经济学人177:伊朗与其核计划 对话暂停

 　　Iran and its nuclear plans

　　伊朗与其核计划
　　Time out
　　对话暂停
　　The West and Iran will negotiate for four more months, but the gap is wide
　　西方与伊朗将全面谈判对话延长四个月，但双方分歧很大
　　AFTER some unconvincing last-minute brinkmanship, Iran and the six world powers it is negotiating with decided 1 on July 18th to extend the deadline for an agreement by four months. The negotiators, seeking to secure a deal to curb 2 Iran's nuclear programme in exchange for the removal of sanctions, are taking a break until September. Then they have until November 24th, exactly a year after the signing of the “joint plan of action” that first set the ball rolling, to find a permanent solution.
　　在一些难以令人信服的边缘政策出台之后，伊朗和六国7月18日决定将对话延长四个月。谈判方希望能通过一个协定，以解除制裁伊朗来换取停止伊朗核项目。现在，双方对话暂停，于9月重新启动，并将持续到11月24日，这个日子自签订“联合行动计划”，也就是第一次开始对话以寻求永恒的解决办法以来，刚好整整一年。
　　In the meantime, the provisions of the six-month interim 3 deal that came into force on January 20th will stay in place with a few minor 4 tweaks. Iran will take another step towards neutralising its stockpile of 20%-enriched uranium by turning the uranium-oxide powder into fuel plates for a research reactor 5. In return, Iran will continue to get very limited relief on some lesser 6 sanctions and another $700m a month from frozen bank accounts abroad.
　　同时，1月20日开始实施的临时协定—日内瓦协定将做出一些微调，但基本保持不变。伊朗下一步将通过把二氧化铀粉末变成每一个研究反应堆的板块燃料板件来使用掉库存的20%浓缩铀。反过来，在对伊朗的制裁上，伊朗只能得到些许缓解，以及每月从海外冻结的银行账户中获得7亿美元的资金。
　　伊朗与其核计划.jpg
　　The decision to extend the negotiations 7 makes sense for both sides and was widely expected. For the mainly Western negotiating team known as the P5+1 the interim deal has increased, if only by a bit, the time it would take Iran to produce enough weapons-grade uranium to make a single nuclear device. Some progress has also been made on a plan to defang the heavy-water reactor at Arak that could provide Iran with an alternative plutonium path to a bomb, by adapting it to a design that produces far less plutonium.
　　延长对话的决定既对谈判双方都有益，也广受期待。对主要的西方谈判小组，也就是被大家所知晓的P5+1组织而言 ，对话暂停增加了时间伊朗能生产出足够武器级的铀来制造单个的核装置。目前就计划通过调整适应一个产生极少钚的设计方案以阿拉克重水反应堆已经取得一些进展。阿拉克能给伊朗提供替代性的钚来完成炸弹。
　　Another issue that people close to the negotiations feel could soon be resolved is that of the enrichment facility at Fordow. Buried deep beneath a mountain and believed by many to be invulnerable to attack by conventional bombs, it could now be converted into a fairly innocuous R&D centre. Combined with the enhanced-inspection regime that Iran has largely co-operated with, these are potential gains worth holding on to, at least for now.
　　另外，谈判相关人员能感觉到另一件事情可能很快得到解决，即弗杜的浓缩装置。很多人都认为这批被埋在大山地下深处的装置很容易遭受传统炸弹的轰击，而现在，已经转入一个相当安全的发展研究所。与伊朗大力合作的增前了的审查制度一并，这些都还值得紧紧抓牢，至少目前是这样。
　　For Iran, the choice has been much starker 8. To walk away from the table at this point would be to condemn 9 Iranians to the prospect 10 of a failing economy permanently 11 locked in the grip of an unyielding sanctions regime. The damage to the presidency 12 of Hassan Rohani, elected last year to end Iran's economic and political isolation 13, would probably be irreparable. Even the glowering 14 supreme 15 leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, might fear the consequences of failure for his regime's legitimacy 16.
　　对伊朗来说，这种选择则更加严峻了。在这个节骨眼上离开谈判桌，伊朗因一个长期受制裁控制日渐衰退的经济状况而受到指责。去年，哈桑鲁哈尼当选总统，结束了伊朗的经济政治孤立状态，而如今他所受到的迫害怕是无法挽回的，甚至是凶狠的至高领导者阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊，也会害怕政权无效的后果。
　　Western negotiators are clearly hoping that contemplation of that grim prospect will give their Iranian counterparts the space they need to make the further concessions 17 undoubtedly 18 required if a comprehensive agreement is to be reached. America and its negotiating partners want to see Iran's current enrichment capacity—about 19,000 centrifuges, half of which are spinning—cut drastically. The Americans believe that anything above 3,000-4,000 would be impossible to sell to a sceptical Congress. Yet the Iranians seem to be digging in their heels by coming up with ever-higher estimates of the number of centrifuges they aim to have.
