人民币升值能走多远(China lets the yuan rise—but how far?)

China has revalued its currency, the yuan, and linked it to a basket of currencies—though it is not yet clear how far it will be allowed to rise. The move may ease trade tension with America, though China's slowing economy, which is boosting its trade surplus, may reignite the spat 1

中国调整了它的货币（元）的价格，并将其与一篮子货币进行挂钩，但人民币升值能走多远目前尚不明晰。这样的行为能缓解中美之间紧张的贸易关系，尽管中国减缓的经济与日益增长的贸易顺差，也许会重新点燃双方的冲突。

SOONER or later, it was going to happen, and on Thursday July 21st it did. China abandoned the 11-year-old peg 2 of its currency, the yuan, at 8.28 to the dollar. From now on, the yuan will be linked to a basket of currencies, the central parities 3 of which will be set at the end of each day. And the currency has been revalued, although by nothing like as much as America and others have been demanding: the yuan's initial central rate against the dollar was shifted by just 2.1%, to 8.11.

迟早会发生的事情，在7月21日星期四这天来临了。中国放弃了它实行11年的外汇制度——1美元兑8.28元人民币。从此以后，人民币将与一篮子货币进行挂钩，每个工作日闭市后公布人民币汇率的收盘价。尽管不如美国和其他国家期望的那么高，但人民币终于重估了：人民币对美元中心汇率上升2.1%，调整为1美元兑8.11元人民币。

So far, it is not clear exactly how the new system will operate. The Chinese called it a “managed floating exchange-rate regime”, which may well imply more management than floating. Neither the currencies in the basket used to set the level of the yuan, nor their weights, have been disclosed. The fact that the Chinese have acted at all is important. But the eventual 4 economic and political effects of the revaluation will depend on how far and how fast the yuan moves from now on. In Friday's trading it barely budged—and in fact closed a fraction below 8.11 to the dollar, suggesting the authorities are keen to damp down market expectations of further rises.

新的系统将如何运作目前尚不清楚。中方称其为“有管理的浮动汇率制度”，很好地暗示了管理大于浮动。至于人民币与之挂钩的“一篮子货币”，既没有公开币种，也没有披露它们在其中的权重。虽然如此，中国官方调整汇率动作的本身就已经十分重要，但最终的政治和经济效应却取决于人民币汇率调整能走的多远，走的多快。在周五的交易市场上汇率几乎未有变动——事实上曾有跌破过8.11对1美元，暗示了官方的渴望：打压市场对进一步升值的预期。

Such a slight initial revaluation is unlikely to do much to slow China's fast-expanding economy. The day before the currency regime changed, the country's official statisticians said that GDP in the second quarter of 2005 was 9.5% higher than a year before—more than most pundits 5 had forecast and only a shade less than the figure for the same period of 2004 (see chart below). Growth rates of industrial production, ahead by 16.8% in the year to June, and investment in fixed 6 assets, up by 25.4% in the first half, year on year, have both eased from their levels at the end of 2003, but remain strong. Inflation, as measured by the consumer-price index, is mild. It slid to 1.6% last month, down from 5%-plus a year ago.

如此轻微的汇率重估未必能减缓中国快速增长的经济。就在汇率制度改变前一天，国家的官方统计人员称2005年第二季度的GDP增长率是9.5%，比多数专家预期的高，只比2004年同期略低一点。工业生产截至六月增长率为16.8%，固定资产投资上半年同比增长25.4%，都比2003年底的水平有所缓和，但仍保持强劲增势。通货膨胀（通过消费价格指数衡量）上涨比较温和，从一年前的超过5%跌落到上个月的1.6%。

In truth, the economy is slowing more markedly than these (highly suspect) official figures suggest. Many economists 8 say that China has an institutionalised[制度化的] bias[偏爱] to over-reporting growth at the bottom of a cycle and under-reporting it at the top, to reduce the volatility[浮夸] of the numbers. Judged by physical indicators 9, such as electricity consumption[消费] or freight[货运] volumes, GDP growth probably peaked at over 12% in 2003 and should slow to 8% by 2006. Since China's macroeconomic[宏观经济] growth is driven more by fixed investment[固定资产投资] than by household consumption[家庭消费] (which dominates[占优] in the West), it is especially vulnerable to any slowing of corporate 10 investment or public spending on infrastructure[基础设施].

