15篇文章贯通六级词汇Unit09-Part2

[00:00.00]Thawing of the Cold War

[00:02.51]—the 1970's to 2001

[00:05.14]American Cold War policy ensued

[00:09.08]until the early 1970's,

[00:11.15]when some major changes

[00:12.58]in thinking were inaugurated.

[00:14.11]Communist China's entry to the United Nations

[00:16.95]was a setback 1 for the United States.

[00:19.47]The Vietnam War was not going well.

[00:22.07]In the early 70s, American President Nixon,

[00:26.56]the arch?conservative and anti-communist president,

[00:29.40]up to that point,

[00:31.48]was preparing to visit China

[00:32.79]and the Soviet 2 Union.

[00:33.88]Why would an American president visit these enemies?

[00:36.84]The Americans came to the realization 3

[00:39.46]that the development of good relations

[00:41.98]with its counterparts in the communist

[00:43.73]world was necessary.

[00:45.59]A forthcoming, more pragmatic approach to

[00:48.65]foreign policy with China was to be

[00:49.07]a departure from the adverse 4 ideological 5 approach.

[00:54.00]The United States had lost solid backing

[00:56.85]from traditional supporters,

[00:58.26]as illustrated 6 by Communist China's

[01:00.46]entry into the United Nations.

[01:02.21]The question as to whether

[01:04.61]Nationalist China or the People's Republic of China

[01:07.24]should hold China's permanent Security Council seat,

[01:10.41]was a topic of much discussion

[01:12.82]and debate for years.

[01:14.35]For many countries,

[01:16.21]the idea of ignoring

[01:17.74]one third of the world's population

[01:19.38]at the UN was difficult to rationalize.

[01:21.79]This debate ensued until 1971,

[01:25.62]when the People?s Republic of China

[01:28.02]finally displaced Nationalist China

[01:30.32]at the United Nations,

[01:31.64]including the permanent seat,

[01:33.16]originally held by Nationalist China

[01:35.35]in the Security Council.

[01:36.89]A baffled United States

[01:38.97]could no longer persuade nor

[01:40.93]intimidate the majority of the countries

[01:43.01]in the UN General Assembly to

[01:45.10]keep Communist China out of the UN.

[01:47.17]The United States had little choice

[01:49.69]but to eventually extend official recognition

[01:52.75]to the People?s Republic of China.

[01:54.61]The war-weary American people

[01:57.35]were no longer supporting the war

[01:59.31]in Vietnam and no longer eagerly supporting

[02:01.94]traditional foreign policy.

[02:03.69]A major scandal(Watergate),

[02:06.86]that would rock the Nixon Administration

[02:08.94]to the resultant resignation of the president,

[02:11.02]was about to be disclosed.

[02:12.66]Practical solutions were needed

[02:14.74]for practical problems.

[02:16.27]Peaceful coexistence meant

[02:18.79]finding some common ground

[02:20.54]on which to activate 7

[02:21.63]international trust and cooperation.

[02:23.82]Nixon's consecutive 8 predecessors 9,

[02:26.44]Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,

[02:28.97]and Johnson would have rolled over

[02:31.37]in their graves if they

[02:32.90]could have seen these changes.

[02:33.43]These changes would have appeared alien,

[02:36.39]contradictory or even contrived 10,

[02:38.68]to them and their contemporaries.

[02:40.87]Presidents Ford 11, Reagan, Bush,

[02:44.48]and Clinton saw the need to keep

[02:46.88]communication channels open with China.

[02:48.96]Americans finally realized that

[02:51.22]they could no longer

[02:52.54]keep down a sleeping giant.

[02:54.18]No longer a Paper Tiger,

[02:56.04]China was a reality,

[02:57.57]and was entitled to an important place

[02:59.97]in world decision?making venues 12.

[03:02.16]In the 1980's following the Cultural Revolution

[03:06.21]and the death of Mao Tsetung,

[03:08.40]China's outlook on the world changed dramatically.

[03:11.02]Deng Xiaopeng's reforms were

[03:13.65]to bring China closer to being

[03:15.07]a major world partner in international trade

[03:17.48]and the development of world markets.

[03:19.67]This was capped with its admission

[03:22.18]to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001.

[03:26.89]China has been most willing to comply

[03:29.51]with all of the regulations of the WTO.

[03:31.92]Americans have only

[03:33.78]half-heartedly opposed China's entry,

[03:35.42]by unfairly using “human rights”

[03:37.72]as a distraction 13 to perhaps disguise

[03:40.13]other international pressures.

[03:41.88]However, the United States,

[03:44.62]for a couple of decades,

[03:46.14]already had major, politically discreet 14,

[03:48.99]vested economic interests in China

[03:51.07]that it could not afford

[03:52.71]to deny or jeopardize 15.

[03:54.13]In 1998, China signed

[03:56.98]a Permanent Normal Trading Relations agreement

[03:59.71]with the United States,

[04:03.43]the prelude 16 to the former's entry into the WTO.

[04:03.97]President Clinton, who visited China in 1998,

[04:08.01]had essentially 17 paid lip service

[04:09.87]to Congressional pressure to push

[04:11.41]the human rights issues with China.

[04:13.15]Except for the occasional irritating crisis

[04:16.10]in recent years, such as

[04:17.86]the spy plane incident off the island

[04:19.61]of Hainan in April 2001,

[04:22.02]Sino-American relations have been cordial

[04:24.53]but cautious. The consensus 18 seems to be,

[04:27.38]that China's destiny as a major international force

[04:30.77]in the 21th century, seems reasonably assured.