经济学人119:游击战的历史 以弱胜强之道

 　　Books and arts

　　文艺
　　A history of guerrilla warfare 1
　　游击战的历史
　　How the weak vanquish 2 the strong
　　以弱胜强之道
　　Fighting an insurgency 3 requires patience, restraint and a good public-relations strategy
　　平定叛乱需要耐心，克制和良好的战略公关
　　Invisible Armies: An Epic 4 History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present.
　　《看不见的军队》:一部述说古今游击战的史诗。
　　By Max Boot. Liveright; 750 pages; $35.
　　作者:Max Boot. Liveright；750页，定价35美元。
　　To be published in Britain in February by W.W. Norton; 25.
　　W.W. Norton将于2月份在英国出版；定价25英镑。
　　Buy from Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk
　　可以在英国亚马逊网上书城购买。
　　LIKE the poor, guerrilla armies have, it seems, always been with us.
　　游击队就像穷人一样，似乎一直都伴随在我们左右。
　　From the nomadic 5 rebels who brought down the Roman empire to the internet-savvy, plane-exploding jihadists who triggered America's ill-conceived global war on terror, irregular forces are a constant factor in the history of warfare.
　　游牧叛乱武装打垮了罗马帝国；互联网专家，爆炸飞机的圣战分子使美国开启了思谋不周的全球反恐战争，非正规部队是战争历史中的一个永恒元素。
　　游击战.jpg
　　And fighting them has become tougher than ever.
　　现在对付游击武装比以往更棘手。
　　Plenty of literature gives advice on how to beat such maddening foes 6.
　　很多文献给都教你如何击败这些令人发狂的敌人。
　　Max Boot, a neoconservative American military historian, has done something different.
　　属于新保守派的美国军事历史学家Max Boot做了一些不同的工作，
　　Invisible Armies is a narrative 7 history of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, ranging from what he describes as its origins, in bringing down the Akkadian empire in Mesopotamia in the 22nd century BC, to the present day.
　　《看不见的军队》叙述了从古至今的游击战和恐怖行动。他认为这种战争起源于公元前22世纪，美索不达米亚的阿卡德帝国就是被游击战摧毁的。
　　The author moves quite quickly over the first 4,000 years or so and only really gets going in the 18th century, with its revolutionary wars of independence.
　　作者很快讲完了前4000年的历史，从18世纪的独立革命战争切入，这大概是真正游击战的发端。
　　Among the many liberal insurgencies he considers are the American revolution; the struggle against Napoleon in the Iberian peninsula; Greece's war for independence against the Ottomans; the wars of unification in Italy and various uprisings against colonial powers, such as the slave revolt against the French that led to the foundation of the Republic of Haiti.
　　在很多自由起义中，他思考了美国革命，伊比利亚半岛反对拿破仑的斗争，希腊人反抗奥斯曼人独立战争，意大利统一之战以及各种反抗殖民势力的起义，如反抗法国的奴隶起义引发了海地共和国的成立。
　　In the 20th century Mr Boot examines the impact of irregular forces in the two world wars; the contribution to insurgent 8 theory of Mao Zedong's seminal 9 work On Guerrilla Warfare, gleaned 10 from his experiences in the Chinese civil war; the very different French and British responses to rebellions against their fading empires; the radical 11 chic 12 revolutionaries of the 1960s and the rise of radical Islamism.
　　Boot先生仔细观察了非正规部队对20世纪两次世界大战的影响；毛泽东那部给起义理论做出贡献的有开创性的著作《论游击战》，这是他从中国内战中收获的经验，不同于逐渐衰落的英法帝国处理叛乱事件；上世纪60年代激进派时髦的革命和极端伊斯兰分子的叛乱。
　　If this sounds a bit like a list, it is because of the way the book is organised. Mr Boot picks a theme, for example, The End of Empire, and then hoovers up into that section all the conflicts that can be made to fit that description.
　　上面的内容有点像开列清单，因为这是本书的组织方式，Boot先生选择一个主题，例如帝国的终结，然后把所有符合主题的斗争收录到这个部分。
　　Each one gets a few pages of lively narrative and a brief analysis of why one side prevailed over the other.
