时间:2019-02-25 作者:英语课 分类:PBS访谈社会系列


英语课

   JUDY WOODRUFF: So, how effective is this deal at preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon?


  We hear from four people with extensive U.S. foreign policy experience.
  Sandy Berger was national security advisor 1 to President Bill Clinton. Retired 2 General Michael Hayden was director of the CIA during the George W. Bush administration. Dennis Ross served in Republican and Democratic administrations as a Middle East peace envoy 3. And Jim Woolsey was director of the CIA during the Clinton administration.
  And we welcome you all to the program.
  Let me just start by asking you all, what do you make of this deal? Does this prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon?
  Jim Woolsey, to you first.
  JAMES WOOLSEY, Former CIA Director: I don't believe it does. I think there is no elastic 4, essentially 5, in the snap-back sanctions. They will — they really depend upon Russian and Chinese cooperation.
  And I think that…
  JUDY WOODRUFF: What do you mean they depend on Russian and Chinese cooperation?
  JAMES WOOLSEY: In order to take action based upon something that we perceive the Iranians have done, unless the Iranians agree and say, ‘oh, yes, we did that,' you have a situation where we have to try to force discipline on the system, and we're not going to have Russian and Chinese support, mostly, in order to do that.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: How strong is that agreement, Sandy Berger, and do you see that weakness?
  SANDY BERGER, Former U.S. National Security Advisor: I think the agreement is a strong agreement.
  I think it prevents Iran from developing a nuclear weapon for at least 10, probably 15 years. I don't think it depends on trust. I think it's verifiable. If they cheat, we can go to the U.N. I think Jim is wrong about the way of reimposing the sanctions. The way the agreement is written, Russia, China and Iran cannot stop us from reimposing the sanctions.
  If the — if us and — if we or our allies believe Iran is cheating, and we go to the U.N., we cannot be blocked by Russia, China and Iran alone or in combination. That's a pretty strong provision. And I think it's essential to the fabric 6 of this agreement. We're not relying upon anything other than our own judgment 7 as to whether or not they're cheating on this agreement.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: General Hayden, how do you see this?
  GEN. MICHAEL HAYDEN (RET.), Former CIA Director: Well, actually a combination of the two views you just heard.
  I think it does do some really good things for a period of about a decade, but it does legitimate 8 an industrial-strength Iranian nuclear program. As we get to the sunset years, even assuming success across the board for the agreement, as we get to the sunset years, Iran is very well-positioned to break out if they choose to do so.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: Dennis Ross, why isn't that a concern, that it does wind Iran down for a period of years, but when that period is over, Iran can build back up again?
  DENNIS ROSS, Former Middle East peace envoy: Well, I think it is a period. I think it is a source of concern.
  I think the key here is, for 15 years, you really are basically deferring 9 what they can do when it comes to a nuclear weapon. But come year 15, they are a threshold nuclear state. And unless we establish a very clear deterrent 10, so that they understand if they move from threshold to weapons status, that the price is going to be unbearable 11, meaning not just sanctions, but the use of force, that's the only way to ensure that they don't become a nuclear weapons state.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: And do you think that deterrent is clear and strong?
  GEN. MICHAEL HAYDEN: Not right now.
  I think we have to make — I think language has to be much more blunt. I think we have to be clear it's not just all options are on the table, but we will not permit Iran to become a nuclear weapons state and we will take whatever steps are necessary, including the use of force, to ensure that.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: Sandy Berger, you're shaking your head.
  SANDY BERGER: Yes. No, I agree.
  The president has said we will not permit Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. That is a commitment of the United States. It doesn't expire. It's not vitiated by this agreement. He should reiterate 12 that and make it very, very clear.
  But the agreement itself restricts Iran for 15 years. But the verification provisions go on much longer. So we will have transparency under this system for a very long time. And if the president reiterates 13 that view that we're not going to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, we will have a lot of access to what they're doing.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: why doesn't that give you confidence, Jim Woolsey?
  JAMES WOOLSEY: Well, in the first place, Russia and China are members of the Security Council, and one can do little under this agreement without having the Security Council's support.
