经济学人41:不明的财源 模糊的数字

 　　Finance and Economics；The euro zone's rescue fund; Funny money, fuzzy maths;

　　财经；欧元区救助基金；不明的财源，模糊的数字；
　　The IMF's coffers are fuller, but the euro zone's “firewall” is still flimsy;
　　IMF金库充盈，欧元防火墙依旧薄弱；
　　Christine Lagarde, the IMF's managing director, boasted of a “Washington moment”. At its spring meetings in theAmerican capital this month, the fund saw its lending power almost double,thanks to the promise of 430 billion dollar in loans from more than a score of itsmembers. The official goal is to boost a “global firewall” against crisis. Theunofficial hope is that a fatter IMF will help ease fears about the euro, bybolstering the 700 billion euro(925 billion dollar) that euro-zone economies havepledged in their own rescue funds.
　　IMF总裁克丽丝汀·拉嘉德女士骄傲地宣称“华盛顿时刻”已经实现。IMF春季会议于本月在华盛顿召开，20多个成员国的注资承诺使IMF可贷资金规模几乎扩大一倍，增加4300亿美元以上。IMF的官方目标是推动建立“全球防火墙”以摆脱经济危机。私下则希望一个资金充足的IMF可以通过扩从欧元区救助基金来缓和欧洲的恐慌情绪，目前该基金放贷规模已达到7000亿欧元（约合9250亿美元）。
　　Europeans often simplyadd the two numbers together, implying there is now a vast 1.4 trillion dollar stash 1.Not so. Look behind the fat figures and you find a lot of fuzzy maths andwishful thinking—just as worsening news in Spain brings talk of that countryneeding a rescue (see article).
　　欧洲人总是简单地将这两项金额相加，认为现在欧洲拥有高达1.4万亿的储备资金。事实并非如此。重新审视这个巨额数字，我们会发现大量模糊的数字和一厢情愿的想法——看看西班牙就明白了，不断恶化的局势下，人们纷纷讨论政府是否需要外部救助。
　　Start with the IMF. Assuming countries make good ontheir pledges, the money itself is real. The biggest collectivecontribution will come from the euro-zone countries, which have promised tolend the fund 200 billion dollar between them. Japan is the biggest single donor 2, with a 60billion dollar pledge motivated partly by a desire not to be eclipsed by China, partlyby fears about its own economic vulnerability. Big emerging economies, such as China, Russiaand Brazil,agreed to chip in. Their contribution, and that of others such as Britain, will be contingent 3 on reforms to thefund's governance, which reduce Europe's cloutand increase that of emerging economies. (America, notably 4, did notcontribute.)
　　我们从IMF开始分析 。假如注资国家兑现他们的承诺，资金可以到位。那么最大的捐赠团体为欧元区国家，他们允诺向IMF注资2000亿欧元；而日本以高达600亿美元的注资抢得头彩，之所以如此大方，一方面是日本不想被中国的光芒所掩盖，另一方面也表现出对其国内经济脆弱性的担忧。像中国、俄罗斯和巴西这样的新兴经济体也表示了捐助意愿。这些国家（包括英国等国）的注资金额将视IMF的治理改革情况而定，他们希望提升自己在IMF的份额和影响力。值得注意的是，美国表示不会增资IMF。
　　Barring a big fight over its governance, the fund should be flushersoon. But no one wants to write a blank cheque forthe rich euro zone. Canada(which itself did not contribute) called for a double lock: future IMF lendingto the euro zone would need to be approved by a vote among non-Europeanmembers. That probably will not happen, but the fund, at best, will be aminority contributor to future rescues.
　　若果不因治理方式改革而引起成员国的纷争，IMF的钱包将很快鼓起来。可是没有哪个国家愿意给富裕的欧元区开出空白支票。加拿大（已经表示拒绝注资）呼吁建立双保险机制：未来IMF向欧元区借款应该取得非欧洲成员国的同意。这难以实现，但至少会使IMF不会充当未来救助工作的“冤大头
　　So the big bucks 5 will have to come from Europe'sown rescue funds. And they are scantier 6 than they seem. Both the EFSF (theexisting rescue facility) and the ESM (a new permanent fund) need to raiseresources by issuing debt. The EFSF backs its bonds withguarantees from the dwindling 7 number of AAA-rated governments; the ESM willhave some paid-in capital. But both could find it hard to raise the large sumsthat might be required for, say, a swift bank recapitalisation in Spain.
　　由此看出，这一大笔钱只能由欧元区自己的救助基金出，而这些救助基金比我们想象的更缺钱。欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF，一个已经存在的救助基金）和欧洲稳定机制（ESM，一个新成立的永久性基金）都只能通过发行债券来募集资金。EFSF依靠信用评级为AAA级别的国家的担保来支持债券发行，可是欧元区拥有AAA信用评级的国家越来越少；而ESM将会拥有一些实收资本。可是，这两个基金在面对巨额资金需求时（比如西班牙面临的银行资本迅速重整）都显得力不从心。
　　So speculation 8 is growing that the funds would not bother withhard cash. One idea is for Spainto have a system-wide asset-protection scheme, where the banks' toxic 9 assetswould be insured by euro-zone guarantees. Another is for the rescue funds toissue bonds to Spain'sown bank-rescue fund, just as the EFSF gave Greek bondholders a bond instead ofcash as part of that country's debt restructuring.
　　越来越多人猜测这些基金并不用为现金烦恼。一种办法是，西班牙应当建立系统范围的资产保护机制，在该机制下欧元区可为银行不良资产提供担保。另一种办法是，由救助基金直接向西班牙的银行救助基金发行债券，正如EFSF向希腊政府债券持有者出售新的债券而不是用现金清偿债务，这也是希腊债务重组的一部分。
　　Another problem is that both the IMF and ESM are considered“preferred creditors”, which means any borrowing from them is first in line forrepayment. If rescue money is sent to the Spanish government to prop 10 up itsbanks, those same banks' holdings of government bonds may be worth less. A bigrescue could actually end up reducing confidence. The newly thickened firewallis less solid than it appears.
　　还有一个问题就是IMF和ESM都被看做是优先债权人，这意味着这意味着任何从他们那里得到的借款都必须优先偿还。如果将救助金注入西班牙政府救来帮助其支撑本国银行，其他银行持有的政府债券很可能贬值。大规模的救助行动很可能最终以削弱市场信心告终。这道新加固的欧洲防火墙并不像看上去那样坚固。