经济学人33:山姆大叔请留步 Please don’t go

 　　Books and Arts; American foreign policy;Please don't go;

　　文艺；华府外交政策;山姆大叔请留步;
　　A handful of books convey a mix of optimism and fear;
　　几本书，乐观与恐惧杂陈;
　　America is irrepressible. Even authors fixated on its decline are optimists 1 in disguise. Times may be hard and the world order is changing, but America has what it takes to bounce back, according to five new books on foreign policy. Indeed, it has to bounce back, because no successor stands ready to shoulder these responsibilities.
　　美国的地位无法撼动。每位宣扬美国没落的作者骨子里都是乐观主义者。时代艰难，世界秩序更迭交替，但美国依然可重振威风，美国政策的这五本书娓娓道来。实际上，美国一定会恢复，因为未有后继者准备担当美国重任。
　　In “The World America Made” Robert Kagan, a prominent neoconservative, argues that the liberal order America created after the second world war may not endure if America loses the power or will to defend it. As hegemons go, America has been exceptional. Democracy has spread under its watch, and its geographical 2 isolation 3 has made the world surprisingly accepting of its use of force. No combination of nations has felt the need to join together to counter America's power, leaving it free to perform vital tasks in the common good, such as keeping open trading routes.
　　著名的新保守主义者罗伯特·卡根（Robert Kagan）的《美国塑造的世界》一书提出，二战后美国创造的自由秩序有可能因为美国失去捍卫的力量或意愿而无以为继。随着世界霸主的消逝，美国无可匹敌。在美国的捍卫下，民主得以发展，地缘的独立令世界甘愿接受其使用武力。没有国家感觉有必要联合一致共同挑战美国的大国地位，反而任其自由担当重要任务捍卫共同利益，例如保持贸易航线通畅。
　　To those who believe that a multipolar world could be at least as peaceful as the one dominated by America, Mr Kagan says history proves otherwise. Rules rarely outlast 5 the powers that created them. Nations go to war when they are “in doubt about which is stronger,” he writes. The world is more stable when one nation dominates, especially when it is a nation like America.
　　对于相信多极世界至少会像由美国主导的单极世界一样保持和平的人，卡根先生说，历史证明恰恰相反。规则无法抵得上创造规则的权力有效。国家彼此间“踌躇谁最强悍”时，即会以战争一决雌雄。一国主导的世界更加稳定，尤其是由像美国这样的国家主导。
　　It is therefore fortunate, Mr Kagan concludes, that most talk about America's decline is overblown. The country has passed through such moods before, during the trauma 6 of Vietnam in the 1970s, for example, and then again in the 1980s during Japan's breakneck ascent 7 as an industrial power. And yet it bounced back. Although past success does not guarantee future triumph, the American system, with its relative freedom, is uniquely capable of recovering and adapting. The danger will come only if Americans believe they can put their global responsibilities on hold while they set their own house in order.
　　故而所幸卡根先生得出结论：多数声称美国没落的说法都是言过其实。这个国家之前已历经这样的悲观情绪，例如上世纪七十年代在越南遭受重创，之后八十年代又经历日本作为一只工业力量快速崛起。然而数次还是恢复实力。尽管以往的成功并不能保证未来的胜利，美国的政治体系，以其相对的自由度，完全可以从低迷中恢复、适应。要是美国觉得，整顿国内事务之时，可暂且搁置国际责任，那么灾难将在所难逃。
　　Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's national security adviser 8, is equally certain that a vigorous and powerful America is indispensable. But he shows more doubt in his new book, “Strategic Vision”. He contends that America must wrestle 9 down its own debt, steady its financial system, reduce inequality, rebuild its infrastructure 10 and fix its gridlocked politics. Abroad, it must promote and guarantee an expanded West (embracing Russia and Turkey) and balance the great powers of Asia.
　　前总统吉米·卡特的国家安全顾问兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基同样同意，强大的美国必不可少。但他在自己的新书《战略眼光》中表露出更多的担忧。他坚称美国必须极力摆脱债务，稳定金融体系，减少社会不平等，重建基础设施并稳固僵持的政治。对外方针，其必须推进、保证扩展西方势力，并平衡亚洲各大国家。
　　Like Mr Kagan, Mr Brzezinski does not believe America's decline is foreordained. Its economy is still relatively 11 vast, its population wealthy and young, its businesses and universities innovative 12. But if decline is not inevitable 13, nor is resurgence 14. He states that America is in danger of sliding into “systemic obsolescence”, caused by political stalemate at home and misguided engagement abroad in “lonely and draining campaigns” against sometimes “self-generated” enemies, such as Iraq.
