放弃北约对美国无益 特朗普是欧洲的提神剂

 　　Snap out of it. Donald Trump 1 is just the jolt 2 Europe needed.

　　振作起来；唐纳德.特朗普(Donald Trump)正是欧洲所需的一针提神剂；
　　Too long coddled by the US, Europeans should welcome the president-elect’s admonition to stand on their own feet.
　　太长时间享受美国庇护的欧洲人，应该对这位当选总统敦促欧洲人自力更生表示欢迎。
　　Stunned 3 by the outcome of the US election, European policymakers have gone in desperate search of silver linings 4.
　　震惊于此次美国大选结果的欧洲政策制定者为了寻找乌云的金边可谓不遗余力。
　　There are none.
　　这金边是找不到的。
　　Whatever Europe’s shortcomings as a partner to the US — and there have been plenty — Mr Trump promises to make the world, including Europe, a more unstable 5 and dangerous place.
　　无论作为美国合作伙伴的欧洲有什么缺点（肯定不少），特朗普一定会让包括欧洲在内的整个世界变得更不稳定、更危险。
　　That this approach may encourage Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own security is all to the good but it does not alter the essential prognosis.
　　他或许会激励欧洲人为自身安全担负起更大的责任，因而不失为一件好事，但这一点不改变上述基本论断。
　　Mr Trump’s foreign policy is a work in progress.
　　特朗普的外交政策还在酝酿当中。
　　Measured by the public statements of the president-elect and his closest advisers 6, it is shot through with contradictions.
　　观察这位当选总统及其最亲密顾问的公开声明，可以看出其中充满了矛盾。
　　America-first isolationism jostles with pledges to increase military spending.
　　一边宣扬美国为先的孤立主义，一边承诺增加军费开支。
　　The recurring 7 themes, though, are economic nationalism and withdrawal 8 from the global responsibilities the US has assumed since 1945.
　　然而，反复出现的主题是经济民族主义以及不再承担美国自1945年以来一直承担的全球责任。
　　Mr Trump, whose criticisms of Nato are longstanding, seems clear that allies — whether Japan, the Republic of Korea or Nato members such as Germany, Poland, France or Britain — should look after themselves.
　　长期对北约(Nato)持批评态度的特朗普似乎已经清楚地表明，美国的盟友——无论是日本、韩国，还是德国、波兰、法国、英国等北约成员国——都应自食其力。
　　The disdain 9 for globalism catches the public mood in the US.
　　特朗普对全球主义的蔑视契合了美国的公众情绪。
　　After costly 10 wars of choice in Afghanistan and Iraq there is not much of a market in the midwest for overseas adventurism.
　　经过了阿富汗、伊拉克这两场不是非打不可且代价高昂的战争，海外冒险主义在美国中西部地区已没有多大市场。
　　The Iraq war was intended as a demonstration 11 of American might. As things turned out, it illuminated 12 national weakness.
　　发动伊拉克战争本是为了显示美国的实力，结果却暴露了美国的弱点。
　　Superior military hardware takes you only so far unless you have political consent.
　　优势武器装备的作用是有限的，除非能获得政治上的同意。
　　The charge that Europe has been a free-rider on the US defence budget broadly speaking is a fair one.
　　广义来说，指责欧洲一直搭乘美国国防预算的便车也不为过。
　　It has been acknowledged, if then ignored, by many European politicians.
　　许多欧洲政治家都承认了这一点——如果不是后来又忽视了这一点的话。
　　I never understood why newly democratic governments in eastern Europe — with most to fear from Russian revanchism — cut so deeply into defence budgets.
　　我一直不明白东欧新成立的民主政府为何如此大规模地削减国防预算，它们最有理由忧惧俄罗斯复仇主义。
　　Some Europeans presented a philosophical 13 justification 14 for the unequal contribution to Nato.
　　一些欧洲人为北约内部这种不平均的费用分摊提出了哲学上的理由。
　　Europe’s role after the collapse 15 of communism was that of a normative power, spreading liberal internationalism by example.
　　共产主义垮台后，欧洲扮演的角色是一个标杆大国，通过树立榜样传播自由国际主义。
　　As the sole superpower, the US could keep the peace.
　　作为全球唯一的超级大国，美国可以维持这种和平。
　　Seen from Washington this was never a good bargain.
　　从华盛顿的角度来看，这从来都不是一笔合算的买卖。
　　And, anyway, things have moved on from that glorious moment of innocence 16 when it was possible, just, to imagine a world order recast in Europe’s postmodern image.
　　此外，无论如何，形势已经发生变化，不再是那个刚刚可以想象一种按照后现代欧洲形象塑造的世界秩序的光荣时刻。
　　All this said, American altruism 17 has always been a myth.
　　话虽如此，美国的利他主义从始至终根本就不存在。
　　From the outset the US commitment to the alliance was rooted in self-interest.
　　美国对北约的承诺从一开始就根植于自身利益。
　　Roosevelt, Truman and the rest had weighed the cost of isolationism during the 1920s and 1930s.
