经济学人07:西班牙及市场 Spain and the markets

 　　Finance and Economics；Spain and the markets；The Spanish patient；

　　财经；西班牙及市场；西班牙患者；
　　A full bail-out of the euro area's fourth-largest economy is looming 1；
　　对欧元区第四大经济体的全面纾困正在逼近；
　　If Spain were a patient, the mood in the hospital ward 2 would be tense. Every attempt by local specialists advised by renowned 3 European consultants 4 to treat the sickness brings no more than temporary relief. Even more worrying, the relapses after each dose are happening sooner and sooner. Spain's chances of avoiding intensive care—a full bail-out—are receding 5 to near vanishing-point.
　　如果西班牙是一名患者，那么在医院病房里的气氛是非常紧张的。由欧洲著名顾问建议，并由当地专家所实施的为治疗疾病所做的每个努力都只带来了短暂的缓解。更令人担忧的是，每次服药后病情的复发一次比一次提前。如此看来，西班牙想要避免重病特别护理——一次全面的纾困——的希望开始变得遥不可及。
　　The symptoms of Spanish sickness are manifest in ten-year government bond yields touching 6 7.75% on July 25th; previous bail-outs of Greece, Ireland and Portugal occurred not long after rates had surpassed 7%. Even more perturbing 7, two-year yields also briefly 8 went above 7%, in effect foreclosing the government's ability to borrow at anything but short maturities 9.
　　西班牙的症状主要表现为10年期的政府债券收益率在7月25日达到了7.75%；而先前对希腊，爱尔兰和葡萄牙的的纾困正是在债券收益率超过了7%后不久发生的。更令人感到不安的是，2年期的收益率也曾在短时期内突破了7%，这就实际上排除了政府有能力发行长期债券的可能而只能发行短期债券。
　　No isolation 10 ward is possible in the financially integrated euro area and Spain's sickness quickly infected other countries. The Italian ten-year bond yield went above 6.5%, its highest since January. European stockmarkets retreated and Italy's fell to a euro-era low. Sentiment was further soured by a report from Moody's, a ratings agency, saying that Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands might lose their cherished triple-A status. The prognosis was based in part on fears about the public-debt burden that northern countries might have to assume if bail-outs spread.
　　在金融一体化的欧元区是没有隔离病房的，于是西班牙的病情很快就感染了其它国家。意大利10年期的债券收益权超过了6.5%，为1月以来最高。欧洲股市回落，意大利股市降到了欧元区的最低点。一份来自穆迪公司——一家评级机构的报告说，德国、卢森堡和荷兰有可能会失去它们宝贵的AAA评级地位，这就使得股市更加敏感。这种预测部分是根据人们对于公共债务负担的恐惧——人们担心一旦纾困蔓延开来，北欧国家可能需要承担责任。
　　The market funk was the more troubling since a Spanish government with a lot going for it had appeared to be getting a grip. Public debt is rising fast, but at 69% of GDP last year was far lower than Italy's 120%—and less even than Germany's 81%. The budget deficit 11 is high (8.9% of GDP in 2011), but only a week before the market panic Mariano Rajoy, the prime minister, announced more tough austerity measures. And on July 20th European finance ministers sanctioned the first tranche of a partial bail-out worth up to EURO100 billion (Dollor121 billion) for Spanish banks.
　　由于仍需努力的西班牙政府似乎开始掌控局面，这种市场恐惧就更令人感到不安了。公共债务快速上升，但去年西班牙公共债务占GDP的69%这一比例远远低于意大利的120%——甚至还低于德国的81%。预算赤字居高不下（2011年占GDP的8.9%），但就在市场恐慌一周前，西班牙总理马里亚诺.拉霍伊还宣布了更多严厉的紧缩措施。7月20日，欧洲财政部长批准为西班牙银行提供价值1000亿欧元（1210亿美元）的第一批纾困资金。
　　So why are investors 12 in such a cold sweat about Spain? One reason is that Mr Rajoy flunked 13 hard choices at the outset, notably 14 the cleansing 15 of the banks. Despite a low starting-point for public debt, deficit overshoots have revealed insufficient 16 central control over the 17 regions that are responsible for a big chunk 17 of spending. Investors fret 18 that more regions may follow Valencia, which applied 19 for aid on July 20th. They are in any case sceptical that Spain can meet its targets for cutting the deficit in the teeth of a recession that is harsher than expected.
　　那为什么投资者对西班牙市场感到如此惶恐不安？原因之一是拉霍伊总理在一开始的艰难抉择中就失败了，尤其是在清理银行方面。尽管公共债务一开始很低，但赤字的快速上升表明了中央政府对17个地区的管理不足，这些地区占据了支出的很大一部分。巴伦西亚于7月20日申请了救助，而投资者担心会有更多的地区跟随巴伦西亚的步伐。他们怀疑西班牙能否面对超出想象的经济衰退，达成削减赤字的目标。
　　The biggest worry is Spain's external debt. Spain ran hefty current-account deficits 20 in the first decade of the euro. As a result, its liabilities to foreign investors exceeded the assets that its residents own abroad by 92% of GDP last year, among the highest in the euro area. The problem for Spain is that foreign capital has been fleeing over the past year. That has weakened the banks and the economy and left the Spanish government shunned 21 by foreign investors for its own financing needs.
