经济学人191:来自俄罗斯的援助 普京的公关部队

 　　Russia's aid convoy 1

　　来自俄罗斯的援助
　　Putin's PR coup 2
　　普京的“公关部队”
　　Russia offers to send aid to eastern Ukraine
　　俄罗斯表示愿意为乌克兰东部地区提供援助
　　HELP is on the way. Or so Russian state television declared on August 12th, as nearly 300 lorries with food, medicine and generators 3 set off from a base outside Moscow for the besieged 4 city of Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.
　　俄罗斯国家电视台8月12日宣布对乌的援助已经在路上了，接近300辆满载食物、药品以及发电设备的货运卡车已经从莫斯科外的基地出发，准备开往乌克兰东部去帮助卢甘斯克地区那些被围困的城市。
　　Confusion reigns 5 over what the lorries are carrying, and over how they will cross into Ukraine. As The Economist 6 went to press, the convoy was heading to Rostov, a Russian city close to the border. It is a measure of Ukrainian distrust of Russian machinations that an aid convoy should be widely suspected of being a Trojan horse for invasion.
　　但是人们一直对卡车上到底装载何物表示怀疑，同时也对他们如何穿过俄乌边境到达任务地区表示质疑。按经济学人的推测，护送车队的目的地将在靠近边境的俄罗斯城镇—罗斯托夫。因为乌克兰当局怀疑这是俄罗斯的诡计，并且这批援助车队极可能是为侵略做准备而送来的“特洛伊木马”。
　　普京.jpg
　　In March Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, sent columns of troops without insignia into Crimea while claiming only local pro-Russian volunteers were at large. Yet the aid convoy is unlikely to be cover for an invasion. Had Mr Putin decided 7 to invade, he would not have needed a stealth fleet of lorries—he has as many as 45,000 troops on the border. Russia does not have to hide arms in aid lorries to get them to its proxy 8 forces.
　　今年3月，当克里米亚地区公投声称亲俄选民占了大多数时，俄罗斯总统弗拉德·普京向该地区输送了一队没有官方标识的军队。不过，这一批的援助车队看上去不太可能是为了侵略打掩护。即使普京已经决定开始侵略行动，他也没必要将军队藏在货运卡车中——在俄乌边境上，他至少驻守了多达45，000人的军队。俄罗斯没必要使用这种偷偷摸摸的方式来运送它的武装力量。
　　Most likely the offer of Russian aid to Luhansk, a city wracked by fighting and left without water or power, is a clever push by Mr Putin to be seen at home to be doing something to protect civilians 10 in the east. Polling by the Levada Centre, a think-tank, shows public support for Russian military intervention 11 in Ukraine dropping from 40% to 26% between June and July, but support for non-military aid remains 12 high. Either the Russian supplies go through, making Mr Putin look the peacemaker, or they are blocked by Ukrainian forces, allowing Russia to appear the nobler party.
　　在普京看来，俄罗斯向被战乱和激进左翼分子围困的卢甘斯克地区提供援助，是他能够在克林姆林宫为保护俄罗斯身在该地区公民做的明智之举。由智囊团——内华达中心进行的调查显示，6到7月之间，公众们对于俄罗斯军事干预乌克兰事务的支持率从40%降低到了26%，但是对于提供非军事援助，人们一如既往地支持。不管是最后俄方的援助车队能穿过边境到达目的地，还是说虽然被乌克兰军队阻挡无法进入，但是允许俄方在一些高层聚会中有所作为的行为。
　　Mr Putin has taken advantage of a blind spot within the Ukrainian government and in the West: the mounting civilian 9 death toll 13 of the “anti-terrorist operation” in eastern Ukraine. On August 13th the UN reckoned that 2,086 people had been killed in the fighting, double the number from just two weeks ago. As Ukrainian forces recapture territory from pro-Russian rebels, their shelling often ends up striking civilian areas.
　　现在，普京已经牢牢抓住了乌政府的一项污点：根据8月13日的统计，在乌克兰东部“反恐行动”中死亡的公民数已经达到2086人，相比两周前，这个人数已经翻番了。因为乌克兰军队在从那些亲俄的反政府主义者手中重新夺得一些地区的控制权时，通常以进攻平民居住区收尾。
　　Yet the convoy carries the risk of escalating 14 tensions rather than bringing relief. Any fight at the border over the passage of the lorries into Ukraine could erupt into a wider clash presaging 15 Mr Putin calling in the troops. After months of Russia's backing anti-government rebels, suspicions in Kiev are high.
　　然而，援助车队不但不能让形势缓和，反而提高了冲突升级的危机。一旦这一路上发生任何战斗都可能带来更为巨大冲突，那时也预示着普京极有可能会呼唤军队的介入。并且，由于数月来俄罗斯对于反政府势力的暗中支持支持，基辅当局有理由高度怀疑俄罗斯的用心。
　　More probably, a break in the fighting to let the lorries in is part of a plan to slow down the pace of the Ukrainian advance, helping 16 to turn the war into a frozen conflict. That would suit Mr Putin fine. But, however deft 17 he may be at controlling the pictures on television, the events on the ground are harder to dictate 18.
　　更可能的是，这种暂停战事以让车队顺利到达卢甘斯克的行为只是拖缓乌克兰前进的计划的一部分，这将有助于将这场战争转入冻结状态。那样正和了普京的如意算盘。不过，无论如何，他可能也只能完全掌控电视画面所呈现的一切，战场上的一切都是未知数。