经济学人170:地质还是地理理论?

 　　Mining

　　采矿业
　　Geology or geography?
　　地质还是地理理论?
　　Miners should spread their risks across countries as well as minerals
　　矿业公司应用多国开采和多矿产开发以分散风险
　　THE past half-dozen years have been kind to miners.
　　过去的六年间，采矿企业的发展是顺风顺水。
　　China is gobbling up minerals as fast as they can dig them up.
　　中国消耗矿产的速度就跟采矿企业挖矿的速度一样快。
　　Commodity prices have surged, dipping only temporarily after the financial crisis of 2008. The doldrums of the 1990s are a distant memory.
　　矿产品价格除了在2008年经济危机爆发后短暂下挫外，一直在上涨。上世纪九十年代的矿产业低潮已成了遥远的回忆。
　　Well, almost. The share prices of big mining firms have wobbled in recent weeks, as jitters 1 about the global economy have intensified 2.
　　情形大抵如此。但最近几周，大型采矿公司的股价如同当下加剧动荡的全球经济一样，忽高忽低。
　　But profits are ballooning. On August 24th BHP Billiton, the world's largest miner, unveiled record annual profits of $23.6 billion.
　　但采矿企业的利润都在增长。8月24日，全球最大的采矿企业，必和必拓公布其年盈利额为236亿美元。
　　Not long ago Rio Tinto, another Anglo-Australian giant, reported record profits for the first half of the year.
　　不久前，另一家英澳联合采矿企业力拓公司也公布了本年度上半年的利润报告。
　　The other big global miners—Vale, Xstrata and Anglo American—are raking in mammoth 3 sums too.
　　Vale， Xstrata 和Anglo American，这三大全球采矿业巨头也捞到了大笔利润。
　　Investors 4 should be celebrating.
　　投资者应该为此庆祝一番。
　　But Rio missed analysts 5'forecasts and investors were quick to question the company's strategy.
　　但力拓的实际利润额与分析师给出的预测数字存有差异，投资者反应迅速，马上对力拓公司的战略提出了疑问。
　　Their main concern is that Rio earned nearly 80% of its profits from a single commodity: iron ore.
　　他们主要忧虑在于公司利润中大约80%都来自于单一一项矿产品：铁矿石。
　　That makes it vulnerable to price swings, and it is not alone.
　　一旦价格出现波动，公司就会直接受其影响，处于不利位置。而且把铁矿石作为主要产品的采矿企业不止一家。
　　Vale, a Brazilian miner, gets a hefty 60% of its revenues from iron ore.
　　巴西采矿企业Vale高达60%的收入都来自铁矿石。
　　And last year it sold most of its aluminium 6 business, thus putting all its eggs in an iron basket.
　　去年，这家企业售出旗下大部分铝业务。跟着就把赌注都放在了铁矿石这个篮子里。
　　There are two theories as to how miners should spread their risks.
　　关于采矿企业如何规避风险，存有两种理论。
　　One is that they should diversify 7 by geology.
　　一是依托地质学原理，采用多种矿物开采。
　　That is, they should dig up lots of different minerals, just in case the price of one of them collapses 8.
　　既：为应对某一矿物质价格下滑的局面而采取多样性开发。
　　That was the thinking behind the mega-merger that created BHP Billiton in 2001.
　　正是这种主导思想促成了2001年必和必拓公司并购。
　　It also explains why Xstrata and Anglo American operate so many different kinds of mines.
　　这也同样能解释为何Xstrata和Anglo American公司选用多种矿物质开采。
　　A rival theory holds that miners should worry more about geographical 9 diversity than the geological sort.
　　与之大相径庭的另一理论是矿产企业应更多地注意到地理带来多样性而不是地质类别。
　　Some analysts believe that because China's appetite for minerals is growing so fast—it already consumes around two-fifths of the world's output of industrial metals—prices can only go up.
　　中国对工业用金属的消耗已经占其全球产量的约五分之二。因此，一些分析家认为中国对矿产需求的增长之快，导致矿产价格只会继续上扬。
　　They talk of a “supercycle” of 20-25 years of high demand.
