黄金市场或将迎来风暴 两极分化

 　　Gold prices have rallied more than 30 per cent since the lift-off in US interest rates in December. A sharp reversal in pricing, sentiment and positioning driven by myriad 1 factors has left gold bears and bulls as polarised as ever.

　　自去年12月美国加息以来，黄金价格已劲升逾30%。多种因素导致的定价、情绪以及投资头寸的巨大逆转，令黄金多空双方一如既往地两极分化。
　　The bearish 2 camp, with analysts 3 such as those at Goldman Sachs, tends to have a constructive 4 view on the US dollar and the ability to raise interest rates and normalise global monetary 5 policy, and generally a benign 6 view on the global economy and inflationary risks.
　　看空黄金的阵营（例如高盛(Goldman Sachs)分析师等）往往对美元以及央行加息与使全球货币政策正常化的能力持积极观点，并且通常对全球经济和通胀风险持乐观态度。
　　In the bullish camp, to which I subscribe 7, the view tends to be more pessimistic on the global economy and the unintended consequences of monetary policy without limits. It sees the recent price action as the beginning of a multi-year bull run in gold.
　　看涨黄金的阵营（我属于这个阵营）通常对全球经济以及毫无限制的货币政策的意外后果较为悲观。他们把最近的价格走势视为黄金多年牛市的开始。
　　My view — that there is a perfect storm for gold — is based on three closely interrelated dynamics 8.
　　我认为，黄金正面临一个完美风暴，这基于3个密切相关的因素。
　　The first is the limits of monetary policy. In response to the Lehman crisis and to combat the threat of deflation, central banks have deployed 9 a wide range of unconventional monetary policies. Quantitative 10 easing and negative interest rates have been game changers — distorting the valuation of government bonds, breaking the theoretical ceiling in prices, squeezing shorts and underweight positions, and feeding what, in my view, is one of the largest financial bubbles in history.
　　首先是货币政策的局限。为应对雷曼(Lehman)危机和抵御通缩威胁，央行动用了一系列非传统的货币政策。量化宽松和负利率已改变了形势，它们扭曲了政府债券的估值，打破了价格的理论天花板，挤压了空头和减持头寸，并助长了在我看来历史上规模最大的金融泡沫之一。
　　At the epicentre of the problem are the central banks. Investors 11 and savers around the world, faced with extraordinarily 12 low and even negative yields in cash and fixed 13 income, have been incentivised — if not forced — to lengthen 14 the duration in their portfolios 15, increasing the risk of capital losses, liquidity 16 and volatility 17 beyond what they might intend or be able to tolerate.
　　这些问题的核心是央行。面对现金和固定收益证券的超低甚至负收益率，全球的投资者和储户被鼓励（如果不是被迫的话）延长投资组合的期限，从而令资金损失、流动性和波动性的风险超过人们可能愿意或有能力容忍的水平。
　　Second, examine the edges of credit markets. The bubble in government bonds and duration has driven risk-taking across equity 18 and credit markets, and lending to weaker and weaker credits, often ignoring or underplaying the risk of capital losses, liquidity and volatility. It’s a bull market that feeds on itself and benefits the weakest players most, such as emerging markets or high yield.
　　其次，考察一下信贷市场的边缘吧。政府债券的泡沫和期限加大了股票和信贷市场的风险承担，并促使贷款被发放给信用越来越差的人，资金损失、流动性和波动性的风险往往被忽视或低估。这个牛市正自噬其身，而最受益的是那些最弱的参与者，例如新兴市场或高收益债券。
　　In a world with limited investment opportunities, excessive risk-taking can lead to speculation 19 and, of course, bubbles. The damage is done but can get worse, especially if countries such as China respond to future crises with more aggressive credit expansions, as it did this year.
　　在一个投资机会有限的世界里，过度的风险承担可能导致投机，当然还有泡沫。损害已经造成，但还可能变得更糟，特别是如果中国等国用更激进的信贷扩张应对未来危机，就像今年中国所做的那样。
　　The current path of monetary and credit expansion is unsustainable and will eventually burst, leaving investors struggling for the return of their capital, instead of return on their capital — an extremely bullish scenario 20 for gold and other real assets.
　　当前的货币和信贷扩张道路是不可持续的，终将破灭，导致投资者难以收回本金，而不只是投资收益，这对于黄金和其他实物资产而言是一个极其利好的情形。
　　Third, the limits of fiat 21 currencies are being tested. Unlike in the global financial crisis of 2008, this time there won’t be any monetary bullets left. Interest rates are already at record lows, asset purchases suffer from the law of diminishing returns, and competitive currency devaluations only increase underlying 22 problems and global imbalances. A dangerous slippery slope that paper cures miss is that they “eventually converge 23 to their intrinsic value: paper”, as Voltaire warned.
　　第三，法定货币的局限性正受到检验。与2008年的全球金融危机不同，这一次将不会有任何货币政策弹药。利率已处于创纪录低点，资产购买遭遇收益递减，而竞争性货币贬值只是加剧了根本问题和全球失衡。就像伏尔泰(Voltaire)警告的那样，纸币疗法忽视的危险滑坡是纸币将“最终归于它们的内在价值：纸”。
　　Over the past few years we have witnessed the first stage of Gresham’s law, whereby “bad money displaces good money”, and we are at the early stages of the second and final phase, whereby “good money displaces bad money”.
　　过去几年，我们见证了格雷欣法则(Gresham’s law)的第一阶段，即“劣币驱逐良币”，我们现在处于第二、也是最后阶段的初期，那就是“良币驱逐劣币”。
　　Gold and the dollar are best placed to play the role of good money, which could result in a substantial appreciation 24 against the bad-money currencies. But the inability or unwillingness 25 of the US to normalise its monetary policy leaves the door wide open for gold to retake its reserve currency status and put an end to the monetary supercycle that started in 1971 with the end of Bretton Woods. It is a period in which the outstanding volume of paper money has grown disproportionately to the amount of gold that once backed it.
　　黄金和美元正处于发挥良币作用的最佳时机，这可能使它们相对于劣币大幅升值。但美国无法或者不愿将其货币政策正常化，这为黄金重夺储备货币地位并终结本轮货币超级周期打开大门。这个超级周期始于1971年布雷顿森林体系(Bretton Woods)瓦解时。这段时期发行的纸币数量远远超过了曾经支撑纸币的黄金的数量。
　　Time will tell if central banks and governments will be able to engineer a smooth solution to the challenges ahead, or if the remedy will be worse than the disease.
　　时间将证明央行和政府能否为未来的危机找到一个平稳的解决方案，或者这种疗法是否比疾病本身还糟。
　　Monetary policy without limits will lead to a very wild and bumpy 26 ride and a larger crisis than the one we have been trying to resolve: a perfect storm for gold.
　　没有限制的货币政策将带来一段非常荒蛮且崎岖的路程，而且会导致一场规模更大的危机：黄金的完美风暴。其规模将超过我们一直试图化解的这场危机。