  And I think that the real problem is that, by paying tens upon tens of billions of dollars to Iran in the near term, which we will do as a result of the sanctions being lifted, we're creating a situation in which Iran is the leading terrorist country in the world, has a lot more resources available to it to buy what they want via Hamas and the other terrorist organizations they front.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: And Gwen asked National Security Adviser 14 Susan Rice about that.
  Michael Hayden, is that a concern to you?
  GEN. MICHAEL HAYDEN: It's absolutely a concern.
  So, assuming a good agreement, let's say it works for that 10-year period, we have got the sunset problem. But also, Judy, look at what we have just done. We have legitimated 15 a program until this morning that was illegal, that was in violation 16 of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
  We have brought Iran back into the family of nations. It's now no longer a renegade state. The sanctions end, they become rich, and none of those other activities about which we are very concerned Iran has been conducting, none of those have stopped.
  JAMES WOOLSEY: Exactly.
  SANDY BERGER: Well, I would say two things.
  First of all, Iran is a nuclear threshold state. They have been a nuclear threshold state since they started building centrifuges in the middle of the Bush administration. The question is, what are we going to do about it? Are we going to roll it back or let them have this program and go forward?
  So I think that's where we are at this point. I absolutely agree this agreement does not solve the Iranian problem in the region. Iran is a country that is destabilizing the region, a country that we have to be concerned with. I don't see this agreement as solving that problem. I think this agreement is useful, not in spite of that, but because of that, because all those conflicts, all that ambition would be more dangerous if Iran were emboldened 17 because they had a nuclear weapon.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: Well, Dennis Ross, as someone who has worked on that — those conflicts in the region, how do you see that aspect of it?
  DENNIS ROSS: Look, there is no question that they will get, with sanctions relief, they will get to what amounts to a windfall. True, it is their money, but you have close to $150 billion that are in frozen assets, frozen accounts right now.
  They don't get it for about six months. What Susan Rice said is right. They have to implement 18 the major obligations, the major nuclear obligations in the deal. And it will take about six months to do that. I think the key here at this point is for the Iranians to understand two things. One, we need to reestablish deterrence 19 not only at the level of them not moving from threshold to nuclear weapons state status, but also we have to raise the cost to them of what they do in the region.
  We have to be prepared to compete with them. They have to realize that if we see them giving a lot more money to Hezbollah, a lot more money to Hamas, to the Houthis or to Asaib Ahl-Haq in Iraq, they are going to see much greater competition from us.
  We should be talking to the Europeans now about targeted sanctions if we see that. And we should be doing contingency 20 planning with the Israelis and with the Arabs to deal with increased activity by the Iranians throughout the region.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: And I saw the president in a phone call today with Prime Minister Netanyahu trying to reassure 21 him on some of these points.
  Jim Woolsey, I want to come to this other question of inspections 23. The president said — it was noticeable the president said 24/7 access. But then, later, we see it's something called managed access. How comfortable are you with whatever inspection 22 arrangement there is?
  JAMES WOOLSEY: Not at all.
  If we point out a violation or the need for an inspection, you have two weeks, and then it goes to a committee, and then the committee looks at it for a while, and then — this has all been very elaborately constructed in such a way as to give Iran a lot of leeway in order to deal with this, and they do not have to have, ultimately, a huge industrial structure that they can't hide.
  They can hide the relevant parts of being able to make a few weapons in a relatively 24 small space and can move them.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: Where do you come down on this, General Hayden?
  GEN. MICHAEL HAYDEN: Pretty much where Jim is.
  The inspections are the pass-fail aspect of the agreement. And we cannot do it through American espionage 25 or national technical means. The only way we get a verifiable agreement is that the IAEA gets to go where they want to go.
  And, Judy, fundamentally, I think that's a technical question that this international group should have the freedom to move. The solution set here moves this into a political process. And I'm just fearful that that will make it much more difficult to verify.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: How do you respond?
  SANDY BERGER: Look, I think the agreement is quite clear. I think the administration has done a good job here.
  If the Iranians don't let us into a particular site, there is a process of several weeks. If we're not satisfied, we and our allies can go to the Security Council and have the sanctions reimposed. If Russia is screaming, if China is screaming and if Iran is screaming, they cannot block that. So, I think that's really crystal clear.
  Let me just make one other point on the sanctions point. We don't own these sanctions. They're not ours. They're international sanctions. They include the Indians and the South Koreans and the Japanese and a lot of countries that aren't terribly threatened by Iran.
