经济学人209:印度太阳能 等待着艳阳

 　　Business

　　商业报道
　　Solar power in India
　　印度太阳能
　　Waiting for the sun
　　等待着艳阳
　　Is the sun the answer to India's energy problems?
　　太阳能是印度能源问题的解决办法吗？
　　ON A salt plain near the border with Pakistan lies half a billion dollars' worth of solar-energy kit 1 paid for by firms from all over the world.
　　靠近巴基斯坦边界的一块盐地，安装了来自全球的公司价值五亿美元的太阳能设备。
　　A million panels stretch as far as the eye can see.
　　目所能及的就有一百万块太阳能板了。
　　Past a dishevelled brass 2 band is a tent crammed 3 with 5,000 people who cheer when Narendra Modi, the chief minister of Gujarat, declares the solar park open:
　　穿过一群散乱的铜管乐队就是一个挤满了正在欢庆的5000人帐篷区，此时，古吉拉特邦的首席部长纳伦德拉·莫迪宣布太阳能电厂正式运行，
　　I pray, sun god, that today Gujarat will show the way to the rest of the world for solar energy.
　　我希望太阳神庇护我们，今天古吉拉特邦将向世界其他地方展示通向太阳能的道路。
　　Despite the uncomfortable cult 4 of personality around Mr Modi, Gujarat is an easy place to do business.
　　除了对莫迪的个人崇拜令人感到不舒服外，古吉拉特邦还是一个容易经商的地方。
　　And solar power would appear to be an obvious winner for India.
　　而太阳能仿佛令印度成为了最大的赢家。
　　The country has plenty of sun and flat, idle land.
　　印度境内有充沛的阳光和许多平坦闲置的用地。
　　India is energy-hungry, but electricity supply is sporadic 5.
　　而它又是一个能源缺乏的国家，电力供应时常不足。
　　Costly 6 diesel 7 generators 8 are popular. Solar power could replace them.
　　连昂贵的柴油发电机在这里也很畅销。
　　And solar parks, which look like giant Lego kits 9, are easier to build than conventional power plants.
　　这方面太阳能可以替代。至于看上去像巨大的乐高积木桶的太阳能发电厂，比起建造传统的发电厂要容易多。
　　The new park, in a place called Charanka, has just over 200 megawatts of capacity running, making it the biggest site in India.
　　最新的电厂，建在Charanka，拥有超过200兆瓦发电量，使其成为印度最大的电力厂。
　　It took 16 months to build. No one builds nuclear power stations nearly that fast.
　　它花了16个月去建造，没有人能用这速度建造出原子能发电站。
　　Two other factors make an Indian solar boom seem possible.
　　还有两个原因使印度的太阳能得到广泛使用成为可能。
　　Conventional energy generation, which in India means burning cheap but dirty local coal, is a mess.
　　传统能源的生产十分混乱，在印度是通过燃烧便宜但污染大的煤炭来发电的。
　　Power stations charge local electricity boards 3-4 rupees per kilowatt 10 hour.
　　发电站以每度电约3~4卢比卖给当地的供电局。
　　The state coal monopoly is unable to dig up enough of the black stuff, forcing power firms to buy pricier imported coal.
　　国家垄断了煤炭，却无法开采足够的量，这迫使能源公司购买更贵的进口煤炭。
　　Hopes that India might find abundant natural gas off its coast have been dashed.
　　印度期望能在远离海岸线的地方找到丰富的天然气的愿望已经破灭。
　　Many observers think the price of conventional power will have to rise to 5-6 rupees.
　　许多观测者认为传统能源价格将上升5~6卢比。
　　Meanwhile, the cost of solar equipment has fallen by a third since 2010, reckons Alan Rosling of Kiran Energy,
　　与此同时，一间由美国私募基金注资的太阳能公司—Kiran能源的阿兰?罗斯林指出，自2010年以后，
　　a solar firm backed by American private equity 11.
　　太阳能装备的花费已经下降了三分之一。
　　Cheaper solar and pricier conventional power have persuaded many that solar will soon be competitive without subsidies 12.
　　相对便宜的太阳能与较贵的传统能源令更多的人在没有补贴的情况下仍选择更有竞争力的太阳能。
　　V. Saibaba, the boss of Lanco Solar, a firm that makes and operates solar parks, says that by 2016 Indian solar will match the price of conventional electricity.
　　负责建造与运营太阳能发电厂的兰科太阳能公司的领导V. Saibaba说，到2016年印度的太阳能价格将接近传统电力的价格。
　　That should mean a building boom.
　　这意味着太阳能发电厂的建造潮将到来。
　　Sunil Gupta of Standard Chartered, a bank, reckons India's share of new global solar installations will rise from 1% this year to 5% by 2015.
　　渣打银行的Sunil Gupta指出，印度的太阳能设备安装量在全球的份额将从今年的1%上升到2015年的5%。
　　India's central government has set a target for 20,000MW of installed solar generation by 2022, from under 1,000MW today.