“In investment cycles,” says Andy Xie, Asia economist 7 at Morgan Stanley, “the leading indicators are profit margins 11[利率], product prices and property prices, which forecast corporate cash flow or ability to borrow.” These three indicators are slowing. For the past five years, Chinese industrial firms have enjoyed record[创记录的] profit margins as revenue growth has outpaced[超过] the increase in wages and raw-material[原料] costs. In 2003 and 2004, industrial production and sales grew at an annual rate of nearly 30% in real terms, analysts 12 estimate, but in 2005 the pace has slowed to around 15%. With commodity[日用品] prices high, companies' margins are being squeezed[挤压]: overheated industries such as cars, steel, cement[水泥] and basic materials are suffering especially.

Property prices are also moderating[缓和] after a period of extraordinary growth, particularly in big cities. Shanghai house prices, up by half since 1998 and by almost 10% in the first quarter of this year, have fallen back by 10-20% since mid-April. Transaction volumes[交易量] in most urban centres have also dropped, because the government has imposed a property-sales tax and tightened 13 mortgage[抵押] requirements.

Overall, however, China seems to be managing the soft landing that it wants. The authorities have acted earlier and more decisively[果断地] than they did in the mid-1990s, curbing[抑制] growth before it gets out of hand. Policymakers have also been more sophisticated[圆滑], targeting selected sectors 14 with administrative 15 restrictions 16 while shifting to market-based measures, including last October's increase in interest rates, to rein 17 in[控制] money and credit growth. A dearer yuan—but much dearer, probably, than after this week's move—would give the economy another downward nudge[轻推].

In addition, the economy is looking better balanced: there are signs that consumer spending is doing more to support the economy, alongside fixed investment and exports. Rising incomes are boosting households' spending power, lifting retail 18 sales by 13% in the first half of the year, compared with the same period of 2004. And the countryside is finally playing a part: after six years of lacklustre[无光泽地] growth, rural incomes rose by 12.5% in the first half.

That said, China's policymakers cannot afford to rest on their laurels[桂冠]. On the one hand, there is a risk that the economy will steam away again as spending for the Beijing Olympics in 2008 takes off. On the other, the vast amount of manufacturing capacity[制造能力] built up over the past few years means that a slightly sharper slowdown, perhaps triggered[被触发] by lower growth in America, could tip the country back into deflation[通缩]. Already, a staggering[令人惊愕的] nine-tenths of manufactured goods in China are thought to be in oversupply 19[过度供给].

In the short term, the biggest worry is that China becomes a victim of its own international success. Until recently China has been a powerful engine driving the world economy. If it slows, existing[现有的] political and trade tensions[紧张] could still worsen. Thus an unfortunate side effect[副作用] of China's attempts to cool its domestic economy has been an exploding trade surplus[贸易顺差], because import growth has softened 20 while exports have remained robust[强健的]. In June, China's exports rose by 30.6%, year-on-year, while imports grew by just 15.1%, widening the monthly trade surplus to $9.7 billion. The cumulative[累计的] surplus for 2005 is now nearly $40 billion, more than for the whole of last year. This year's current-account surplus could reach 9% of GDP. “Just one year ago, China was the world's fastest-growing importer of heavy industrial products,” says Jonathan Anderson, chief Asia economist at UBS. “Today, the mainland is actually a growing net exporter, with shipments[出货] of not only textiles but also steel, other metals and chemicals accelerating visibly.”

Slowing imports (of everything but commodities) are bad news for international companies, at a time when those doing business in China are already suffering from increased competition and oversupply. And mainland firms are becoming aggressive exporters of everything from textiles and steel to electronics and even cars. Ningbo Bird[波导], based in Zhejiang province, is flooding Asia with cheap mobile-phone handsets it cannot sell profitably at home.

Revaluing the yuan should make some of the tensions created by all this less acute[强烈]. American politicians, in particular, have been demanding a step in this direction—President George Bush's spokesman welcomed the move. However, some congressmen have been demanding a much bigger stride[步幅]. And investment is becoming as touchy[难处理的] an issue as trade has been. China is no longer using its huge stock of foreign-exchange reserves[外汇储备]—over $700 billion—merely to buy American Treasury 21 bonds[美国国债], but to snap up[抢购] physical assets too. The $18.5 billion contested bid by CNOOC, a big Chinese oil company, for America's Unocal is causing an uproar[骚动] in Washington, DC. China's currency move may dampen calls for trade protection and revaluation for a while. But if its domestic economy slows and thus becomes less supportive of global growth, such calls are likely to return soon.