　　人们最大的担忧是西班牙的外债。西班牙进入欧元区的第一个十年就背负了大量的往来账户赤字，其结果是去年西班牙的外债超过其居民在国外拥有的资产，其差额相当于GDP的92%，这位于欧元区前列。西班牙的问题是在过去的一年中，外国资本在不断外流，这就使得银行和经济情况不断恶化，并使得西班牙政府在融资方面吸引不了外国投资者。
　　The European summit in late June offered a flicker 22 of hope but it is guttering 23. Euro-area leaders agreed that the European Stability Mechanism 24 (ESM), their new permanent rescue fund, would be able to inject funds directly into banks rather than via loans to the government. That perked 25 markets up since it promised to sever 26 the link between weak banks and weak sovereigns. But before long the deal looked less solid: the ESM cannot come into force until September, when Germany's constitutional court will rule on its legality. Assuming it passes that test, the ESM cannot be used for direct bank recapitalisation until a European supervisor 27 is put in charge.
　　六月底的欧洲峰会为人们带来了一丝希望，但这个希望却正在逐渐破灭。欧元区领导人同意欧洲稳定机制（ESM）—— 新的永久救助基金，可以直接为各银行注入资金而无需通过政府。这个消息让市场振奋不已，因为它承诺断开脆弱的银行和脆弱的国家之间的联系。但没过多久这个协议便看起来不那么可靠：欧洲稳定机制直到九月才生效，到时德国宪法法庭会对其合法性进行裁决。即使这个机制通过了考验，在欧洲监督机构成立之前，它依然不能直接用来对银行进行资金重组。
　　Spain may yet be able to fend 28 off a bail-out for some time. It has some cash reserves and can still borrow at short maturities. The euro area also has its temporary rescue fund, which will lend the Spanish government the initial sum of money for the banks. But even if Spain survives a hot summer, the markets are signalling that it will need a full bail-out later this year.
　　西班牙可能仍可抵挡纾困计划一段时间，它还有一些现金并能发行短期债券。欧元区也有临时救助资金，它可以把首批贷款借给西班牙政府以对其银行进行重组。但即使西班牙能安然度过这个夏天，市场表明其在年底依然需要一次全面纾困。
　　That would be a nightmare, and not just for Spain. The Spanish government must borrow EURO385 billion until the end of 2014 to cover its budget deficit and other needs such as bond redemptions, according to economists 29 at Credit Suisse. Even if the IMF chips in a third as in previous bail-outs, European lenders would have to find EURO250 billion or so. They have already committed EURO100 billion to rescuing Spanish banks, so for other emergencies they would have only EURO150 billion of the EURO500 billion now in their rescue kitties.
　　这将是一场噩梦，不仅仅对于西班牙来说。瑞士信贷的经济学家们称，在2014年底之前，西班牙政府必须借入3850亿欧元来填补其预算赤字以及满足其它一些需要，如债务偿还。即使国际货币基金组织能和之前的纾困中一样提供三分之一救助资金，欧洲领导人也依然需要筹集2500亿欧元左右。他们已经承诺用1000亿欧元来拯救西班牙银行，那么一旦出现其它状况，5000亿欧元的救助资金中他们便只剩1500亿欧元来应对。
　　The course of events is eerily 30 similar to what happened a year ago. Then European leaders appeared to have secured their summer holidays with a “breakthrough” summit. But things soon fell apart. Nerves about Italy and Spain were calmed only when the European Central Bank (ECB) started buying their bonds. The central bank was never keen on this and it has not been buying bonds for several months. Even if the ECB were to resume purchases they might be less effective than before, because its refusal to share in the pain of the Greek debt restructuring in March frightened bondholders elsewhere.
　　事件的发展过程和去年的极为诡异地相似。欧洲领导人似乎以“突破性”的峰会保住了他们的暑期，但事情很快又分崩离析。只有在欧洲中央银行开始购买意大利和西班牙的债券后人们的紧张情绪才得以缓解。中央银行从未对此如此热情并且已多月未购买债券。但即使欧洲中央银行重新开始购买债券，效果也大不如从前了，因为3月份希腊债务进行重组时，欧洲中央银行拒绝承担其债务，这让其它国家的许多债券持有人感到恐慌。
　　The awkward truth is that the Spanish government is not alone in flunking 31 hard choices. The plight 32 of Spain and the danger of its sickness spreading to Italy call for a decisive countermove by Germany and the ECB. One being discussed would be to give the ESM a banking 33 licence, which would magnify its resources by allowing it to borrow from the central bank. The graver the euro crisis gets, the bigger the response has to be—and the harder it is to sell to sceptical northern electorates 34.
　　令人尴尬的事实是，西班牙政府并不是唯一一个在艰难抉择中不及格的政府，西班牙的困境及病情已扩散到意大利，这就需要德国和欧洲中央银行采取果断应对措施。已经讨论过的措施之一是给欧洲稳定机制发一个银行执照，允许它从中央银行贷款，从而扩大其资源。欧元危机一旦变得更加严重，所需做出的回应也更大—— 想要说服持怀疑态度的北欧选民也就更加困难。