　　印度政府设定了一个指标，到2022年，安装的太阳能发电量将从现在的1000百万瓦以下上升到20,000百万瓦。
　　That would still represent a miserly 5% or less of total power-generation capacity in India,
　　这显得有点保守，因为这只是印度总发电量的5%，甚至更少。
　　and cost perhaps $30 billion-40 billion to build—a fraction of the investment in new coal-fired plants.
　　投资约300亿美元~400亿美元去建造太阳能发电厂，而这只是相当于投资于新建的火力发电站的一小部分。
　　So plenty of folk think the official target will be smashed.
　　所以很多人认为官方目标将难以达成。
　　D.J. Pandian, a civil servant in charge of energy policy in Gujarat, believes his state alone will easily reach 10,000MW of capacity in a decade.
　　D.J. Pandian，一位负责古吉拉特邦能源问题的官员则相信，单单古吉拉特邦在十年内就将轻易地达到10,000百万瓦的发电量。
　　But not everyone agrees.
　　但不是每一个人都认同。
　　Half of these plants won't be here in ten years, says a German boss at the new solar park—bad news,
　　这些厂的一半在十年内都不会建在这里，一位在新的太阳能发电厂的德国领导说。
　　since the contracts are for 25 years.
　　他指出，坏消息是，因为合同是25年，
　　Too many firms have cut corners, he reckons.
　　导致太多公司节省成本。
　　A Chinese executive raises his eyebrows 13 at India's plans to force solar firms to buy some equipment locally.
　　一位中国执行官听了印度计划迫使太阳能公司购买当地的某些设备后扬起了眉毛。
　　The supply chain and economies of scale are not there, he says.
　　供应链以及经济规模还不理想。他说。
　　An American manager scoffs 14: We've all been coming to India for years and they'll never get there…
　　一位美国经理调侃到，我们全部来印度已经多年了，清楚他们还没有达到那程度，
　　They don't have the infrastructure 15.
　　他们没有基础设施。
　　The difficulty of getting plugged into the grid 16 and a shortage of water to clean panels are common worries.
　　难以接入电网以及因水的短缺而致难以清理太阳能板是常见的忧虑。
　　Solar faces two other problems.
　　太阳能普及面对两个问题。
　　First, Gujarat's state government has guaranteed high prices of 15 rupees for the first 12 years of operation to solar producers,
　　第一个是，古吉拉特邦的政府要求确保太阳能生产商每度电15卢比的高价，作为第一个12年内的运营成本，
　　which should mean they make money.
　　这也意味着他们可以盈利。
　　But at the national level there is a separate system.
　　但在国家层面上仍有一个分流制。
　　It relies on reverse auctions 18 in which those solar producers who commit to producing power at the lowest cost win the right to operate.
　　那些太阳能制造商是依靠逆向拍卖选出的，谁能用最低的成本生产能源，谁就能获得运营的权利。
　　In the second national solar auction 17, of 350MW, in December, the winning firms committed themselves to selling solar power for as little as 7.5 rupees.
　　在12月的第二个国家级太阳能运营拍卖会，其产能为350百万瓦，竞拍成功的公司已经承诺，他们将用低至每度7.5卢比的价格卖太阳能。
　　Many people doubt that it is possible to make money at these prices.
　　很多人怀疑按这些价格到底能不能实现盈利。
　　An Indian engineer says the auction was a farce 19 and that it is impossible to build a solid plant and operate it for less than 10 rupees.
　　一位印度工程师说拍卖会只是一场闹剧，建立一个固定的工厂并以低于每度10卢比的价格运营它，这是不可能的。
　　Firms bidding below, say, 8.5 rupees must assume that technology will improve, equipment prices will keep falling,
　　参与投标的厂商们也说，要是技术得到提升，而设备价格又持续下降，
　　or that they can make their sums work by borrowing cheap dollars rather than dear rupees.
　　或者说他们能通过借到廉价的美元而不是昂贵的卢比来总结工作。只有这样，每度电8.5卢比才显得有可能。
　　Second, if prices do not fall steeply, there may be little appetite for solar power.
　　此外，如果价格没有快速下降，可能很少人会愿意使用太阳能。
　　The grid is rickety.
　　电网也变得摇摇欲坠。
　　Many states' distribution firms are financial zombies.
　　许多国家的流通企业都是金融僵尸。
　　Today the cost of solar subsidies is hidden—pooled with the overall generation bill in states such as Gujarat or,
　　今天太阳能补贴的费用被隐藏了—像古吉拉特邦，统计在全部的账单中，或许，
　　for projects under the national scheme, buried in the finances of a big state-owned conventional power firm.
　　根据国家计划的项目，埋藏了一个大型的传统国有能源企业的资产。
　　Such bureaucratic 20 subterfuge 21 works on a small scale.
　　像这些官僚式的托词只影响了一小范围。
　　But if the bill for solar swells 22, it is not hard to imagine the kind of public backlash against subsidies that has hit cash-strapped Europe.
　　但要是太阳能的账单变大，不难想象，公众对补贴的不满将冲击欧洲的经济。
　　India's politicians may then start to ignore contracts.
　　印度的政客可能将开始不履行合约。
　　To solve India's energy problems, solar firms must deliver blindingly low prices.
　　要解决印度的能源问题，太阳能公司必须盲目地实现低价卖电。