经济学人113:拼拼凑凑见真相 Piecing it together

 　　Books and Arts; Book Review; The financial crisis; Piecing it together；

　　文艺；书评；金融危机：拼拼凑凑见真相；
　　All The Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis. By Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera.
　　《万魔聚此：金融危机隐藏的历史》，Bethany McLean 和 Joe Nocera著。
　　The latest book on the financial crisis has an odd title. You begin reading “All the Devils Are Here”, a line from Shakespeare's “The Tempest”, expecting to encounter satanic bankers and corrupt 1 government cronies preying 2 on a defenceless public. In fact the people who emerge are infinitely 3 more interesting: arrogant 4, desperate, even clueless—but, with a few exceptions, not devils.
　　这本最新出炉的讨论经济危机的书有个奇怪的名字。“万魔聚此”，读到这句出自莎士比亚《暴风雨》剧中的对白，你可能会觉得书中讲的应该是穷凶极恶的银行家和与之狼狈为奸的腐败政府官员如何如何侵害毫无招架之力的公众。但实际上里面提及的人物却比这耐人寻味得多：傲慢者、铤而走险者，甚至还有无知之徒，但除了少数人之外，他们都算不上恶魔。
　　Take Angelo Mozilo. From the time he started Countrywide Financial in the late 1960s the Bronx-born outsider was convinced he could put millions of deserving families in homes, maintain impeccable underwriting standards—and get rich. That became impossible as the subprime mania 5 grew. By 2006 Mr Mozilo had a “Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde” quality, the authors note, giving warning that disaster loomed 6 while at the same time insisting his company would still thrive. In fact, Countrywide had become a leading purveyor 7 of toxic 8 mortgage products that would take the company to the brink 9 of bankruptcy 10.
　　就拿安吉罗·莫兹罗(Angelo Mozilo)来说吧。当他在20世纪60年代末创立全国金融公司(Countrywide Financial)时，这位出生在纽约布朗克斯区的门外汉深信，自己能够帮助数百万应该得到帮助的家庭获得一个属于他们自己的家，同时维持无懈可击的承保标准——然后发家致富。可是随着次级贷的热狂逐步升温，这一切预想都化为泡影。本书作者指出，到2006年时，莫兹罗先生已经有人格分裂的趋势了，他一方面发出警告说大难就要临头，另一方面却仍然坚信自己的公司还能兴旺发达下去。可事实上，全国金融公司当时已是有毒抵押贷款产品最大的承办商，这足已让它濒临破产。
　　Similar tensions prevailed across Wall Street. Inside Merrill Lynch and AIG, senior executives worried as far back as 2005 and 2006 about their firms' exposure to the mortgage market. The Cassandras in these companies were ignored, sidelined or fired, not because their bosses were corrupt, but because they didn't believe the warnings. Joe Cassano, the short-tempered head of AIG's infamous 11 financial-products division, worried about credit losses but apparently 12 not about the possibility of multiple, massive collateral 13 calls, which proved the firm's undoing 14. Stan O'Neal, Merrill's head, had no idea that his firm had accumulated fatal levels of subprime exposure because he had pushed aside the people who might have warned him. Goldman Sachs was spared the fate of those companies largely because its managers listened to its naysayers.
　　类似的紧张气氛盛行于华尔街。美林证券和AIG的高管们早在2005年、2006年时就已经开始担心公司涉足抵押贷款市场将会带来隐忧。公司内部预见到这种噩运的“预言家们”被置之不理，得不到重视，甚至被炒了鱿鱼，原因却不是因为老板贪污受贿，而是因为他们根本就不相信这些警告。AIG声名狼藉的金融产品部主管乔-卡萨诺(Joe Cassano)脾气暴躁，当时他确实对信用损失的状况不太放心，但却没有考虑过可能产生巨量的复合抵押品要求，而这却最终导致该公司的崩溃。美林证券的头儿斯坦奥尼尔（Stan O'Neal）把本可能规劝警告他的人都打入冷宫，因此根本没有意识到公司已经累积了致命数额的次级贷。而高盛之所以能够逃脱这些公司的噩运，很大程度上是因为其高管听进去了逆耳的忠言。
　　Much of the history that Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera recount has already appeared in news accounts, books, government investigations 15 and court proceedings 16. Still, they have synthesised an impressive amount of that material and supplemented it with their own reporting to produce a comprehensive and authoritative 17 account. Lesser-known events and individuals take on new prominence 18, such as the 1986 tax law that made it possible to slice up mortgage-backed securities, and the important role played by Ameriquest and its politically deft 19 founder 20, Roland Arnall, in leading the race to the bottom in subprime standards.
　　本瑟尼·麦克里恩和乔·诺瑟拉在书中讲述的危机历史大部分都已经在新闻报道、书籍、政府调查报告和庭审文件中得到披露。不过，他们的长处在于，将数量相当可观的材料加以整合，并加入自己的独家报道，形成了关于这场危机历程的全面而权威的阐述。先前相比较而言被忽略的事件和人物重新得到重视，比如使得拆分抵押证券成为可能的《1986年税法》，还有阿姆莱奎斯特抵押公司(Ameriquest)及其政治手腕高杆的创始人罗兰·阿尔诺(Roland Arnall)在主导这场次级贷评定标准直线下降的竞赛中所起的重要作用。
　　Inevitably 21, some important chapters of the crisis get short shrift. The collapse 22 of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers get only a few pages each, which may not matter so much because they have been so thoroughly 23 covered elsewhere. The macroeconomic forces behind the bubble, such as low interest rates at home and abroad, are all but ignored. Indeed, the authors never wander beyond America's shores. Ms McLean and Mr Nocera, who write for Vanity Fair and the New York Times, have reporters' penchant 24 for detail. The litany of names, numbers and financial jargon 25 is at times exhausting, even with the help of an eight-page cast of characters and two-page glossary 26 of acronyms 27. And there are too many pointless, anonymous 28 quotes.
　　篇幅有限，危机中的某些重头戏不可避免地被简略带过。对贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟公司崩溃的讨论在书中都只有寥寥几页。不过这样处理也并无不妥，因为它们已经被说烂了。另外，这场泡沫后面的宏观经济因素（如美国国内外的低利率）则完全被忽略掉了。两位作者的关注点始终没有超出美国的范围。麦克里恩女士和诺色拉先生为《名利场》和《纽约时报》撰稿，具有记者对细节的强烈偏好。即使坐着列出了长达八页的人物表和两页的缩略语表，文中对人名、数字和金融术语的罗列有时还是让人吃不消。毫无意义且不知出处的引用也实在太多。
　　Ultimately, though, their journalistic approach is the central contribution of their book. Its balanced and complex portrayal 29 of the roots of the crisis won't satisfy those who really do see devils at work; but it is closer to the truth.
　　不过，归根到底，这本书最大的贡献就是作者采用的新闻报道立场。书中对这场危机的根源进行的刻画有些平均，比较复杂。这很难让确实看到“魔鬼们”在使坏的人感到满意；但却更为接近真相。