经济学人:噪音污染:嘘!小点声儿!

 　　Noise pollution

　　噪音污染
　　Shhhh!
　　嘘！小声点！
　　Why quiet carriages don’t work, and how they might be made to?
　　安静车厢的推广之途屡屡受挫。原因何在，如何改之？
　　QUIET carriages on trains are a nice idea: travellers voluntarily switch phones to silent, turn stereos off and keep chatter 1 to a minimum. In reality, there is usually at least one inane 2 babbler to break the silence.
　　在列车上设 “安静车厢”是个不错的想法：旅客们自觉将手机调成静音，关掉随身听，轻声地交谈。而在现实中，通常至少会蹦出一个无脑的大嘴巴打破车厢的宁静气氛。
　　A couple of problems prevent peaceful trips. First, there is a sorting problem: some passengers end up in the quiet carriage by accident and are not aware of the rules. Second, there is a commitment problem: noise is sometimes made by travellers who choose the quiet carriage but find an important call hard to ignore.
　　安静之旅基于以下一些原因无法实现。首先是车厢分类问题：一些乘客阴差阳错的坐到了安静车厢，而没有留意乘车守则。其次是乘车义务问题：选择就坐安静车厢的乘客在途中接到一通无法忽视的重要电话，无奈之下发出了声响。
　　The train operators are trying to find answers. Trains in Queensland Australia, are having permanent signs added to show exactly what is expected; a British operator has invested in signal-jamming technology to prevent phone calls. Microeconomics suggests another approach: putting a price on noise.
　　列车运营商正试图找寻解决之道。 澳大利亚昆士兰州的火车里常设标识，提醒乘客遵守乘车守则；英国的一家列车运营商引用信号干扰技术来避免电话骚扰。而微观经济学则提出了另一种方法——金钱同噪音挂钩。
　　Fining people for making a din 3 would surely dissuade 4 the polluter and is a neat solution in theory, but it requires costly 5 monitoring and enforcement. Another tack 6 would be to use prices to separate quiet and noisy passengers—in effect, creating a market for silence. A simple idea would be to sell access to the quiet carriage as an optional extra when the ticket is bought. Making the quiet coach both an active choice and a costly one would dissuade many of those who do not value a peaceful ride.
　　开噪音罚单肯定会减少噪声污染者，并且从理论上讲乃一剂良方，但此方案需耗费大量监管和执行费。另一种方案是从票价上区分喜静的和喜闹的乘客，实际上是开辟“花钱买清静”的交易。一种简单的区分方法是，售票时提供安静车厢选项，乘客可选择支付额外费用在安静区就坐。如此一来，“安静座位”不仅可由乘客主动选择，高票价还可将大量不珍惜安静旅途的人拒之门外。
　　Charging may also solve the commitment problem. This is particularly tricky 7, as attitudes to noise can change during the journey. Some passengers would pay the quiet premium 8 but still chatter away when some vital news arrives. Schemes that reward the silent—a ratings system among fellow passengers, for example—could help. The idea is that losing your hard-won reputation offsets 9 the short-term gain from using the phone. But such a system also fails the simplicity 10 test.
　　收费也有可能解决义务问题。乘客对待噪音的态度在旅途中或多或少会有所改变，这就使得义务问题变得尤为复杂——有些乘客虽然愿意额外花钱到安静车厢就坐，而在看到某些重要新闻时，仍旧按耐不住自己开始喋喋不休。旨在奖励安静乘车旅客的奖励计划或大有裨益。例如，同车乘客打分系统，理念是以来之不易的声誉换取接电话来带的片刻享受。但该系统也不会通过易用性测试。
　　A 2010 book by George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton argues that “norms”—feelings about how everyone should behave—also play a role in decision-making. Charging a price, even if just a token amount, means the quiet carriage becomes a service that fellow passengers have bought, not just a preference they have expressed. Perhaps different norms would come into play, encouraging calm. If not, a personal bubble is always an option: noise-cancelling headphones start at around $50.
　　乔治·阿克尔洛夫和瑞秋·克拉顿在2010年出版的一书中认为，人类对个体该如何行止的感觉就是“行为规范”，这种规范也影响决策过程。即便是象征性收取少量金额，单凭收费这一行为，就意味着安静车厢不再是同行乘客的偏好之选，而是他们所购买的一项服务。或许在鼓励人们保持车厢安静时，应该引入不同的行为规范。若此方案也行不通，那么在列车上出售$50起价的降噪耳机，创造“个人空间”总是不二之选。