经济学人02:操之过急的巴塞尔

 　　Finance and Economics;Bank capital;Half-cocked Basel;

　　财经;银行资本;操之过急的巴塞尔;
　　Stop-gap rules on banks' trading books may add perilous 1 complexity 2.
　　把银行交易帐户作为权宜之计可能增加了危险的复杂性。
　　The nnew year hangover throbbed 3 agonisingly for investment bankers this year. Blame Basel 2.5, a new set of international rules which charges banks higher capital for the risks they run in their trading books (as opposed to their banking 4 books, where they keep assets that they intend to hold to maturity). Those charges were too low before. And heaping higher costs on banks should please politicians and Joe Public. But they add another layer of complexity to banks' risk management.
　　今年，新年遗留问题沉闷地牵动了投资银行家的神经。这都得归咎于巴塞尔协议2.5版（以下简称巴塞尔2.5），这是一套新的国际规则，它针对银行交易帐户（与银行账户不同，在银行账户里他们打算持有资产至到期日）中操作的风险性资产收取更多费用。以前收取的费用太低了。银行成本累加应该会讨政治家和普通百姓的喜欢。但是他们给银行的风险管理增加了另外一层复杂性。
　　Basel 2.5 came into force on December 31st in most European and major world financial jurisdictions 5. Switzerland applied 6 the rules a year early, and the costs are substantial. Third-quarter figures for Credit Suisse show a 28% increase in risk-weighted assets, and hence capital charges, for its investment-banking activities purely 7 because of Basel 2.5.
　　12月31日，巴塞尔2.5在欧洲大部分地区和世界主要金融辖区开始实施。瑞士一年前贯彻了这一法规，成本很高。瑞士信贷第三季度数据显示风险加权资产增长了28%，因为巴塞尔2.5，今后资本费用仅仅是针对投行业务的。
　　The most notable laggard 8 is America. US financial regulators do not oppose Basel 2.5, but it clashes with the Dodd-Frank act, America's big wet blanket of a financial reform. Basel 2.5 uses credit ratings from recognised agencies such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's to calibrate 9 capital charges. Dodd-Frank expressly forbids the use of such ratings agencies, whose poor judgments 10 are held partly responsible for the crisis. Instead American regulators are working on their own cocktail 11 of credit-risk calibrations for Basel 2.5, using market data and country-risk ratings from the OECD. Their solution is still months away from application (though not as distant as implementation 12 by the Russians or Argentines).
　　最引人注意的拖延者是美国。美国金融监管机构并不反对巴塞尔2.5，但是巴塞尔2.5与美国大的金融监管改革法案《多德-弗兰克法案》却存在冲突。巴塞尔2.5使用的信誉评级从评级机构穆迪和标准普尔到校准资本收费。《多德-弗兰克法案》特别禁止了使用评级机构，他们匮乏的判断力对危机负有部分责任。而美国的校准人都忙于利用来自世界经济合作发展组织的市场数据和国家风险评级，应付他们自己在巴塞尔2.5下的信用风险校验。他们的方案距离实施仍有数月之久（虽然执行力不和俄国或者阿根廷一样虚幻）
　　Basel 2.5 for the first time charges banks extra capital for the credit risk of what they hold in their trading portfolio 13 (because the crisis showed that markets are not always liquid enough to be able to offload assets). That includes a charge for the risk that a counterparty goes bust 14. It also imposes heavy charges on securitised bundles of assets unless the credit risk of each piece of the bundle has an identifiable market price. Banks that have portfolios 15 of trading positions which they reckon offset 16 each other have to convince regulators that their risk models work or face being charged at a cruder, standardised rate.
　　巴塞尔2.5第一次针对于银行交易性资产的信贷风险收取额外费用（因为危机显示了市场并不是一直有足够流通性来剥离资产）。这包括了交易对象破产的风险。它也对资产证券化产品征收了高额的费用，除非产品包中每种资产的信贷风险有明确的市场标价。那些自己认为拥有彼此抵消投资组合的银行必须说服监管机构他们所使用或者面临的风险模型正在被以野蛮的、标准的费率收费。
　　The problem with Basel 2.5, recognised by regulators and bankers alike, is its complexity. The risk of a trading portfolio must now be broken down into five “buckets”—value at risk (VaR), a measure of how much could be lost in an average trading day; stressed VaR (how much could be lost in extreme conditions); plus three types of credit risk ranging from the risk of single credits to those of securitised loans. Traders are understandably confused. For some banks, developing risk models and getting them approved is just too expensive: more complex businesses will be shut down. That will please those who want banks to be more boring.
　　监管机构和银行家似乎承认了巴塞尔2.5 问题的复杂性。交易性资产的风险现在必须分解成五个“桶”：风险值（VAR），估计平均每个交易日的可能损失；极限风险值（极限状态下的可能损失）；再加上三个不同类别的信用风险值，从单个信贷风险到抵押贷款依次排列。交易员都觉得很困惑。对于一些银行而言，开发风险模型并获得通过成本太高了：更复杂的业务将被停止。这将使一些想让银行更加令人厌烦的人非常满意。
　　But unintended consequences will doubtless follow. Useful products may become less tradable. Trading of riskier 17 products could migrate to unregulated entities 18. Banks may be tempted 19 into new forms of regulatory arbitrage 20, by juggling 21 assets between their trading book and their banking book. Worst of all, perhaps, is the increased risk of back-office bungling 22 because of the extra complexity.
　　但是这无疑将招致意外的后果。实用的产品交易量会减少。风险产品的交易可能转移至不受监管的实体。银行可能会被交易账户和银行账户之间变换的资产诱惑，进入一套新的监管套利模式。最坏的情况可能是由于额外的复杂性造成的后台拙劣的工作风险增加 。
　　Regulators recognise this risk. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 23, which drew up the rules and is also responsible for the full Basel 3 regime that will come into force in 2019, is still conducting what it calls a “fundamental review” of capital rules for banks' trading books. Publication is not expected before March. Those sore heads will not soon clear.
　　监管部门认识到了这种风险。起草规则并负责2019年开始执行的全部的巴塞尔3的巴塞尔委员会银行监督机构，仍在指挥着他们称之为对银行交易账户的资金制度“基本审查”的行动。三月前是不会发行官方文件的。头疼的问题也一时不会被解决。