私营军事公司的兴起(5)

Test case in Africa

[20] This week, MPRI expects to get government approval to go into Equatorial Guinea, an agreement that illustrates 1 the questions some critics have with a so-called privatization of foreign policy.

[21] The contract was initially 2 rejected by two State Department desks, holding it up for two years, Soyster says. It was approved only after MPRI lobbied the department's Africa desk, arguing that if it was not allowed to do the job, someone else would.

[22] Equatorial Guinea, most of which is an island off western Africa, will pay for the contract. It wants to develop a coast guard to protect its vast oil resources, which are being tapped by Mobil Oil, Soyster says.

[23] In doing so, the government could secure probably strengthen its grip on power.

[24] Yet the government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema is a rampant 3 violator of human rights, accused of political killings 4, election fraud, and questionable 5 monetary 6 practices, according to the 1999 State Department world report on Human Rights.

[25] Equatorial Guinea's closest allies seem to be North Korea and Cuba, and it was once the brunt of State Department jokes as the worst overseas post. In 1993, US ambassador John Bennett received a death threat for trying to save local political prisoners.

[26] "The question is, 'Do you want to train a military in modern techniques so it can preserve itself?'" says Arvind Ganesan, who follows the issue for Human Rights Watch.

[27] David Isenberg, an arms-control analyst 7 at DynMeridian, a consulting firm, says PMCs are often used in these borderline situations, when working through official channels is either too cumbersome 8 or politically difficult . "The administration likes it because it avoids the prospect 9 of creating a furor 10 if ( something goes wrong)," he says.

[28] But, he explains, the US needs to do a better job of regulating PMCs, which by and large are willing to follow clearly laid rules.

[29] "If the government wants to get the most out of them, they need to regulate them," he says. "That would quiet.. .fear that they could become rogues 11 or soldiers of fortune."

非洲的试验案例

[20)军事专业资源股份有限公司期待本周得到政府的批准前往赤道几内亚，这项双方达成的协议恰好说明了某些批评家指出的所谓对外政策私营化的问题。

[21]索伊斯特说，国务院的两个司最初都拒绝这项合同，使事情拖了两年。公司向国务院非洲司做了疏通工作，讲明即使不允许他们公司去做这项工作，也会有别人去做--只是在此之后，国务院才批准。

[22]赤道几内亚的大部分领土是非洲西部海岸外的一座岛屿，上述合同所需经费将由该国支付。索伊斯特说，赤道几内亚希望建立一支海岸卫队来保护本国庞大的石油资源，这些资源正由美孚石油公司进行开发。

[23]政府这样做可能可以保持住甚至强化其政权。

[24]然而，据国务院1999年世界人权报告介绍，特奥多罗·奥比昂·恩圭马总统的政府是一个疯狂践踏人权的政府，他被指责进行政治屠杀、在选举中舞弊，而且在金融币制方面也有问题。

[25]赤道几内亚最亲密的盟国好像是朝鲜和古巴，国务院有些人开玩笑时曾首当其冲地戏称该国为最差的海外岗位。1993年，美国大使约翰·贝内特因尽力解救当地的政治犯而收到了死亡威胁。

[26]阿尔温德·加内桑为《人权观察》工作，一直跟踪研究这个问题。他说："问题是，'你希望用现代技术训练出一支可以自我保存下来的军队吗?'"

[27]戴维·伊森伯格是DynMeridian咨询公司的军备控制分析家。他说，当遇到官方渠道做工作受到阻碍或政治上有困难等不确定情况时，就常常使用私营军事公司。"政府喜欢这样，因为如果(发生什么问题)，这可以避免引起抗议浪潮。"

[28]但是，他解释说，美国需要更好地对私营军事公司进行规范管理，总的来说，这些公司愿意遵循明确制定的规章。

[29]"如果政府想充分利用他们，就需要对他们进行规范管理，"他说。"那会平息……害怕他们会成为恶棍流氓或兵痞的恐惧心理。"