnam, including 20 percent of all of our combat forces. The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result, they've been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.
Two other significant developments have occurred since this Administration took office. Enemy infiltration 54, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack over the last three months, is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year. And most important,United Statescasualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three years.
Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S.combat ground forces and their replacement 55 by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.
I have not, and do not, intend to announce the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision which I’m sure you will understand. As I’ve indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts. One of these is the progress which can be, or might be, made in theParistalks. An announcement of a fixed 56 timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive 57 for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.
The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June.
Now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time, rather than on estimates that are no longer valid 58. Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor 59 leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.
However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point. At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam, they would stop the shelling of cities inSouth Vietnam.
I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have noted 60 the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially 61 on those factors. If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.Hanoicould make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage.
If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes 62 our remaining forces inVietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation. This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy which as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces I am making and meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.
My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war. I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans fromVietnamwithout regard to the effects of that action. Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement, if possible, or through continued implementation 63 of our plan for Vietnamization, if necessary -- a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.
I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just inVietnambut in the Pacific and in the world.
In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence inAmerica. Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable 64 remorse 65 and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.
We have faced other crises in our history and we have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what has to be done when we knew our course was right. I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic 66 Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved. InSan Franciscoa few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading, “Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.” Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view.
But as President of theUnited States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this nation to be dictated 67 by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the nation by mounting demonstrations 68 in the street. For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all the people. If a vocal 69 minority, however fervent 70 its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society.
And now, I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war. I respect your idealism. I share your concern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for AmericainVietnam. It's very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.
I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men inVietnam. But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some futureVietnamsome place in the world.
And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication 71 of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred 72 against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.
I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed. If it does not succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter. Or if it does succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won’t matter.
I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism 73 or national destiny these days, but I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion. Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor. But even then,Americawas the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined 74 by whether the American people have the moral stamina 75 and the courage to meet the challenge of free-world leadership.
Let historians not record that, whenAmericawas the most powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated 76 by the forces of totalitarianism.
So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency 77 to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed 78. For the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.
Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand --North Vietnamcannot defeat or humiliate 79 theUnited States. Only Americans can do that.
Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: “This is the war to end wars.” His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard reality of great power politics. And Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.
Tonight, I do not tell you that the war inVietnamis the war to end wars, but I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which -- to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated 80 -- the goal of a just and lasting 81 peace.
As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path for that goal and then leading the nation along it.
I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command, in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.
Thank you and good night.
Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.
I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnamis that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding 1 issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.
Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.
How and why didAmericaget involved inVietnamin the first place?
How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration?
What has really happened in the negotiations 2 inParisand on the battlefront inVietnam?
What choices do we have if we are to end the war?
What are the prospects 4 for peace?
Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was beyond [behind] schedule. Five hundred and forty-thousand Americans were inVietnamwith no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Parisand theUnited Stateshad not put forth 5 a comprehensive peace proposal.
The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.
In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate 6 withdrawal 7 of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor 8 was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him -- and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.
But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.
Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war. The great question is: How can we winAmerica’s peace?
Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: Why and how did theUnited Statesbecome involved inVietnamin the first place? Fifteen years agoNorth Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet 9 Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnamby instigating 10 and supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel toVietnamas combat advisers 11. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.
Now many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnamwas wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.
But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?
In January I could only conclude that the precipitate 12 withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnamwould be a disaster not only for South Vietnambut for theUnited Statesand for the cause of peace.
For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably 13 allow the Communists to repeat the massacres 14 which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor 15 camps.
We saw a prelude 16 of what would happen inSouth Vietnamwhen the Communists entered the city of Huelast year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody 17 reign 18 of terror in which 3,000 civilians 19 were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.
With the sudden collapse 20 of our support, these atrocities 21 at Huewould become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled toSouth Vietnamwhen the Communists took over in the North.
For theUnited Statesthis first defeat in our nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asiabut throughout the world.
Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved inVietnamand understood what had to be done.
In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence 22 and clarity said,
"We want to see a stable Government there," carrying on the [a] struggle to maintain its national independence." We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnambut Southeast Asia. So we’re going to stay there."¹
President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.
For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation 23 inSouth Vietnamwithout question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of worlds conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace -- in theMiddle East, inBerlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war.
For these reasons I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war fought on many fronts. I initiated 24 a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.
