股东vs管理层:公司治理谁说了算?

 　　“Shareholders 2 are stupid and impertinent — stupid because they give their money to somebody else without any effective control over what this person is doing with it, and impertinent because they ask for a dividend 3 as a reward for their stupidity.”

　　“股东既愚蠢又无礼，说他们愚蠢是因为他们把自己的钱交给了其他人，却无法有效控制这个人怎么用这笔钱，说他们无礼是因为他们要求获得股息来回报自己的愚蠢。”
　　So said the banker Carl Fürstenberg, who ran the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft in the late 19th and early 20th century. His disdainful attitude to shareholders appears to live on today with many high-tech 4 entrepreneurs, including the founders 5 of Snap, the Californian company that runs the popular mobile messaging app Snapchat.
　　这是银行家卡尔?弗斯滕伯格(Carl Fürstenberg)说过的话，他曾在19世纪末和20世纪初执掌Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft。他对股东的鄙视态度似乎传承给了当今的很多高科技企业家，包括加州公司Snap创始人，该公司管理着颇受欢迎的移动消息应用Snapchat。
　　股东vs管理层:公司治理谁说了算?
　　Snap’s initial public offering will be the first in the US to issue shares with no voting rights at all. Co-founders Evan Spiegel, chief executive, and Bobby Murphy, chief technology officer, have been transparent 6 about their intentions, stating clearly in the prospectus 7 that it has no intention of paying cash dividends 8 for the foreseeable future.
　　Snap的首次公开发行(IPO)是美国首次发行毫无投票权的股票。该公司联合创始人——首席执行官艾文?斯皮格尔(Evan Spiegel)和首席技术官鲍比?墨菲(Bobby Murphy)——对于他们的意图并不隐晦，他们在招股说明书中明确表示，无意在可预见的未来支付现金股息。
　　Yet pricing of shares in the lossmaking company is expected to value it at up to $18.5bn, which was last week revised down in updated regulatory filings from $22.2bn.
　　然而预计这家亏损公司的估值将高达185亿美元，这一数字还是在最新监管申报文件中从222亿美元下修的。
　　By any standard Snap’s governance arrangements are flawed and its directors minimally 9 accountable. Anne Simpson, a leading governance expert at the California pension fund Calpers, dubs 10 this “a banana republic approach” to corporate 11 governance.
　　无论按照什么标准，Snap的治理安排都是存在缺陷的，其董事承担的责任微乎其微。加州公务员退休基金(CalPERS)的领先治理专家安妮?辛普森(Anne Simpson)称其为公司治理的“香蕉共和国战略”。
　　Yet the decision to prevent outside shareholders from exercising control rights over the company is also symptomatic of a deeper problem with modern corporate governance, as are the tiered voting structures that prevail at other tech companies such as Google, Facebook and Alibaba. Modern corporate governance practice sits uncomfortably with the business models employed in the more advanced sectors 13 of the global economy. Taken together with changes in the structure of ownership, this has drastically weakened the accountability of management to shareholders.
　　然而，阻止外部股东对公司行使控制权的决定，也显示出现代公司治理的更深层次问题，谷歌(Google)、Facebook和阿里巴巴(Alibaba)等其他科技公司普遍使用的分级投票结构也是如此。现代公司治理实践与这些全球经济中比较先进的行业采用的业务模式格格不入。再加上所有权结构的变化，这大大削弱了管理层对股东承担的责任。
　　Sharing the spoils
　　利益分享
　　The big question underlying 14 Snap’s challenge to conventional corporate governance turns on how the spoils of the capitalist system are shared. Today’s governance codes are rooted in a 19th century concept of the corporation, where the shareholder 1-capitalist is seen as the key stakeholder and risk-taker in the system. The implicit 15 assumption is that the shareholder is entitled to the residual 16 profits and net assets of the company after the claims of labour and all the other creditors 17 have been met.
　　Snap挑战传统公司治理的根本问题在于资本主义制度的利益如何分享。如今的治理规则植根于19世纪的公司概念：股东-资本家被视为这个制度的关键利益相关者和风险承担者。其隐含的假设是，股东在公司支付员工工资和对其他所有债权人履行偿还义务后，有权获得剩余利润和公司净资产。
　　This view of the limited liability company made sense in the 19th century, when capital was scarce and labour cheap and plentiful 18. That reality was captured in the way employers referred to their workers as “hands” — a form of linguistic 19 reductionism that reflected the state of labour relations at the time.
