俄罗斯政治桎梏经济发展

 　　Capping what president Vladimir Putin must feel has been a good year for Russia, Moscow’s stock market is one of 2016’s best performers.

　　俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔.普京(Vladimir Putin)在年末的感受应该是俄罗斯度过了美好的一年，莫斯科股市是2016年表现最佳的股市之一。
　　Despite sanctions restricting banks’ and oil companies’ access to western finance, Russian equities 1 are up about 27 per cent in local currency and 47 per cent in dollar terms.
　　尽管制裁限制了俄罗斯银行和石油公司到西方市场融资，以俄罗斯卢布计俄罗斯股市上涨约27%，以美元计涨幅更是达到了47%。
　　Yet this recovery is linked almost entirely 2 to short-term external factors rather than long-term fundamentals.
　　然而，这种复苏几乎完全只与短期外部因素有关，无法归功于长期基本面。
　　Oil prices, Russia’s economic lifeblood, are up about 50 per cent from a year ago.
　　俄罗斯经济命脉——石油的价格相比一年前上涨约50%。
　　Little surprise, then, that equities and the rouble should have strengthened.
　　因此，俄罗斯股票和卢布上扬也不足为奇了。
　　Investors 3 are also betting on a Trump 4 trade — a deal between Mr Putin and the incoming US president that eases sanctions.
　　投资者也在押注特朗普交易——普京和即将上任的美国总统可能达成一项放松对俄制裁的协议。
　　The outlook remains 5 anaemic.
　　俄罗斯的经济前景依然黯淡。
　　Russia is just pulling out of a two-year recession.
　　该国还在努力摆脱持续2年的衰退。
　　Output contracted about 0.6 per cent this year.
　　今年的经济产出将收缩约0.6%。
　　Assuming sanctions remain, international forecasters see economic growth of perhaps 1.2 per cent next year, and 1.5 per cent in 2018 and beyond.
　　假定制裁没有解除，国际预测者认为俄罗斯明年经济增长率可能为1.2%，在2018年和以后达到1.5%左右。
　　That lags behind global growth, the US, and even the EU.
　　这落后于全球、美国，甚至欧盟的预期经济增速。
　　The Russian president has boosted his popularity by seeking to restore his country’s great power status, starting with the 2014 annexation 6 of Crimea.
　　俄罗斯总统寻求恢复俄罗斯大国地位，2014年吞并克里米亚就是开端，这提升了他本人的支持率。
　　But the cost of sanctions and isolation 7 — on top of weak energy prices — has been high.
　　但制裁和孤立的代价——尤其是在能源价格低迷的情况下——十分高昂。
　　Though Mr Putin promised healthy growth when he returned as president in 2012, aggregate 8 growth over his six-year third term is set to be about 1 per cent at best — while the global economy has been expanding at well over 3 per cent a year.
　　尽管普京在2012年再次出任总统时承诺将实现俄罗斯经济健康增长，预计在他第三个总统任期的6年里俄罗斯最多只会增长约1%，而全球经济目前保持着每年3%以上的增速。
　　In a country with a freer press and more competitive politics, voters would surely judge such broken promises harshly.
　　如果是在一个媒体更自由、政治竞争更强的国家，选民必然会严厉评判这种未能兑现承诺的行为。
　　There are ways to boost growth.
　　有一些方法能够提振俄罗斯的增长。
　　Easing sanctions might add a percentage point.
　　放松制裁或许会让增长提升1个百分点。
　　A similar amount could come from expanding Mr Putin’s efforts to make Russia’s bureaucracy and state management more efficient and chisel 9 away at endemic corruption 10.
　　普京改善俄罗斯官僚体系、提高政府管理效率以及铲除地方腐败的措施如果能加大力度，或许也能让增长再提升1个百分点。
　　The fundamental problem, however, is that domestic and foreign investors, uncertain about Russia’s prospects 11 and protection of property rights, are not putting sufficient capital in new capacity or productivity improvements.
　　然而，根本问题是国内外投资者因为不确定俄罗斯的前景和产权保护情况，没有大力投资增加新产能或者提高生产率。
　　Investment is running at about 20 per cent of output.
　　目前投资占经济产出比重约为20%。
　　Mr Putin pledged in 2012 to lift it to 27 per cent.
　　普京在2012年承诺将这一比例提升到27%。
　　To address the investment problem, Russia needs not just long-delayed structural 12 reforms, but sweeping 13 institutional changes to boost political competition and rule of law, and to establish an independent judiciary.
　　要解决投资难题，俄罗斯不仅需要实施拖延已久的结构性改革，还需要进行彻底的制度变革，以促进政治竞争、加强法治，并建设独立的司法体系。
　　Alexei Kudrin, the liberal former finance minister apparently 14 still trusted by Mr Putin, has been asked to draw up reform plans to be unveiled next year.
　　显然仍得普京信任的自由主义前财政部长阿列克谢.库德林(Alexei Kudrin)受命拟定明年将要公布的改革计划。
　　But there is little optimism that they will ever be implemented 15.
　　但对于这些改革最终是否能得到实施，很少有人保持乐观。
　　The business community long ago concluded real reform was unlikely as long as this president and his circle remain in place.
　　商界很久之前就得出结论，只要普京和他的圈子依然当政，俄罗斯就不可能实施真正的改革。
　　Reforms robust 16 enough to boost the economy would threaten their hold on power.
　　足以提振经济的强劲改革将会威胁他们对权力的掌控。
　　Will Russians accept years of stagnation 17? Their phlegmatic 18 response to the belt-tightening demanded of them since 2014 suggests they might.
　　俄罗斯人会接受持续数年的停滞吗？对2014年以来被要求勒紧裤腰带的境遇，俄罗斯人平静以对，这表明他们或许真的会接受。
　　Mr Putin’s propaganda machine is adept 19 at distraction 20, and Russians see little alternative to their current leader.
　　普京的宣传机器擅长转移注意力，俄罗斯人也不认为有谁能替代他们现在的领袖。
　　The image of market democracy, moreover, was tarnished 21 by the hardships and distortions of Russia’s 1990s post-communist transition.
　　此外，俄罗斯在上世纪90年代后共产主义转型中经历的困境和扭曲现象损害了市场经济和民主体制的形象。
　　The EU and US have ceased to be seen as positive models.
　　欧洲和美国不再被视为正面榜样。
　　Other world leaders may have to get used to the idea of Mr Putin being around for a long time yet — even as he slowly allows Russia’s economy to slip ever further behind.
　　世界其他国家的领袖或许必须习惯，普京还将在很长一段时间里屹立政坛——即使他正慢慢让俄罗斯经济进一步落后。