　　每个主题都占据几页篇幅，叙述的很生动，并且简要地分析了一方为何能战胜另一方。
　　The formula works rather well. Even when the author is rattling 13 through fairly familiar territory, such as the failures of the French against the Vietminh, he usually finds something fresh or pithy 14 to say.
　　这种方式的效果很好。即使述说大家熟悉的事情，作者也能讲出点新鲜东西和独到见解。
　　Take, for example, Vo Nguyen Giap, the brilliant Communist general who succeeded in expelling first the French and then the Americans from Vietnam.
　　例如杰出的共产党将领武元甲成功地把法国人和美国人先后赶出越南。
　　Giap closely followed the teachings of Mao in planning a three-stage struggle,first localised guerrilla war, then war of movement and finally general uprising,which he waged with a three-tier force of village militias 15, full-time 16 guerrillas and a regular army.
　　武元甲密切遵循毛泽东的教导，制定了一个包含三个阶段的斗争—先是局部的游击战，接着实施运动战，最后发动大起义 —他投入了三种力量:民兵、专职游击队和正规军。
　　But where Mao was always cautious to avoid confrontations 17 with more powerful forces, Giap's tendency to roll the dice 18 on premature 19 offensives in 1951, 1968 and again in 1972 could have proved fatal each time had it not been for the psychological and political frailties 20 of the other side.
　　毛泽东总是谨慎地避免和更强大的力量发生对抗，但是武元甲愿意为过早攻击孤注一掷。1951年，1968年和接下来的1972年他都用了这种方法，要不是对方存在着心理上和政策上的弱点，这三次作战就不会造成致命的影响。
　　In guerrilla warfare, what matters most is the ability to shape the story, not the facts on the ground.
　　在游击战中，最重要的是推动战争向前发展的能力，而非战场上的实际情况。
　　This is how guerrillas are able to win wars even as they lose battles.
　　这就是游击队即使战斗失利的情况下仍然能够赢得战争。
　　Because insurgencies pit the weak against the strong, most still end up failing.
　　因为这些起义以弱势抗强敌，大部分还是以失败告终。
　　Between 1775 and 1945 only about a quarter achieved most or all of their aims.
　　Boot先生说，从1775年至1945年，只有四分之一的起义完成了自己的大部分或全部目标。
　　But since 1945 that number has risen to 40%, according to Mr Boot.
　　但是自1945年以来，成功率增长到了40%。
　　Part of the reason for the improving success rate is the rising importance of public opinion.
　　成功率的提高部分原因是公众舆论的重要性日益突出。
　　Since 1945 the spread of democracy, education, mass media and the concept of international law have all conspired 21,
　　自1945年以来，民主、教育、大众媒体和国际公法的概念得到推广，
　　to sap the will of states engaged in protracted 22 counter-insurgencies.
　　这都削弱了应对长期叛乱的国家意志。
　　In the battle over the narrative, insurgents 23 have many more weapons at their disposal than before.
　　战斗过程中，可供叛乱分子使用的武器比以前多得多。
　　Mr Boot does not conclude that counter-insurgency in the 21st century is a losing game.
　　Boot先生没有推断在21世纪镇压叛乱是徒劳之举。
　　But to prevail requires an understanding of the game's rules.
　　然而获胜之前要理解游戏的规则。
　　He is a powerful advocate for the so-called population-centric approach pioneered by the British during the 12-year post-war Malayan Emergency, which lasted until 1960, and rediscovered by American generals,such as David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal in Iraq and Afghanistan,only after things there had gone disastrously 24 wrong.
　　他极力鼓吹所谓以民众为中心的方法，这是战后英国在应对马来亚12年危机时倡导的理论，美军将领如分别在伊拉克和阿富汗的局势,严重恶化之后对此做出重新发现。
　　The first principle is to abandon conventional military tactics.
　　第一原则是放弃常规战术。
　　Clear and hold beats search and destroy.