　　与卡根先生一样，兹比格涅夫先生不相信美国的没落命中注定。其经济规模仍旧相对巨大，人口富裕，偏于年轻，企业与大学富有创新精神。但是，如果衰落并非注定发生，重振威风也不一定。他声称，美国因国内政治僵持，与对外受误导向间或“无中生有”的敌人（例如伊拉克）展开“孤立无援，劳民伤财的军事行动”，继而有滑向“体系滞后”的危险。
　　If American leadership does collapse 15, what then? Like Mr Kagan, Mr Brzezinski argues that no single power is ready to supplant 16 it. He foresees instead a protracted 17 period of chaotic 18 realignments. China may be ambitious and proud, but it is still in the throes of modernisation; it knows that its continued rise depends for now on the present order. A nationalist and militaristic China would swiftly isolate 19 itself as anxious neighbours allied 20 against it.
　　如果美国的领导层衰落，那会怎样？与卡根先生一样，兹比格涅夫先生坚称尚未有独立势力有实力替而代之，有所担当。他预测世界反而会长期处于动荡，势力重新划分的局面。中国可能野心勃勃，心存高远，但是其仍旧处于现代化的阵痛中；中国很清楚，其现今的持续发展有赖与当前稳定的秩序。一旦周边国家联合对抗，民族主义与军事主义的中国有可能迅速置于孤立状态。
　　For now it seems the alternative to a world dominated by America is “No One's World”, the title of Charles Kupchan's book. A professor of international relations and a veteran of the Clinton White House, he is the gloomiest of these authors. For the first time in history, he says, the world will have no global guardian 21. Western policymakers are deluded 22 to think that they can use their twilight 23 of pre-eminence to lock rising powers into their own values and institutions.
　　现在似乎美国主导世界的另外雏形就是“无主世界”，此为查尔斯·库普乾（Charles Kupchan）的新书名。库普乾为国际关系教授，曾为克林顿政府幕僚，他是这些作者中最为悲观的。他说，将不会再有世界守护者，此说可谓首开先河。西方决策者蒙蔽双眼，自认为他们可以利用自身统领世界的最后暮光限定崛起的力量于他们自己的价值观与体系内发展。
　　It is going to be much harder than that, Mr Kupchan says. The spread of liberal ideas has been driven less by their intrinsic appeal than by the material dominance of Western countries. Democracy might still advance, but not fast enough to match the great rebalancing of power now under way. And even if the rising powers do come to share the West's values, they will clash over status and prestige, because they feel that this is their turn for a place in the sun. The West “will have to give as much as it gets as it seeks to fashion a new international order that includes the rest”.
　　现实情况并非这么简单，库普乾先生说。驱动自由思想传播的，不再是西方国家的内在吸引力，更多的是他们的物质主导。民主仍在改善，但是速度缓慢，不足抵挡正在发展的势力重新平衡的趋势。即使崛起中的力量确实共享西方的价值观，他们也会因攫取地位与威望而产生冲突，因为他们觉得该轮到他们占居尊位。西方“将倾其所有，寻求塑造全新的国际秩序，将其他国家纳入其中。”
　　For example, the West will need to stop preaching that only liberal democracies are to be considered legitimate 24 governments: “responsible governance” should be enough to put a state in good international standing 25. To his mind, America's “overzealous” promotion 26 of democracy in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan did more harm than good. The West must now show greater respect for the sovereignty of other nations and treat China with “a nuanced mix of engagement and containment 27”.
　　例如，西方将停止宣扬只认可自由民主为合法政府的条件：“有责任的政府”便足以使一国获得适当的国际地位。以库普乾先生看来，美国在波斯尼亚、伊拉克和阿富汗“过度”推广民主利大于弊。西方当前必须对他国政府主权表示更多的尊重，以“协作与遏制相柔和的微妙政策”与中国交往。
　　Grand theories of foreign policy are entertaining. The actual work of it is far messier, as shown in “Bending History”, a close review of President Barack Obama's first term by three scholars at the Brookings Institution. They find that for all his inspiring speeches, the president's performance has at best been workmanlike. In fact the lofty speeches are a problem: they have often seemed detached from actual policy, raising expectations he cannot fulfil.