We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed a cease fire under international supervision 25. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigongovernment has pledged to accept the result of the election.
We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we’re willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnamto determine their own future.
At the Parispeace conference Ambassador Lodge 26 has demonstrated our flexibility 27 and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoihas refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional 28 acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally 29 and that we overthrow 30 the government of South Vietnamas we leave.
We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums 31 and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum 32. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.
Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented 33 step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately 34 and secretly because we thought we thereby 35 might open a door which publicly would be closed.
I did not wait for my inauguration 36 to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Unionfurnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist 37 their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations withNorth Vietnam.
None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock 38 in theParistalks. I spoke 39 directly in this office, where I’m now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive 40 progress toward bringing the war to an end.
Let me read from that letter to you now:
“Dear Mr. President:
I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf 41 of four years of war. But precisely 42 because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnamhas gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people ofVietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic 43 war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings 44 of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture 45 both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."
I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on August 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated 46 the public position North Vietnamhad taken atParisand flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press.
In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met withVietnam’s chief negotiator inParisin 11 private sessions. And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.
But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on January 20th, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.
Well, now, who’s at fault? It’s become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of theUnited States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession 47, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.
There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation 3 depends only on Hanoi’s deciding to negotiate -- to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth -- the bad news as well as the good news -- where the lives of our young men are involved.
Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace -- a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with the major shift in U. S.foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guamon July 25. Let me briefly 48 explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine 49 -- a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnambut which is an essential element of our program to prevent futureVietnams.
We Americans are a do-it-yourself people -- we’re an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy. InKorea, and again inVietnam, the United Statesfurnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression 50.
Before any American troops were committed toVietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling inAsiaas a private citizen. He said: “When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom,U.S.policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.”
Well in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guamthree principles as guidelines for future American policy towardAsia. First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied 51 with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense 52.
After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of thePhilippines, Thailand,Vietnam,South Korea, other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.
The defense of freedom is everybody’s business -- not justAmerica’s business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous Administration, we Americanized the war inVietnam. In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.
The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.
The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird’s visit toVietnamin March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces. In July, on my visit toVietnam, I changed General Abrams’s orders, so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 per cent.
And now we have begun to see the results of this long-overdue change in American policy inVietnam. After five years of Americans going into Vietnamwe are finally bringing American men home. By December 15 over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn 53 fromSouth Vietnam, including 20 percent of all of our combat forces. The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result, they've been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.
Two other significant developments have occurred since this Administration took office. Enemy infiltration 54, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack over the last three months, is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year. And most important,United Statescasualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three years.
Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S.combat ground forces and their replacement 55 by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.
I have not, and do not, intend to announce the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision which I’m sure you will understand. As I’ve indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts. One of these is the progress which can be, or might be, made in theParistalks. An announcement of a fixed 56 timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive 57 for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.
The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June.
Now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time, rather than on estimates that are no longer valid 58. Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor 59 leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.
However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point. At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam, they would stop the shelling of cities inSouth Vietnam.
I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have noted 60 the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially 61 on those factors. If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.Hanoicould make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage.
If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes 62 our remaining forces inVietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation. This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy which as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces I am making and meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.
My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war. I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans fromVietnamwithout regard to the effects of that action. Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement, if possible, or through continued implementation 63 of our plan for Vietnamization, if necessary -- a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.
I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just inVietnambut in the Pacific and in the world.
In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence inAmerica. Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable 64 remorse 65 and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.
We have faced other crises in our history and we have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what has to be done when we knew our course was right. I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic 66 Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved. InSan Franciscoa few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading, “Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.” Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view.
But as President of theUnited States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this nation to be dictated 67 by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the nation by mounting demonstrations 68 in the street. For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all the people. If a vocal 69 minority, however fervent 70 its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society.
And now, I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war. I respect your idealism. I share your concern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for AmericainVietnam. It's very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.
I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men inVietnam. But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some futureVietnamsome place in the world.
And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication 71 of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred 72 against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.
I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed. If it does not succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter. Or if it does succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won’t matter.
I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism 73 or national destiny these days, but I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion. Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor. But even then,Americawas the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined 74 by whether the American people have the moral stamina 75 and the courage to meet the challenge of free-world leadership.
Let historians not record that, whenAmericawas the most powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated 76 by the forces of totalitarianism.