  They opposed these sanctions, because they wanted to bring Iran to the table, and they believed we would negotiate seriously. If we don't now follow through on that, the sanctions regime will unravel 26, Iran will get its money without any nuclear controls.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: And that raises the question about what happens if this falls apart. For the critics who are saying this is the wrong deal, what's the alternative, Dennis Ross?
  DENNIS ROSS: Well, I think there is a burden on the critics to explain that, because I think the point that Sandy just made is right.
  There is a reality here. You have the international community basically embracing this agreement. Certainly, the members of 5-plus-one have embraced this agreement. The Iranians will say they're going to implement the agreement. I actually think, if this were to be blocked, the Iranians would come out and say, we will implement it.
  And the European Union — if you read the agreement, the European Union, commits, there are separate paragraphs where the European Union commit, if the Iranians do their part in terms of meeting these major obligations, the E.U. is then committed to lifting the sanctions.
  So, I am concerned that you wouldn't be able to sustain that. And so if the critics are really convinced that the best way to deal with this is to block the sanctions, they have to explain why the outcome isn't going to be sanctions collapse 27, the Iranians get the windfall, they're really not restricted.
  In a sense, both — from my standpoint, the administration has some issues it has to address, including how you deal with the suspect sites. It's an — we have 24/7 access to facilities like Natanz. It comes — when it comes to suspect sites, that becomes more problematic, and then you're talking about what could be a 30- to 35-day period before you actually get access.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: And you're saying the critics also have a question to answer.
  Jim Woolsey, what is the answer? Why wouldn't the sanctions regime collapse, Iran just moves toward complete nuclear program that it wants?
  JAMES WOOLSEY: Well, I think it will come very close to doing that anyway.
  We have to realize what we have got here and what we're dealing 28 with. It's not a state — I once led a set of negotiations 29 and participated in three with the Soviets 30. And with the Soviets, it was a different situation. They were far from lovely folks to deal with.
  But with Iran, we're dealing with a leadership of the country that are theocratic 31, totalitarian, genocidal imperialists. And each of those words I think can definitely be supported. They have a word, taquia, which essentially means lying to infidels. It's recommended.
  And we are not dealing with a normal sort of autocratic state that we have to be careful how we deal with.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: But my question is, if this doesn't work, what's the alternative?
  Isn't the alternative, Michael Hayden, Iran has a clear path to do what it wants?
  GEN. MICHAEL HAYDEN: It depends. It depends on American leadership. It depends on how clearly we state our reasons that this is not a good enough deal.
  And good enough might be as good as it gets. But, Judy, if you push that logic 32 too far, you don't have a plan B, you could actually back yourself into a position where any deal is better than no deal. And I don't think that's a sustainable position.
  JUDY WOODRUFF: Gentlemen, we're going to leave it there. It's just day one of debating this nuclear agreement.
  We thank you all for being here, Jim Woolsey, Michael Hayden, Sandy Berger, and Dennis Ross. Thank you.