　　外交政策大理论具有娱乐性。但如《弯曲的历史》一书所示，外交政策的实际工作远非有条有理。该书由布鲁金斯学会的三名学者所撰，细致剖析了奥巴马总统的首届任期。他们发现奥巴马所有激动人心的演说中，最好的表现也是经过精心设计。实际上，慷慨陈词的演说即是问题所在：似乎演说内容经常偏离实际政策，给人以无法实现的期望。
　　The Brookings authors conclude that much of Mr Obama's agenda remains 28 incomplete. Killing 29 Osama bin 4 Laden 30 and decimating al-Qaeda were successes, but the outcome in Afghanistan and relations with Pakistan hang in the balance. Though “resetting” relations with Russia made possible the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and paved the way for tighter sanctions on Iran, Russia's mercurial 31 politics could always throw such progress into reverse. The “pivot” to Asia in November 2011 was “appropriate”, but leaves future relations with a rising China unresolved.
　　布鲁金斯学会的作者们得出结论，奥巴马的多数议程仍未完成。击毙奥萨马·本·拉登并摧毁基地组织算是成功，但是阿富汗的未来及与巴基斯坦的关系仍悬而未决。尽管“重调”与俄罗斯的关系有可能达成《新战略武器消减条约》，为加紧对伊朗的制裁铺平道路，但是俄罗斯的政治变换不测，随时有可能反悔，放弃这一进展。2011年证明为亚洲“轴心”“适时得当”，但是与崛起中国关系的未来走向仍不明朗。
　　The abject 32 failure of the first term was in Palestine. As these scholars see it, Mr Obama's determination to ignore Israeli public opinion while cultivating the Arab street doomed 33 his diplomacy 34. In the Arab spring he balanced “prudent” support for the tide of democracy against a realistic regard for American interests. Even so, the net result is that the pillars of America's position in the region—its strategic alliances with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the virtuous 35 triangle between Israel, Egypt and Turkey—are shaking.
　　奥巴马首次任期的惨败就是在巴勒斯坦。几位学者注意到，奥巴马先生在培育阿拉伯街头运动之时，一意忽视以色列民意，毁掉了他的外交政策。阿拉伯之春期间，他权衡美国的现实利益，对这股民主浪潮的支持“审慎有度”。即便如此，他获得的实际效果时就是美国在该地区的中心地位——美国与埃及和沙特阿拉伯之间及以色列、埃及和土耳其睦邻三角之间的战略伙伴关系——岌岌可危。
　　If America cannot bend the Middle East to its will, what of China? In “Obama and China's Rise” Jeffrey Bader, one of the architects of Mr Obama's China strategy until leaving the White House in 2011, explains in a brisk insider's narrative 36 just how tricky 37 it can be to concoct 38 the “nuanced mix” of engagement and containment that Mr Kupchan advocates. But in the end Mr Bader is one of the optimists. America prevailed over Germany, Japan and the Soviet 39 Union, which had imperial ambitions. China, he asserts, does not—not yet, at any rate.
　　如果美国无法使中东顺从自身的愿望，那中国又如何？担任奥巴马先生中国战略规划师之一，直至2011年离开华府的杰弗瑞·巴德（Jeffrey Bader）的《奥巴马与中国崛起》中，以知情者身份简短叙述，掌控库普乾先生所宣称的协作与遏制“相柔和的微妙政策”多么诡异多变。但是，巴德先生起码是个乐观主义者。德国、日本及前苏联都曾具有帝国野心，而美国个个战而胜之。他坚称，中国还没有这一野心——至少现在还没有。
　　Maybe. But America's clashes with these powers came when its own economy was growing. How will it fare if it is truly in decline? Ultimately, these authors agree, America's power abroad stands on its health at home. If its economy cannot be restored, and America really is indispensable, then the whole world is in serious trouble.
　　事实或许如此。但美国与这些强国的冲突都是在国内经济改善之时出现。若美国果真衰落，那前景又如何？这几位作者最后一致赞同，美国的国外权力取决于国内的良性发展。如果美国国内经济无法恢复，而其又真的不可或缺，那整个世界即将陷入混乱。