　　西方的谈判者很明显，他们就是在期待如果要达成全面的协议，不容乐观的前景会让伊朗做出进一步妥协。美国与其协商伙伴希望能看到伊朗大规模减少其目前的浓缩能力——1.9万分离机，其中一半处于工作中。美方认为，超过3000-4000以上，持怀疑态度的国会就不会买账。然而，伊朗似乎拒不让步，他们已经增加了预计持有的分离机数量。
　　In a speech on July 7th, Mr Khamenei declared that Iran must be able to produce enough enriched uranium to fuel the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear reactor when a contract with Russia to supply fuel runs out in 2021. That translates to a “definite need” for 190,000 separative work units. Iran would need more than 100,000 of the older IR-1 centrifuges that are the current backbone 19 of its enrichment programme, or about 20,000 of the more efficient IR-2m centrifuges it has recently begun to deploy 20. The Iranians say this is in line with what they describe as their “right to enrich” for civil nuclear purposes under the terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
　　7月7日，哈梅内伊在讲话中说到，当与俄罗斯签订的燃料供给合约到2021年到期，伊朗一定能生产足够的浓缩铀供给俄罗斯建造的布什尔反应堆。也就是满足额定的19万分离功单位。伊朗还需10万多老式IR-1分离机，目前这是浓缩项目中的主要设备，或者2万多更高效的IR-2分离机，这也是目前已经开始采用的。伊方表示，这与他们所描述的在《不扩散核武条约》下，“有权浓缩”民用核是一致的。
　　America has tacitly admitted that Iran will have to be allowed to do some enriching as the price for a deal that otherwise constrains 21 its nuclear plans. But it will not accept that Iran, given its record of deceit and clandestine 22 activity, needs a capacity to enrich that is possessed 23 by very few other countries that use civil nuclear power. Robert Einhorn, an arms-control expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington who served in the Clinton administration, argues that the Iranian demand “fails the realism test at several levels”. It has no need to produce all its own fuel because it can either go on getting it from Russia or on the enriched-uranium buyers' market. Iran has neither the technical knowledge nor the infrastructure 24 to produce fuel of the type Bushehr requires.
　　美国机智地回应，承认伊朗以达成协议为前提能进行一些浓缩项目，不然将限制其核计划。但鉴于伊朗有撒谎和暗中擅自行为的前科，美国不会允许伊朗拥有只有少数使用民用核的国家拥有的浓缩能力。Robert Einhorn是华盛顿布鲁金斯学会的一位军备控制专家，曾为克林顿工作。他认为伊朗的需求在很多层面上显得不现实。伊朗完全没有必要将其所有的燃料生产出来，因为它能继续从俄罗斯或者浓缩铀市场得到燃料。伊朗既没有技术知识也没有基础设施生产出布什尔所需要的燃料品种。
　　If the enrichment capacity that Iran says it will eventually need is both implausible and far in excess of anything being contemplated 25 as acceptable to the P5+1, so too is its concept of the time an agreement would run before Iran could be treated as a “normal” NPT signatory. Iran is thinking in terms of not much more than five years, while the Americans and their partners have in mind ten to 20 years of punctilious 26 compliance 27 before Iran could start building up its centrifuges again. It is possible that under such a deal Iran might be allowed to continue developing advanced centrifuges and learn the techniques of fuel fabrication, thus preparing itself for a more ambitious nuclear programme after the agreement expires. That, Mr Einhorn thinks, could be the basis of a compromise.
　　如果伊朗所说自己最终需求的浓缩能力既不合情理，也不能被P5+1接受，那么在伊朗也能被视为一个正常的《不扩散核武条约》签署国之前，协议达成所需的时间也是一样的。伊朗的考虑是5年内，而美国及其盟友心中所想的时间伊朗需要谨慎遵从条约规定10到20年，才能再开始建立分离机。只有在这样的前提下，伊朗才有可能被允许继续发展高级的分离机以及学习燃料制造技术，因而在协议期满之后为自己更宏伟的核计划做好准备。 Einhorn表示这是妥协的基础。
　　Can Mr Rohani sell a deal along those lines back home, above all to the enigmatic Mr Khamenei? They may not even know. But four months is not long to find out.
　　鲁哈尼能与哈梅内伊达成协议吗？他们也许不会知道，但是花上四个月的时间，不难发现。