　　这种有限责任公司的观念在19世纪是合理的，当时资本短缺，而劳动力廉价而且充足。突显这一现实的是，当时雇主将员工称为“人手”，这种语言上的简化反映出那时的劳资关系状况。
　　The 19th century company law framework allowed the shareholder-capitalist to exercise exclusively the control rights over the business. Shareholders could vote at the annual general meeting on issues such as the election of directors, while other stakeholders could not. Whether this is appropriate today when the world is awash with savings 20 and finance capital is abundant — witness low or negative real interest rates in global bond markets — is moot 21. The real driver of high growth in the economy is increasingly human capital.
　　19世纪的公司法律框架允许股东-资本家对企业独家行使控制权。股东可以就董事选举等问题在年度股东大会上投票，而其他利益相关者不能。至于在如今全球储蓄充裕和金融资本富足（看看全球债券市场极低或处于负数区间的实际利率吧）的情况下，这种模式还是否合理，那是一个悬而未决的问题。但是人力资本日趋成为真正推动经济高增长的因素。
　　These highly skilled people are at much greater risk from the bankruptcy 22 of their employer than the fund managers or pension fund beneficiaries who hold investments in the company as part of widely diversified 23 portfolios 24. Yet pension fund trustees or professional fund managers, who tend to take a narrowly financial view of corporate performance, still retain the control rights in most quoted companies.
　　相比那些作为多元化投资组合的一部分投资于公司的基金经理或养老基金受益人，高技能人才面临着高得多的雇主破产风险。然而，往往对公司业绩抱有狭隘财务观点的养老基金受托人或职业基金经理，仍然保留着多数上市公司的控制权。
　　But in technology-intensive sectors the balance of power between owners of capital and entrepreneurs has swung dramatically toward the entrepreneurs. With companies like Facebook, flotation was not prompted by any need for new capital. The purpose has rather been to secure an exit for venture capitalists who backed the fledgling businesses. Going public also provides a currency with which to pay employees or finance future acquisitions.
　　但在技术密集型的行业，资本所有者与企业家之间的力量平衡已经戏剧性转向企业家。像Facebook这样的公司，上市并非出于筹集新资本的需要，而是让那些支持过这家新兴公司的风险资本家退出。上市还为支付员工薪酬或未来收购提供了一种货币。
　　Indeed, one of the reasons for excess global saving, which takes place in the corporate as well as the household sector 12, is the shift from physical to human capital in the modern economy. Brain power is not capital-intensive.
　　的确，全球储蓄过剩（既出现在企业界，也出现在家庭）的一个原因在于，现代经济的重心已从实物资本转向人力资本。聪明才智并不需要密集资本。
　　With younger tech companies like Snap, the purpose of flotation is different: fresh equity 25 fills the yawning gap between revenue and expenditure 26.
　　对于Snap这种较为年轻的科技公司，上市目的有所不同：新股本将填补收入与支出之间越来越大的缺口。
　　In the technology sector the issue of fairness between the different stakeholders in the corporation has been unilaterally resolved by founding entrepreneurs who have retained voting control despite bringing in outside capital — the prime examples being Sergey Brin and Larry Page, co-founders of Google.
　　在科技行业，公司内部不同利益相关者之间的公平问题迄今由创始企业家们单方面解决；尽管引入外部资本，但他们仍持有投票控制权，最好的例子是谷歌联合创始人谢尔盖?布林(Sergey Brin)和拉里?佩奇(Larry page)。
　　In some companies the human capital contribution of employees has been properly recognised by the grant of stock with votes attached; in others, not. There is also a significant risk that in a rapidly evolving tech world — where some listed companies never make a profit and others lose their competitive edge — incumbent 27 management cannot be fired to make way for new blood.
　　在一些公司，员工的人力资本投入得到了合理承认，他们获得了附带投票权的股票；而在其他公司则没有。另一个重大风险是，在快速演变的科技界（一些上市公司从未盈利，还有一些丧失了竞争优势），无法炒掉现有管理层，让新鲜血液接手。
　　Reluctant to engage
　　不愿接触
　　Poor management accountability in the tech sector coincides with another weakening of governance arising from changes in the structure of ownership. The number of investors 28 willing or able to monitor, engage and hold management to account is dwindling 29. High-profile activists 30 such as Carl Icahn, Jeffrey Ubben of ValueAct and Bill Ackman of Pershing Square capture headlines, but the wider universe of conventional investors engaging with investee 31 companies is going in a different direction.