　　罗斯福(Roosevelt)、杜鲁门(Truman)等领导人权衡了上世纪二、三十年代实行孤立主义的代价。
　　Nato was the first line of defence against the global, and anti-American, ambitions of Soviet 18 communism.
　　北约是抵御苏联共产主义全球（反美）野心的第一道防线。
　　Likewise, the postwar international economic architecture was drawn 19 to American specifications 20.
　　同样，战后的国际经济体系也是根据美国的意愿打造的。
　　A secure and prosperous Europe provided a rich market for US multinationals 21.
　　安全、繁荣的欧洲为美国跨国公司提供了广阔的市场。
　　American business was the big winner from an open international order.
　　美国企业是开放的国际秩序的大赢家。
　　The assumption was modified only slightly once the Berlin Wall came down.
　　柏林墙倒塌后，这种设定仅稍有调整。
　　The Atlantic alliance would at once entrench 22 democracy in the former communist states and spread the liberal Washington consensus 23 to rising states in the south and east.
　　这个跨大西洋联盟立刻在前共产主义国家巩固民主，并向南方和东方崛起的国家传播信奉自由主义的华盛顿共识。
　　The economic calculus 24 has changed during the past decade — mainly because China has been the biggest winner from the open trading system — but it is hard to find a significant US business that thinks America would benefit from a retreat into protectionism.
　　虽然过去十年全球经济格局已经改变——主要因为中国已成为开放贸易体系的最大赢家——但很难找到一家认为美国将从回归贸易保护主义中受益的重要美国企业。
　　It would not take much to upend the alliance.
　　拆散北约也不是很难。
　　Now, as during the cold war, Nato stands or falls on the credibility of the US commitment to defend its allies.
　　像冷战期间那样，如今北约的成败依然系于美国保卫盟友承诺的可信度上。
　　If Mr Trump shares the view of his friend Newt Gingrich that Estonia is little more than a suburb of St Petersburg the game is lost.
　　如果特朗普赞同友人纽特.金里奇(Newt Gingrich)的观点——爱沙尼亚不过是圣彼得堡的郊区——那这场博弈就输了。
　　No manner of increase in European defence budgets will sustain Nato deterrence 25 if Russia sees the US dumping the alliance’s Article 5 mutual 26 defence arrangements.
　　如果俄罗斯看到美国放弃北大西洋公约第五条关于共同防御的安排，无论欧洲国家如何增加国防预算都无法维持北约的威慑作用。
　　A part of Mr Trump may say: who cares? He can certainly find realists in the US and European foreign policy establishments who would turn over parts of the former Soviet space to a Russian sphere of influence.
　　特朗普内心有一个声音或许会说：管他呢？他一定可以在美欧外交政策建制派中，找到会听任俄罗斯把部分前苏联地区收入自己势力范围之内的现实主义者。
　　But the true realist question is what does the US get from Moscow in return? Not much beyond a damaging reputation as an unreliable ally.
　　但真正现实的问题是，美国能从莫斯科得到什么回报？除了留下不可靠的盟友的坏名声外，美国不会得到什么。
　　Beyond its economic interest in European stability — the EU may have its troubles but it is America’s richest overseas market — the US has much to lose from a break-up of the alliance.
　　不仅是欧洲的稳定关系到美国的经济利益（欧盟或许遭遇了麻烦，但仍是美国最富裕的海外市场），北约解体还将让美国损失更多。
　　You do not restore American power and prestige by ditching old friends.
　　抛弃了老朋友的美国是不会恢复实力和威望的。
　　Europe’s role during these past several decades has been to offer the US a stamp of international legitimacy 27 in the pursuit of its national interests.
　　欧洲过去几十年一直扮演为美国追求国家利益提供国际合法性证明的角色。
　　Some would say it has sold itself too cheaply.
　　有人会说，欧洲要价太低了。
　　As Wolfgang Ischinger, the chairman of the Munich Security Conference, wrote recently in The New York Times: Wherever Mr Trump looks, he will not find better partners to work with to secure America’s strategic interests.
　　慕尼黑安全会议(Munich Security Conference)主席沃尔夫冈.伊申格尔(Wolfgang Ischinger)最近在《纽约时报》(The New York Times)上撰文称：无论在哪儿，特朗普都找不到（比欧洲）更好的、保护美国战略利益的合作伙伴了。
　　So yes, Europeans should spend more on defence.
　　没错，欧洲应当在国防上投入更多。
　　As importantly, they need a strategy to confront the threat from Moscow and the chaos 28 on its southern borders.
　　同样重要的是，他们需要一项应对莫斯科的威胁以及南部边境外混乱局面的战略。
　　But no one should pretend that the US would be a winner were Mr Trump to rupture 29 permanently 30 one of the most successful alliances in history.
　　但如果特朗普永久瓦解这个历史上最成功的联盟之一的话，谁都不应假装美国会成为赢家。