反对高管高薪的力量很薄弱 CEO该不该为薪资辩白

 　　Until recently, a good motto for the well-paid British chief executive would have been united we stand, divided we rise.

　　直到不久前，对于薪资丰厚的英国CEO而言，一句颇有道理的箴言是团结让我们屹立，分开让我们上升。
　　Businesses often act together to fight measures that may dent 1 corporate 2 profits, as a group of trade associations did this week in pushing back against government attempts to raise its national living wage for those at the bottom of the pay scale.
　　企业经常联手反抗那些可能减少企业利润的措施，就像一些行业协会最近所做的那样——它们反抗了政府提高薪资最低人群的全国最低工资的计划。
　　On their own pay, though, chief executives work separately, tackling each challenge at company level.
　　然而，在自己的薪资的问题上，他们却单独行动，在公司层面解决每一个挑战。
　　The High Pay Centre lobby group’s annual survey of FTSE 100 bosses’ pay — issued, by cruel coincidence, the same day as the living wage letter — underlines the effectiveness of such tactics.
　　游说组织高薪中心(High Pay Centre)对富时100指数(FTSE)成分股公司CEO的薪资进行的年度调查，突显出这种手段的有效性。这项调查发布与CEO发出抗议最低工资的联名信是在同一天，可谓残酷的巧合。
　　Heads of big UK companies have seen their average pay rise by a third since 2010 and were paid more than 140 times employees’ average wages in 2015.
　　自2010年以来，英国大公司CEO的平均薪资上涨了三分之一，是2015年员工平均薪资的140倍以上。
　　Theresa May, the prime minister, has called their bluff 3.
　　英国首相特里萨?梅(Theresa May)戳穿了他们的把戏。
　　By pointing out, days before her appointment last month, how perceptions of bosses’ pay undermine trust in the privileged few of the corporate establishment, she may finally draw them into the debate they have tried to ignore.
　　就在她被任命为首相几天前，她指出，有关CEO薪资的看法破坏了人们对于企业界有特权的少数人的信任，就此她可能终于把他们拖入了他们一直试图不去理睬的辩论中。
　　Rarely do executives defend their own rewards publicly.
　　高管们很少公开为自己的薪资辩护。
　　One exception is Sir Martin Sorrell, ranked as Britain’s best-paid FTSE 100 chief executive, who in 2012 wrote a defiant 4 opinion piece for the Financial Times despite attempts by people close to the WPP chief to deter 5 him.
　　一个例外是英国薪资最高的富时100成分股公司CEO苏铭天爵士(Sir Martin Sorrell，见上图)。2012年，尽管接近这位WPP首席执行官的人士曾经试图阻止他，但他还是为英国《金融时报》写下了一篇挑衅性评论文章。
　　He claimed he was merely behaving as an owner rather than a manager.
　　他声称，他只不过是在像一位所有者（而非管理者）那样行事。
　　I thought that was the object of the exercise, he wrote.
　　他写道：我本就认为，我应该像一位所有者那样行事。
　　A more concerted effort by companies to defend — let alone curb 7 — levels of executive pay would be unthinkable.
　　企业采取更加联合的行动维护（更别提限制）高管薪资的做法将是难以想象的。
　　More to the point, it would be unnecessary.
　　更重要的是，这将是不必要的。
　　Chief executives are sheltered by the very pay data their companies are required to publish.
　　CEO所在公司必须公开的薪资数据让首席执行官们得到保护。
　　This market information is brandished 8 by compensation consultants 9 to justify 10 above-average contract settlements for corporate leaders, and used by headhunters to bait the lines for their successors.
　　薪酬咨询顾问们利用这种市场信息证明，企业领导人的约定薪资高出平均水平是合理的，猎头则利用这种信息诱惑下任CEO的可能人选。
　　In addition, executive pay, however elevated, is trivial compared with overall payroll 11 costs.
　　另外，不管高管薪资有多高，与公司的总薪资成本相比，数额也很小。
　　And the forces campaigning against inflated 12 executive rewards are weak.
　　反对高管高薪的力量很薄弱。
　　UK investment institutions have less clout 13 than they used to, even assuming they choose to spend time actively 14 analysing pay levels.
　　英国投资机构的影响力已不如从前，即便假设他们会选择花费时间积极分析薪资水平。
　　Non-executive directors are too timid.
　　非执行董事过于胆小。
　　Pliable 15 board members are corralled into remuneration committees that rarely shake the status quo, let alone claw back pay awards when underperformance exposes them as excessive.
　　温顺的董事会成员们被拖入薪酬委员会——薪酬委员会很少打破现状，更别提在业绩不佳时收回过高的奖金了。
　　Rather than challenge high pay, boards can fall back on their legal responsibilities to shareholders 16.
　　董事会对股东负有法律责任，他们可以倚赖这一点，不去挑战高管的高薪酬。
　　Guy Jubb, a governance expert, pointed 17 out last month that the duties of directors are too permissive and have given legitimacy 18 to implementing 19 excessive boardroom pay practices.
　　公司治理方面的专家盖伊?朱布(Guy Jubb)不久前指出，董事的责任太过宽松，为付给董事高薪的做法提供了合法性。
　　As Frank Field, the opposition 20 Labour party MP, put it more bluntly in London’s Evening Standard: The model that has emerged over the past 30 years is a con 6.
　　反对党工党议员弗兰克?菲尔德(Frank Field)在《伦敦标准晚报》(London Evening Standard)上更直白地写道：过去30年出现的那种模式是个骗局。
　　Enter Mrs May.
　　梅登场了。
　　Her proposals — annual binding 21 votes on what chief executives are paid, worker representation on boards — have flaws but they point in the right direction; drawing board members from a wider range of backgrounds, for instance, would increase the likelihood of challenge.
　　她的提议（每年就CEO薪资进行具备约束力的投票，安排员工代表进入董事会）存在缺陷，但方向是正确的；例如，从背景更多样化的人中吸收董事会成员将加大向这个问题发起挑战的可能性。
　　More important, while her intervention 22 may not yet have changed the law, it has changed the environment.
　　更重要的是，她的干预或许尚未改变法律，但它改变了环境。
　　The level and terms of executive pay are now, rightly, the subject of a political discussion at the highest level.
　　高管薪资的水平和条款现在理所应当地成为最高层面政治讨论的话题。
　　Mrs May’s intervention set chief executives’ richly cushioned position in sharp relief against the precarious 23 existence of those workers counting on the living wage.
　　梅的干预让CEO们极其舒适的地位与那些指望最低工资过活的员工们不牢靠的的状态形成鲜明对比。
　　She should make business leaders realise that what they have grown used to treating as a little local difficulty is a national problem that, for once, requires a collective response.
　　她应该让企业领导人意识到，他们已习惯于当作一个内部小问题来处理的问题，已成为一个全国性问题，这一次它需要集体回应。