n.顾问,指导老师,劝告者
  • They employed me as an advisor.他们聘请我当顾问。
  • The professor is engaged as a technical advisor.这位教授被聘请为技术顾问。
adj.隐退的,退休的,退役的
  • The old man retired to the country for rest.这位老人下乡休息去了。
  • Many retired people take up gardening as a hobby.许多退休的人都以从事园艺为嗜好。
n.使节,使者,代表,公使
  • Their envoy showed no sign of responding to our proposals.他们的代表对我方的提议毫无回应的迹象。
  • The government has not yet appointed an envoy to the area.政府尚未向这一地区派过外交官。
n.橡皮圈,松紧带;adj.有弹性的;灵活的
  • Rubber is an elastic material.橡胶是一种弹性材料。
  • These regulations are elastic.这些规定是有弹性的。
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上
  • Really great men are essentially modest.真正的伟人大都很谦虚。
  • She is an essentially selfish person.她本质上是个自私自利的人。
n.织物,织品,布;构造,结构,组织
  • The fabric will spot easily.这种织品很容易玷污。
  • I don't like the pattern on the fabric.我不喜欢那块布料上的图案。
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见
  • The chairman flatters himself on his judgment of people.主席自认为他审视人比别人高明。
  • He's a man of excellent judgment.他眼力过人。
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法
  • Sickness is a legitimate reason for asking for leave.生病是请假的一个正当的理由。
  • That's a perfectly legitimate fear.怀有这种恐惧完全在情理之中。
v.拖延,延缓,推迟( defer的现在分词 );服从某人的意愿,遵从
  • Recently, the Supreme Court has focused on an additional reason for deferring to administrative agencies. 最近,最高法院强调了尊重行政机构的另一种理由。 来自英汉非文学 - 环境法 - 环境法
  • Think of it as deferring part of the compiler's job to runtime. 可以认为这是将编译器的部分工作延迟到了运行时。 来自互联网
n.阻碍物,制止物;adj.威慑的,遏制的
  • Large fines act as a deterrent to motorists.高额罚款是对开车的人的制约。
  • I put a net over my strawberries as a deterrent to the birds.我在草莓上罩了网,免得鸟歇上去。
adj.不能容忍的;忍受不住的
  • It is unbearable to be always on thorns.老是处于焦虑不安的情况中是受不了的。
  • The more he thought of it the more unbearable it became.他越想越觉得无法忍受。
v.重申,反复地说
  • Let me reiterate that we have absolutely no plans to increase taxation.让我再一次重申我们绝对没有增税的计划。
  • I must reiterate that our position on this issue is very clear.我必须重申我们对这一项议题的立场很清楚。
反复地说,重申( reiterate的第三人称单数 )
  • The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. 中国政府重申,台湾问题是中国的内政。 来自汉英非文学 - 汉英文件
  • Wang Jianzhou reiterates a fact and a viewpoint in Davos. 王建宙在达沃斯重申一个事实和一个观点。
n.劝告者,顾问
  • They employed me as an adviser.他们聘请我当顾问。
  • Our department has engaged a foreign teacher as phonetic adviser.我们系已经聘请了一位外籍老师作为语音顾问。
v.合情合理的( legitimate的过去式和过去分词 );合法的;法律认可的;法定的
  • The judge legitimated the use of the gun as evidence. 那位法官使用枪支作为证据合法化。 来自辞典例句
  • He legitimated his accession to the estate. 他使他的承继产业合法化。 来自辞典例句
n.违反(行为),违背(行为),侵犯
  • He roared that was a violation of the rules.他大声说,那是违反规则的。
  • He was fined 200 dollars for violation of traffic regulation.他因违反交通规则被罚款200美元。
v.鼓励,使有胆量( embolden的过去式和过去分词 )
  • Emboldened by the wine, he went over to introduce himself to her. 他借酒壮胆,走上前去向她作自我介绍。
  • His success emboldened him to expand his business. 他有了成就因而激发他进一步扩展业务。 来自《简明英汉词典》
n.(pl.)工具,器具;vt.实行,实施,执行
  • Don't undertake a project unless you can implement it.不要承担一项计划,除非你能完成这项计划。
  • The best implement for digging a garden is a spade.在花园里挖土的最好工具是铁锹。
威慑,制止; 制止物,制止因素; 挽留的事物; 核威慑
  • An extreme school of "disarmers" pronounced stable deterrence was a dangerous deception. “裁军论者”中的极端派声称,稳定的威摄是一种危险的骗局。
  • Escalation is thus an aspect of deterrence and of crisis management. 因此逐步升级是威慑和危机处理的一个方面。
n.意外事件,可能性
  • We should be prepared for any contingency.我们应该对任何应急情况有所准备。
  • A fire in our warehouse was a contingency that we had not expected.库房的一场大火是我们始料未及的。
v.使放心,使消除疑虑
  • This seemed to reassure him and he continued more confidently.这似乎使他放心一点,于是他更有信心地继续说了下去。
  • The airline tried to reassure the customers that the planes were safe.航空公司尽力让乘客相信飞机是安全的。
n.检查,审查,检阅
  • On random inspection the meat was found to be bad.经抽查,发现肉变质了。
  • The soldiers lined up for their daily inspection by their officers.士兵们列队接受军官的日常检阅。