So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency 77 to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed 78. For the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.
Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand --North Vietnamcannot defeat or humiliate 79 theUnited States. Only Americans can do that.
Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: “This is the war to end wars.” His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard reality of great power politics. And Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.
Tonight, I do not tell you that the war inVietnamis the war to end wars, but I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which -- to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated 80 -- the goal of a just and lasting 81 peace.
As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path for that goal and then leading the nation along it.
I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command, in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.
Thank you and good night.
a.最主要的
- Development is of overriding importance. 发展是硬道理
- My overriding concern is to raise the standards of state education. 我最关心的是提高国民教育水平。
协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过
- negotiations for a durable peace 为持久和平而进行的谈判
- Negotiations have failed to establish any middle ground. 谈判未能达成任何妥协。
n.谈判，协商
- They closed the deal in sugar after a week of negotiation.经过一星期的谈判，他们的食糖生意成交了。
- The negotiation dragged on until July.谈判一直拖到7月份。
n.希望，前途(恒为复数)
- There is a mood of pessimism in the company about future job prospects. 公司中有一种对工作前景悲观的情绪。
- They are less sanguine about the company's long-term prospects. 他们对公司的远景不那么乐观。
adv.向前；向外，往外
- The wind moved the trees gently back and forth.风吹得树轻轻地来回摇晃。
- He gave forth a series of works in rapid succession.他很快连续发表了一系列的作品。
adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的
- His immediate neighbours felt it their duty to call.他的近邻认为他们有责任去拜访。
- We declared ourselves for the immediate convocation of the meeting.我们主张立即召开这个会议。
n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销
- The police were forced to make a tactical withdrawal.警方被迫进行战术撤退。
- They insisted upon a withdrawal of the statement and a public apology.他们坚持要收回那些话并公开道歉。
n.前辈，前任
- It will share the fate of its predecessor.它将遭受与前者同样的命运。
- The new ambassador is more mature than his predecessor.新大使比他的前任更成熟一些。
adj.苏联的，苏维埃的；n.苏维埃
- Zhukov was a marshal of the former Soviet Union.朱可夫是前苏联的一位元帅。
- Germany began to attack the Soviet Union in 1941.德国在1941年开始进攻苏联。
v.使（某事物）开始或发生，鼓动( instigate的现在分词 )
- Distant but clear Longyin instigating the eardrums of every person. 遥远却清晰的龙吟鼓动着每一个人的耳膜。 来自互联网
- The leader was charged with instigating the workers to put down tools. 那位领导人被指控煽动工人罢工。 来自互联网
顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授
- a member of the President's favoured circle of advisers 总统宠爱的顾问班子中的一员
- She withdrew to confer with her advisers before announcing a decision. 她先去请教顾问然后再宣布决定。
adj.突如其来的；vt.使突然发生；n.沉淀物
- I don't think we should make precipitate decisions.我认为我们不应该贸然作出决定。
- The king was too precipitate in declaring war.国王在宣战一事上过于轻率。
adv.不可避免地；必然发生地
- In the way you go on,you are inevitably coming apart.照你们这样下去，毫无疑问是会散伙的。
- Technological changes will inevitably lead to unemployment.技术变革必然会导致失业。
大屠杀( massacre的名词复数 )； 惨败
- The time is past for guns and killings and massacres. 动不动就用枪、动不动就杀、大规模屠杀的时代已经过去了。 来自教父部分
- Numberless recent massacres were still vivid in their recollection. 近来那些不可胜数的屠杀，在他们的头脑中记忆犹新。
n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦
- We are never late in satisfying him for his labor.我们从不延误付给他劳动报酬。