　　在科技行业管理问责机制比较薄弱的同时，所有权结构的变化也导致治理削弱。愿意或能够监督、接触管理层，并追究其责任的投资者数量在减少。卡尔?伊卡恩(Carl Icahn)、ValueAct的杰弗里?乌本(Jeffrey Ubben)和Pershing Square 的比尔?阿克曼(Bill Ackman)等高调维权投资者抢占新闻头条，但从传统投资者整体来看，与被投资公司接触的人反而在减少。
　　Over the past half century, the structure of listed companies in most markets within the OECD, the Paris-based club of mostly rich nations, has moved from direct ownership to intermediary ownership by professional asset managers. In the UK, for example, direct individual ownership in listed companies decreased in the 50 years to 2014 from more than 50 per cent to just under 12 per cent. In the US, direct ownership has dropped from 84 per cent to 37 per cent.
　　过去半个世纪，在总部设在巴黎、主要由富国组成的经合组织(OECD)多数市场上市的公司，在所有权结构上已从直接所有转向专业资产管理公司的中间所有。例如，在英国，在截至2014年的50年里，个人直接持有的上市公司股份已从50%以上降至不到12%。在美国，直接所有的比重已从84%降至37%。
　　As Mats Isaksson and Serdar Celik of the OECD have pointed 32 out, the great majority of intermediary investors lack the financial incentive 33 to monitor and engage with managers. There is also a principal-agent problem: agents acting 34 for pension scheme members are reluctant to engage in activism in relation to companies from whom they hope to win or retain pension fund mandates 35. At the same time newer types of investors, such as high-frequency traders and hedge fund short sellers, have no interest in exercising ownership rights.
　　正如经合组织的马茨?伊萨克森(Mats Isaksson)和塞尔达尔?塞利克(Serdar Celik)所指出的，绝大多数中间投资者缺乏监督和接触管理者的财务激励。这里还存在一个委托代理关系的问题：代表养老金计划成员的代理，不愿投入与他们希望赢得或保留养老基金投资委托的公司相关的维权活动。与此同时，高频交易员和对冲基金卖空者等较新型投资者对于行使所有权毫无兴趣。
　　The difficulties of engaging are particularly acute for the growing band of passive investors, such as index tracking funds and exchange traded funds that own baskets of shares, bonds or commodities that are traded on exchanges. They operate in highly competitive, low-margin markets. Because of the cost of collecting and analysing information and engaging with management at large numbers of companies, many professional investors rely on the recommendations of proxy 36 advisers 37.
　　对于数量日益增多的被动投资者（例如指数跟踪基金和拥有一篮子在交易所交易的股票、债券或大宗商品的交易所交易基金(ETF)）而言，接触公司管理层的难度尤其大。它们在竞争激烈、利润率较低的市场运作。由于收集和分析信息以及接触公司管理层的成本高昂，很多专业投资者依赖代理顾问的建议。
　　“The business model and governance approach of many passive investors look incompatible 38 with the growing expectation on institutional investors to act as active, well-informed owners,” says Simon Wong, a leading corporate governance expert at Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago.
　　芝加哥西北大学法学院(Northwestern University School of Law)领先的公司治理专家Simon Wong表示：“很多被动投资者的业务模式和治理方法，看上去与外界日益期望机构投资者充当活跃、了解情况的所有者不符。”
　　The exception to the rule of slavish adherence 39 to the proxy advisers’ recommendations relates to conflicts of interest. Proxy Insight, a company that monitors the voting behaviour of investors, has examined voting by the top 10 global institutional investors and looked at the correlation 40 with the recommendations of ISS and Glass Lewis, the two biggest proxy advisers.
　　不听从代理顾问建议的例外情况涉及利益冲突。监督投资者投票行为的Proxy Insight考察了全球10大机构投资者的投票行为，研究它们与两大代理顾问——机构股东服务(ISS)和Glass Lewis——建议的相关性。
　　In 2016 these investors voted 90.3 per cent in line with ISS and 83.2 per cent in line with Glass Lewis on all recommendations. Yet on contentious 41 votes such as boardroom pay the respective percentages dropped to 51.4 per cent and 29.5 per cent. In other words, the fund managers supported company boards against the advice of ISS and especially Glass Lewis, which is more aggressive on egregious 42 pay awards. It is no coincidence that many fund managers have been attacked by proxy advisers for their own executive pay arrangements.
　　2016年，这些投资者的投票有90.3%与ISS的建议相符，有83.2%与Glass Lewis的建议相符。然而，在董事会薪资等备受争议的投票上，两者的比例分别降至51.4%和29.5%。换句话说，相对于ISS的建议，基金经理更支持公司董事会，忽视了ISS和Glass Lewis（特别是后者）的建议，这两大代理顾问对过分的薪酬态度更严厉。并非巧合的是，很多基金管理公司本身的高管薪资安排也受到代理顾问的抨击。
　　Restoring oversight 43
　　恢复监督
　　All of this points to a growing governance vacuum. The resulting weakness in accountability is exacerbated 44 by the growth of public sector investors such as sovereign wealth funds. With the notable exception of Norway’s fund, the world’s biggest, these secretive institutions are often reluctant to engage with companies in foreign jurisdictions 45 because they fear being accused of meddling 46 in other countries’ affairs.