　　他们提出所谓“超旋回”理论，即：一种持续时间长达二十到二十五年的高需求。
　　The big threat now is not that prices will fall but that governments will seek to grab a greater share of miners'profits, predicts Grant Thornton, a consultancy.
　　正大联合会计师事务所认为，当下采矿业所面临的最大威胁不是矿业产品价格下降，而是多国政府都设法能在采矿企业所得的利润中分得一杯羹。
　　So miners should spread their political risk by digging in multiple countries.
　　所以多家采矿企业采取多国开采的方法规避政治风险。
　　BHP is doing well by following the first theory. It wants to become a large supplier of potash, a base for fertilisers, and recently spent $12.1 billion on Petrohawk, an American shale-gas firm, to add to an energy business that already accounts for a fifth of its profits.
　　必和必拓采用第一种理论，公司也因此运转良好。其希望在化肥的基础材料，碳酸钾上成为大型的供应商。此外还在最近花费121亿美元购买美国一家页岩燃气公司Petrohawk。必和必拓能在能源产业上的利润，已占其总利润的五分之一，此举用来增加其在能源商业上的实力。
　　But the second theory is gaining followers 10.
　　但持第二种理论的企业正在逐渐增多。
　　Several cash-strapped African governments are looking hungrily at miners'bulging moneybags.
　　一些财政紧张的非洲政府，眼睛放着蓝光，紧盯着采矿企业鼓鼓的钱袋不放。
　　Tanzanian politicians are mulling a supertax on miners.
　　坦桑尼亚的政客们正考虑对各采矿企业征收附加税。
　　Namibia and Zimbabwe have plans for the “indigenisation” of mining assets—ie, forcing miners to sell or hand them over to locals.
　　纳米比亚和津巴布韦已有计划，要将矿产资源“本土化”：即强迫采矿企业将出售或转让给当地人民。
　　Peru's new government pledged to levy 11 a windfall tax, but has since agreed merely to negotiate a better deal for its treasury 12.
　　秘鲁新上台的政府曾保证将对采矿企业征收暴利税，但最近同意，可以与采矿企业谈判，但谈判的前提必须是增加政府财政收入。
　　Trouble can arise in unexpected places: in 2010 Australia's government tried to impose a mining supertax.
　　本不认为会出麻烦的地方也出了事故。
　　A campaign by big miners forced a climbdown and cost the prime minister his job, but Australia will now slap a tax on iron ore and coal mining.
　　2010年，澳大利亚政府尝试对采矿企业征收附加税。多家采矿业巨头联合抵制，此事最终不了了之，导致总理引咎辞职。但现在澳大利亚政府还是会出手抬高铁矿石和煤矿产业的税收。
　　Anglo American illustrates 13 the dangers of geographical concentration.
　　Anglo American公司给我们诠释了地理集中论的危险。
　　The firm was originally South African, but moved its headquarters to London in 1999.
　　此公司在南非发家,与1999年将公司总部迁往伦敦。
　　It still relies on South African assets for 40% of its profits, however. Whenever a South African politician talks about nationalisation, its shares react as if whacked 14 with a shovel 15.
　　然而，公司利润的40%仍出自于其在南非的企业。每当一个南非政客跳出来对企业国有化品头论足一番时，该公司的股价就会应声而落。
　　One ruling-party firebrand talks of seizure 16 without compensation.
　　某一执政党的成员还煽风点火，大谈特谈什么占资产，不赔偿。
　　His views will probably not prevail, but Anglo is investing heavily in Latin America and elsewhere, just in case.
　　这种观点可能是个别人的想法，但为防不测，Anglo American公司正在拉丁美洲及其它地区大力投资。
　　Miners have so much cash that they are sure to splurge on further acquisitions.
　　采矿企业手握大笔现金，肯定会在进一步的兼并中投下巨资。
　　To guard against future adversity, they would be wise to seek both kinds of diversity.
　　为防患于未然，对之上提出的两种理论采取兼而有之的策略不失为是明智之举。
　　For political winds are as unpredictable as swings in commodity prices.
　　因为变化莫测的政治局势就像摇摆不定的产品价格一样，无法预测。