- He was completely spent after two weeks of hard labor.艰苦劳动两周后，他已经疲惫不堪了。
n.序言，前兆，序曲
- The prelude to the musical composition is very long.这首乐曲的序曲很长。
- The German invasion of Poland was a prelude to World War II.德国入侵波兰是第二次世界大战的序幕。
adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染
- He got a bloody nose in the fight.他在打斗中被打得鼻子流血。
- He is a bloody fool.他是一个十足的笨蛋。
n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势
- The reign of Queen Elizabeth lapped over into the seventeenth century.伊丽莎白王朝延至17世纪。
- The reign of Zhu Yuanzhang lasted about 31 years.朱元璋统治了大约三十一年。
平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓
- the bloody massacre of innocent civilians 对无辜平民的血腥屠杀
- At least 300 civilians are unaccounted for after the bombing raids. 遭轰炸袭击之后，至少有300名平民下落不明。
vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷
- The country's economy is on the verge of collapse.国家的经济已到了崩溃的边缘。
- The engineer made a complete diagnosis of the bridge's collapse.工程师对桥的倒塌做了一次彻底的调查分析。
n.邪恶，暴行( atrocity的名词复数 )；滔天大罪
- They were guilty of the most barbarous and inhuman atrocities. 他们犯有最野蛮、最灭绝人性的残暴罪行。 来自《简明英汉词典》
- The enemy's atrocities made one boil with anger. 敌人的暴行令人发指。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
n.雄辩；口才，修辞
- I am afraid my eloquence did not avail against the facts.恐怕我的雄辩也无补于事实了。
- The people were charmed by his eloquence.人们被他的口才迷住了。
n.羞辱
- He suffered the humiliation of being forced to ask for his cards.他蒙受了被迫要求辞职的羞辱。
- He will wish to revenge his humiliation in last Season's Final.他会为在上个季度的决赛中所受的耻辱而报复的。
n.监督，管理
- The work was done under my supervision.这项工作是在我的监督之下完成的。
- The old man's will was executed under the personal supervision of the lawyer.老人的遗嘱是在律师的亲自监督下执行的。
v.临时住宿，寄宿，寄存，容纳；n.传达室，小旅馆
- Is there anywhere that I can lodge in the village tonight?村里有我今晚过夜的地方吗？
- I shall lodge at the inn for two nights.我要在这家小店住两个晚上。
n.柔韧性，弹性，（光的）折射性，灵活性
- Her great strength lies in her flexibility.她的优势在于她灵活变通。
- The flexibility of a man's muscles will lessen as he becomes old.人老了肌肉的柔韧性将降低。
adj.无条件的，无限制的，绝对的
- The victorious army demanded unconditional surrender.胜方要求敌人无条件投降。
- My love for all my children is unconditional.我对自己所有孩子的爱都是无条件的。
adv.无条件地
- All foreign troops must be withdrawn immediately and unconditionally. 所有外国军队必须立即无条件地撤出。
- It makes things very awkward to have your girls going back unconditionally just now! 你们现在是无条件上工，真糟糕！ 来自子夜部分
v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆
- After the overthrow of the government,the country was in chaos.政府被推翻后，这个国家处于混乱中。
- The overthrow of his plans left him much discouraged.他的计划的失败使得他很气馁。
讨论会； 座谈会； 广播专题讲话节目； 集会的公共场所( forum的名词复数 )； 论坛，讨论会，专题讨论节目； 法庭
- A few of the forums were being closely monitored by the administrators. 有些论坛被管理员严密监控。
- It can cast a dark cloud over these forums. 它将是的论坛上空布满乌云。
n.论坛，讨论会
- They're holding a forum on new ways of teaching history.他们正在举行历史教学讨论会。
- The organisation would provide a forum where problems could be discussed.这个组织将提供一个可以讨论问题的平台。
adj.无前例的，新奇的
- The air crash caused an unprecedented number of deaths.这次空难的死亡人数是空前的。
- A flood of this sort is really unprecedented.这样大的洪水真是十年九不遇。
adv.以私人的身份，悄悄地，私下地
- Some ministers admit privately that unemployment could continue to rise.一些部长私下承认失业率可能继续升高。
- The man privately admits that his motive is profits.那人私下承认他的动机是为了牟利。
adv.因此，从而
- I have never been to that city,,ereby I don't know much about it.我从未去过那座城市，因此对它不怎么熟悉。
- He became a British citizen,thereby gaining the right to vote.他成了英国公民，因而得到了投票权。
n.开幕、就职典礼
- The inauguration of a President of the United States takes place on January 20.美国总统的就职典礼于一月二十日举行。
- Three celebrated tenors sang at the president's inauguration.3位著名的男高音歌手在总统就职仪式上演唱。
vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍
- They come here to enlist men for the army.他们来这儿是为了召兵。
- The conference will make further efforts to enlist the support of the international community for their just struggle. 会议必将进一步动员国际社会，支持他们的正义斗争。
n.僵局，僵持
- The negotiations reached a deadlock after two hours.两小时后，谈判陷入了僵局。
- The employers and strikers are at a deadlock over the wage.雇主和罢工者在工资问题上相持不下。
n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说
- They sourced the spoke nuts from our company.他们的轮辐螺帽是从我们公司获得的。
- The spokes of a wheel are the bars that connect the outer ring to the centre.辐条是轮子上连接外圈与中心的条棒。
adj.建设的，建设性的
- We welcome constructive criticism.我们乐意接受有建设性的批评。
- He is beginning to deal with his anger in a constructive way.他开始用建设性的方法处理自己的怒气。
n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂
- The gulf between the two leaders cannot be bridged.两位领导人之间的鸿沟难以跨越。
- There is a gulf between the two cities.这两座城市间有个海湾。
adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地
- It's precisely that sort of slick sales-talk that I mistrust.我不相信的正是那种油腔滑调的推销宣传。
- The man adjusted very precisely.那个人调得很准。
adj.悲剧的，悲剧性的，悲惨的
- The effect of the pollution on the beaches is absolutely tragic.污染海滩后果可悲。
- Charles was a man doomed to tragic issues.查理是个注定不得善终的人。
n.（上帝的）祝福( blessing的名词复数 )；好事；福分；因祸得福
- Afflictions are sometimes blessings in disguise. 塞翁失马，焉知非福。 来自《简明英汉词典》
- We don't rely on blessings from Heaven. 我们不靠老天保佑。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头
- The project is situated at the juncture of the new and old urban districts.该项目位于新老城区交界处。
- It is very difficult at this juncture to predict the company's future.此时很难预料公司的前景。
反复地说，重申( reiterate的过去式和过去分词 )
- "Well, I want to know about it,'she reiterated. “嗯，我一定要知道你的休假日期，"她重复说。 来自英汉文学 - 嘉莉妹妹
- Some twenty-two years later President Polk reiterated and elaborated upon these principles. 大约二十二年之后，波尔克总统重申这些原则并且刻意阐释一番。
n.让步，妥协；特许(权)
- We can not make heavy concession to the matter.我们在这个问题上不能过于让步。
- That is a great concession.这是很大的让步。
adv.简单地，简短地
- I want to touch briefly on another aspect of the problem.我想简单地谈一下这个问题的另一方面。
- He was kidnapped and briefly detained by a terrorist group.他被一个恐怖组织绑架并短暂拘禁。
n.教义；主义；学说
- He was impelled to proclaim his doctrine.他不得不宣扬他的教义。
- The council met to consider changes to doctrine.宗教议会开会考虑更改教义。
n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害
- So long as we are firmly united, we need fear no aggression.只要我们紧密地团结，就不必惧怕外来侵略。
- Her view is that aggression is part of human nature.她认为攻击性是人类本性的一部份。
adj.协约国的；同盟国的
- Britain was allied with the United States many times in history.历史上英国曾多次与美国结盟。
- Allied forces sustained heavy losses in the first few weeks of the campaign.同盟国在最初几周内遭受了巨大的损失。
n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩
- The accused has the right to defense.被告人有权获得辩护。
- The war has impacted the area with military and defense workers.战争使那个地区挤满了军队和防御工程人员。
vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出
- Our force has been withdrawn from the danger area.我们的军队已从危险地区撤出。
- All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.一切外国军队都应撤回本国去。
n.渗透；下渗；渗滤；入渗
- The police tried to prevent infiltration by drug traffickers. 警方尽力阻止毒品走私分子的潜入。 来自《简明英汉词典》
- A loss in volume will occur if infiltration takes place. 如果发生了渗润作用，水量就会减少。 来自辞典例句
n.取代，替换，交换；替代品，代用品
- We are hard put to find a replacement for our assistant.我们很难找到一个人来代替我们的助手。
- They put all the students through the replacement examination.他们让所有的学生参加分班考试。
adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的
- Have you two fixed on a date for the wedding yet?你们俩选定婚期了吗？
- Once the aim is fixed,we should not change it arbitrarily.目标一旦确定，我们就不应该随意改变。
