经济学人:印度的非银行金融 (1)

 　　CAN a big financial firm's credit rating fall from AAA one month—good enough for pension funds and life insurers—to junk the next without causing a crash? 一个大型金融公司的信用评级在一个月内从AAA—对养老基金和寿险公司而言足够好了—降至垃圾水平，还能不破产么？

　　India's government decided 1 it did not want to find out. Last week it granted Infrastructure 2 Leasing and Financial Services (IL&FS), 印度政府决定不想去弄清楚这个问题。上周印度政府给基础设施租赁和金融服务有限公司（IL&FS）
　　one of India's biggest shadow banks, a parachute. Plenty are worrying that it will not be enough. 这个印度最大的影子银行之一提供帮助。很多人担心政府的帮助还是不够。
　　As recently as early September, IL&FS raised few concerns. A couple of weeks later it had defaulted on several payments to creditors 3. 早在九月初，没什么人关注IL&FS。几周后，IL&FS拖欠了几位债权人的付款。
　　By the end of the month it had said it would raise 45bn rupees ($630m) of fresh capital through a rights issue from its owners, 截止月底，其表示公司所有者将配股筹集450亿卢比（6300万美元）新资金，
　　including the Life Insurance Corporation of India, a state-owned insurer. 公司所有者包括国有保险公司—印度人寿保险公司。
　　On October 1st the government forced out the board and appointed a new one. It was, in effect, a shadow-bank bail-out. 10月1日，政府迫使董事会辞职并任命了新的董事会。实际上，这是影子银行救市。
　　IL&FS is a very Indian beast. It was founded in 1987, with the support of state owned banks, to provide finance to local governments for infrastructure. IL&FS是一家非常印度式的强硬公司。在国有银行的支持下，该公司于1987年成立，为当地政府基础设施建设提供资金。
　　It has grown into a vast conglomerate 4, with 169 group companies. 该公司旗下有169家集团公司，已经成长为了一家大型企业集团 。
　　It finances, builds and runs everything from toll 5 roads to "smart cities", not just in India but abroad. 该公司资助、建立并运营一切事物，比如收费公路和“智能城市”，且不仅仅是在印度还在海外。
　　Though it is private, the projects it runs, and the roughly 40% of its equity 6 that is owned by nationalised firms, 虽然是私有企业，但它的运营项目及其约40%的股权都由国有公司所有，
　　make it what Indian analysts 7 call "quasi-sovereign". If it went bust 8, projects across the country would stall, leaving taxpayers 9 on the hook. 因此印度分析师称其为“半独立”。如果该公司破产，全国的项目将停滞不前，纳税人也会因此被套牢。
　　As India's state-owned banks have sought to repair their ropy balance-sheets, 当印度国有银行试图修复他们糟糕的资产负债表时，
　　IL&FS, which lends but does not take deposits, grew to satisfy demand for infrastructure finance. IL&FS这样有贷款却没有存款业务的公司已经成为了可以满足基础建设融资要求的公司了。
　　Its own debt nearly doubled from 2014 to 2018, to 910bn rupees. It used to borrow mainly from banks. 该公司的债务自2104年到2018年翻了一倍，至9100亿卢比。过去它主要从银行贷款。
　　Recently it has turned to the corporate-bond market. More than a third of its debt falls due within 12 months, up from a fifth a year ago. 近期，它已经开始转向企业债券市场。公司将在12个月内到期的债务量从一年前的五分之一增长为三分之一。
　　The problem is that most of its assets are long-term, illiquid projects. This year interest due overtook operating profit; hence the cash crunch 10. 问题是公司大部分资产都是长期的非现金项目。今年的到期利息超过了营业利润；因此出现了现金危机。