　　所有这些都显示治理真空日益扩大，而由此造成的问责机制薄弱，则因为公共部门投资者（如主权财富基金）的增多而加剧。除全球最大的主权财富基金挪威主权财富基金外，这些行事隐秘的机构往往不愿接触海外司法管辖地的公司，生怕自己被指责插手他国事务。
　　An extreme example of public investment leading to a governance vacuum concerns the Bank of Japan’s quantitative 47 easing measures. The BoJ’s asset buying programme now extends to equities 48, which it is hoovering up at a rate of ￥6tn ($53bn) a year through purchases of ETFs.
　　公共投资导致治理真空的一个极端例子与日本央行(Bank of Japan)的量化宽松举措有关。日本央行的资产购买计划现在扩大到股票，它正以每年6万亿日元（合530亿美元）的规模通过购买ETF大举购入股票。
　　The central bank is thus a dominant 49 player in the Japanese stock market. Yet the voting rights to its shares are retained by the companies running the ETFs, which have no incentive to engage in costly 50 monitoring of corporate performance or to exercise their votes. The BoJ has thus diluted 51 oversight of the Japanese corporate sector, which is notorious for its lack of accountability to shareholders, while blunting the impetus 52 of the governance reforms pushed by Shinzo Abe, the prime minister.
　　因此，日本央行是日本股市的主要参与者。然而，这些股票的投票权由管理ETF的公司保留，而它们没有兴趣投入大量人力物力监督公司表现或行使投票权。因此，日本央行稀释了对日本企业界的监督（日本企业本来就以缺乏股东问责机制出名），也妨碍了日本首相安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)推动的治理改革努力。
　　Today’s corporate governance agenda in the Anglosphere and Japan is heavily oriented towards stewardship 54 by institutional investors. Yet insurance companies and pension funds — the natural long-term potential stewards 53 — have been retreating from the equity market while less governance-minded institutions such as public sector funds and passive funds take over. The Office for National Statistics said British insurers and pension funds owned 8.9 per cent of the domestic equity market in 2014 compared with 43.3 per cent in 1998.
　　如今，英语国家和日本的公司治理议程大大侧重于机构投资者的看管。然而，天然的长期潜在管家——保险公司和养老基金——正从股市退却，公共部门基金和被动型基金等治理意识较弱的机构正在补位。英国国家统计局(ONS)称，2014年，英国保险公司和养老基金占国内股市的8.9%，而1998年为43.3%。
　　This dwindling rump of conventional institutional investors is, in effect, acting as a Platonic 55 guardian 56 of the corporate sector while lacking the Greek philosopher’s wisdom — witness their inability to address the excesses of boardroom pay and their shortcomings before the financial crisis, where they connived 57 in excessive risk-taking and failed to constrain 58 chief executives at failing banks, most notably 59 Dick Fuld of Lehman Brothers and Fred Goodwin of RBS.
　　实际上，这些日渐式微的传统机构投资者正成为企业界的“柏拉图”式守护者，只是缺乏这位希腊哲学家的智慧，看看他们无力解决董事会薪资过高的问题，以及金融危机之前的缺陷吧，那时他们默许了过度的冒险行为，而且未能制约一些失败银行的首席执行官，最引人注目的是雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)的迪克?富尔德(Dick Fuld)和苏格兰皇家银行(RBS)的弗雷德?古德温(Fred Goodwin)。
　　Corporate governance is not yet a lost cause. Since Sir Adrian Cadbury’s committee produced its pioneering report in the UK in 1992, boards have become more professional. The ranks of shareholder activists are swelling 60, although many have a short-term focus. Conventional institutions are increasingly willing to oppose management on issues such as excessive pay.
　　然而，公司治理并非毫无希望。自从1992年阿德里安?卡德伯里爵士(Sir Adrian Cadbury)的委员会在英国发表那份开拓性的报告以来，董事会已变得更为专业。维权股东的行列在壮大，尽管很多人关注短线。传统机构越来越愿意在薪资过分等问题上反对管理层。
　　Yet in much of the world the system remains 61 overdependent on a shrinking band of shareholders whose willingness and ability to hold management to account is questionable 62 — or, as in the case of Snap, who are forcibly excluded from any stewardship role.
　　然而，在这个世界的很多地方，整个体制仍过于依赖一群日益减少的股东，而后者追究管理层责任的意愿和能力是带有问号的，或者就像在Snap的例子中，他们被排除在看管角色以外。