n.刺激；动力；鼓励；诱因；动机
- Money is still a major incentive in most occupations.在许多职业中，钱仍是主要的鼓励因素。
- He hasn't much incentive to work hard.他没有努力工作的动机。
adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的
- His claim to own the house is valid.他主张对此屋的所有权有效。
- Do you have valid reasons for your absence?你的缺席有正当理由吗？
n.坦白，率真
- He covered a wide range of topics with unusual candor.他极其坦率地谈了许多问题。
- He and his wife had avoided candor,and they had drained their marriage.他们夫妻间不坦率，已使婚姻奄奄一息。
adj.著名的，知名的
- The local hotel is noted for its good table.当地的那家酒店以餐食精美而著称。
- Jim is noted for arriving late for work.吉姆上班迟到出了名。
adv.部分地，从某些方面讲
- The door was partially concealed by the drapes.门有一部分被门帘遮住了。
- The police managed to restore calm and the curfew was partially lifted.警方设法恢复了平静，宵禁部分解除。
危及，损害( jeopardize的第三人称单数 )
- If your reckless behavior jeopardizes this mission, you're out! 如果你不注意你的言行，会危及到这次任务你也会被开除！
- Factionalism now seriously jeopardizes our overall interest. 现在闹派性已经严重地妨害我们的大局。
adj.不可避免的，必然发生的
- Mary was wearing her inevitable large hat.玛丽戴着她总是戴的那顶大帽子。
- The defeat had inevitable consequences for British policy.战败对英国政策不可避免地产生了影响。
n.痛恨，悔恨，自责
- She had no remorse about what she had said.她对所说的话不后悔。
- He has shown no remorse for his actions.他对自己的行为没有任何悔恨之意。
adj.爱国的，有爱国心的
- His speech was full of patriotic sentiments.他的演说充满了爱国之情。
- The old man is a patriotic overseas Chinese.这位老人是一位爱国华侨。
v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布
- He dictated a letter to his secretary. 他向秘书口授信稿。
- No person of a strong character likes to be dictated to. 没有一个个性强的人愿受人使唤。 来自《简明英汉词典》
证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威
- Lectures will be interspersed with practical demonstrations. 讲课中将不时插入实际示范。
- The new military government has banned strikes and demonstrations. 新的军人政府禁止罢工和示威活动。
adj.直言不讳的；嗓音的；n.[pl.]声乐节目
- The tongue is a vocal organ.舌头是一个发音器官。
- Public opinion at last became vocal.终于舆论哗然。
adj.热的，热烈的，热情的
- It was a debate which aroused fervent ethical arguments.那是一场引发强烈的伦理道德争论的辩论。
- Austria was among the most fervent supporters of adolf hitler.奥地利是阿道夫希特勒最狂热的支持者之一。
n.奉献，献身，致力，题献，献辞
- We admire her courage,compassion and dedication.我们钦佩她的勇气、爱心和奉献精神。
- Her dedication to her work was admirable.她对工作的奉献精神可钦可佩。
n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨
- He looked at me with hatred in his eyes.他以憎恨的眼光望着我。
- The old man was seized with burning hatred for the fascists.老人对法西斯主义者充满了仇恨。
n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义
- His new book is a demonstration of his patriotism.他写的新书是他的爱国精神的证明。
- They obtained money under the false pretenses of patriotism.他们以虚伪的爱国主义为借口获得金钱。
adj.坚定的；有决心的
- I have determined on going to Tibet after graduation.我已决定毕业后去西藏。
- He determined to view the rooms behind the office.他决定查看一下办公室后面的房间。
n.体力；精力；耐力
- I lacked the stamina to run the whole length of the race.我没有跑完全程的耐力。
- Giving up smoking had a magical effect on his stamina.戒烟神奇地增强了他的体力。
（使某人）窒息而死( suffocate的过去式和过去分词 )； （将某人）闷死； 让人感觉闷热； 憋气
- Many dogs have suffocated in hot cars. 许多狗在热烘烘的汽车里给闷死了。
- I nearly suffocated when the pipe of my breathing apparatus came adrift. 呼吸器上的管子脱落时，我差点给憋死。
n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期)
- Roosevelt was elected four times to the presidency of the United States.罗斯福连续当选四届美国总统。
- Two candidates are emerging as contestants for the presidency.两位候选人最终成为总统职位竞争者。
v.使羞辱，使丢脸[同]disgrace
- What right had they to bully and humiliate people like this?凭什么把人欺侮到这个地步呢？
- They pay me empty compliments which only humiliate me.他们虚情假意地恭维我，这只能使我感到羞辱。
adj.一心一意的；献身的；热诚的
- He dedicated his life to the cause of education.他献身于教育事业。
- His whole energies are dedicated to improve the design.他的全部精力都放在改进这项设计上了。