n.检查( inspection的名词复数 );检验;视察;检阅
  • Regular inspections are carried out at the prison. 经常有人来视察这座监狱。
  • Government inspections ensure a high degree of uniformity in the standard of service. 政府检查确保了在服务标准方面的高度一致。 来自《简明英汉词典》
adv.比较...地,相对地
  • The rabbit is a relatively recent introduction in Australia.兔子是相对较新引入澳大利亚的物种。
  • The operation was relatively painless.手术相对来说不痛。
n.间谍行为,谍报活动
  • The authorities have arrested several people suspected of espionage.官方已经逮捕了几个涉嫌从事间谍活动的人。
  • Neither was there any hint of espionage in Hanley's early life.汉利的早期生活也毫无进行间谍活动的迹象。
v.弄清楚(秘密);拆开,解开,松开
  • He was good with his hands and could unravel a knot or untangle yarn that others wouldn't even attempt.他的手很灵巧,其他人甚至都不敢尝试的一些难解的绳结或缠在一起的纱线,他都能解开。
  • This is the attitude that led him to unravel a mystery that long puzzled Chinese historians.正是这种态度使他解决了长期以来使中国历史学家们大惑不解的谜。
vi.累倒;昏倒;倒塌;塌陷
  • The country's economy is on the verge of collapse.国家的经济已到了崩溃的边缘。
  • The engineer made a complete diagnosis of the bridge's collapse.工程师对桥的倒塌做了一次彻底的调查分析。
n.经商方法,待人态度
  • This store has an excellent reputation for fair dealing.该商店因买卖公道而享有极高的声誉。
  • His fair dealing earned our confidence.他的诚实的行为获得我们的信任。
协商( negotiation的名词复数 ); 谈判; 完成(难事); 通过
  • negotiations for a durable peace 为持久和平而进行的谈判
  • Negotiations have failed to establish any middle ground. 谈判未能达成任何妥协。
苏维埃(Soviet的复数形式)
  • A public challenge could provoke the Soviets to dig in. 公开挑战会促使苏联人一意孤行。
  • The Soviets proposed the withdrawal of American ballistic-missile submarines from forward bases. 苏联人建议把美国的弹道导弹潜艇从前沿基地撤走。
adj.神权的,神权政治的
  • The priest caste wields considerable power in this rigidly theocratic society. 祭司阶层(priestcaste)在这个严格的神权社会中掌握着相当大的权力。 来自互联网
  • The heartland of Islam, by contrast, is theocratic. 相反,伊斯兰教的核心地带则是神权政治。 来自互联网
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性
  • What sort of logic is that?这是什么逻辑?
  • I don't follow the logic of your argument.我不明白你的论点逻辑性何在。
标签: PBS 访谈
学英语单词
acceptable quality level(aql)
acent
adrenal cortex hormone extract
aligning collar
anthonyi
Arago's rotation
arylazole
b-integral cancellation
Barisal Division
barrier dam
blackey
bushwillow
butyl bromide
BX cable
byambasuren
cargo oil tank cleaning installation
Celticisms
characteristics of spray amount
childebertis
ciambrone
cocoanut husk
coking furnace
compass control box
contaminated
contusion and laceration of brain
cruising range
delphi techniquetechnological forecasting
dihYdroxydimethylbutyric acid
Dikanäs
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e ddress
electronic discharge
extractum filicis liquidum
fairisles
fuller earth
general average disbursement insurance
genus diomedeas
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gibor
guinea flower
hand interrupter
heterotrophic callus
Homburg am Main
hplc-rias
idempotent of qr code
in a week
industrial reorganization act
intricenyne
laughline
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local treaty
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malamide
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middleboxes
modern-day digital computer
molefe
morbus acutissimus
multi-agent sysetm
multi-head extruder
nereite
Nichol's radiometer
nitencies
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nonstandardized technique
object metamerism
once-shiny
oranon
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perforated-plate extraction tower
pheidiac
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posterior mesenteric plexus
primordial composition
proximal branch
psalmodikon
radiation enviroment
rigid rapier weaving machine
Röthenbach
silkworm genetics
simple liquid
soft-soaper
Spenceley Glacier
sphygmobolometer
supercharger regulator
terrazzos
test-drove
the pleasure garden
trachipteridaes
truebred
u-stem
uraline
warm extrusion
wave front reconstruction microscopy
yeave
Zimbabwean,Zimbabwian