　　清除和控制胜过搜寻和破坏。
　　To defeat an insurgency you must provide enough security for ordinary people to live their lives.
　　要平息叛乱，必须给普通民众的生活提供充足的安全保障。
　　The second is that legitimacy 25 is vital for both sides: corrupt 26 or excessively violent governments will always struggle,
　　第二合法性对双方来说都是重要的:腐败或过于暴力的政府一直会引发斗争，
　　but so too will guerrillas who terrorise their own people.
　　但是游击队也会威胁本国人民。
　　The third is staying power.
　　第三是耐力。
　　Firepower is no substitute for patience and boots on the ground.
　　在战场上火力不能取代忍耐力和士气。
　　The people you need on your side must believe that you are in it for the long haul.
　　必须要让你争取的民众相信你会长期和他们在一起。
　　The fourth is that most counter-insurgency campaigns abroad are lost at home.
　　第四大部分在海外开展的镇压叛乱的战斗都输在国内。
　　Liberal democracies have short attention spans, low tolerance 27 for casualties and other calls on their cash.
　　自由主义的民主国家对于需要花钱的重大伤亡事故和其他征召不大关注，容忍度也不高。
　　Unless voters believe that an intervention 28 is necessary for their own security they will quickly withdraw support for it.
　　除非选民认为有必要采取干涉措施才能保障自身的安全，否则他们会很快放弃对这种行动的支持。
　　All of which explains why things are not going well in Afghanistan.
　　以上情况都可以解释为什么阿富汗的事情进展不顺。
　　The population-centric approach—and the troop surge needed to realise it came late in the day and with a foolishly rigid 29 deadline.
　　实行以民众为中心的方法和增加部队都来的太晚，而且愚蠢地附带着严格的时限。
　　The Afghan government has some popular legitimacy, but not enough in the places where the insurgency is resilient.
　　阿富汗政府在一定程度上拥有广泛的合法性，但是在叛乱行动回弹的地方该政府的合法性还是不足。
　　Nor has it been possible for American forces to deny the Taliban their sanctuary 30 in Pakistan: insurgencies with outside support are much harder to beat.
　　美国人不可能容忍塔利班在巴基斯坦避难:得到外部支持的叛乱更加难以平息。
　　Voters in America and Europe are not prepared to spend any more blood or money on what most presume is a lost cause.
　　美国和欧洲的选民还不想在大部分人看来要注定失败的行动上流更多的血，花更多的钱。
　　Few think that what happens in Afghanistan will affect their own safety.
　　几乎没有人意识到发生在阿富汗的事情会影响到自己的安全。
　　Counter-insurgency may be out of fashion again, but it remains 31 necessary to know how to do it.
　　镇压叛乱可能又过时了。但是我们还需要如何应对叛乱。
　　Mr Boot offers a timely reminder 32 to politicians and generals of the hard-earned lessons of history.
　　Boot先生及时地向军政要人提醒了这个得来不易的历史教训。
　　1.bring down 降；抬下
　　Family workers bring down costs.
　　家庭工人降低了成本。
　　But the kingdom has recently taken steps to bring down prices, consulting refiners and offering extra oil.
　　但沙特最近已采取措施以压低油价，与炼油厂磋商，提出可供应额外石油。
　　2.lead to 导致,引起
　　Osteoporosis may also lead to tooth loss.
　　骨质疏松可能会导致牙齿脱落。
　　Salary differences between countries can lead to resentment 33.
　　不同国家间的薪酬差异会引起相互的敌视。
　　3.hoover up 吸纳
　　Hsbc mexico was well-placed to hoover up those dollars.
　　汇丰墨西哥分行在吸纳这些资金方面处于有利地位。
　　They will hoover up bonds, whatever their rating.
　　无论评级如何，他们都会吸纳债券。
　　4.succeed in 取得成功
　　Outsiders seldom succeed in turning around a luxury brand.
　　局外人很少成功使得某一奢侈品牌成功脱困。
　　May you succeed in the coming new year!
　　祝你在新的一年里取得成功！