2006年VOA标准英语-Expert Questions Viability of Darfur Peace

By Catherine Maddux
Washington
22 May 2006

The implementation 2 of the peace accord to end more than three years of war in Darfur, Sudan, appears to be stumbling, amid accusations 3 of cease-fire violations 4. Some analysts 5 have expressed concern the deal contains holes that make implementation, and, ultimately, peace in Darfur, very difficult. VOA's Catherine Maddux spoke 6 to one such expert, who observed the negotiations 7 in Abuja, Nigeria.

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An African Union peacekeeper and colleagues in the background standing 8 guard to control a crowd (file photo) 
  

The May 5 peace accord was mediated 9 by the African Union, following nearly two years of off-and-on talks between the Sudanese government and Darfur rebel groups.

The agreement raised hopes of bringing an end to more than three years of war in the vast, arid 10 western Darfur region. The war has killed an estimated 200,000 people and uprooted 11 some two million others from their villages. But questions remain about how well the accord can be implemented 12, for instance, how to disarm 13 the government-backed Arab militias 14, known as the janjaweed, held responsible for the most serious atrocities 15, including genocide.

Colin Thomas-Jensen, a researcher at the International Crisis Group who spent time at the Abuja talks, says the Darfur accord is built upon three major issues: security, power-sharing and wealth-sharing.

"The final deal has fairly detailed 16 security arrangements for the disengagement of forces, disarmament," said Colin Thomas-Jensen. "There are loose provisions for the disarmament of the Janjaweed, that is still something that needs to be worked out. As well as the integration 17 of some of the [rebel] SLA forces into the Sudanese armed forces and the police. On the wealth-sharing, there is money from the central government for rehabilitation 18. There's a small pot of money for compensation."

Thomas-Jensen says, for the rebels there will be some power-sharing on the state level. Only one rebel group out of three - the Sudanese Liberation Army - signed the deal, along with the Khartoum government. In doing so, the rebels got one big prize, although not precisely 19 what SLA leader Minni Arkou Minnawi pressed for.

"At the level of the presidency 20, there is something called a senior assistant to the president, which is a new position created by this agreement, which essentially 21 has the function of a vice 22 president, but is not called a vice president," he said. "Finally, there is established a transitional authority for the region, a sort of quasi-regional government that will stay in place for the next few years to administer some of the region-wide programs for rehabilitation with the money that they have received from the central government."

A big issue at the negotiating table was a return to Darfur's status in 1994, when it was a single region with its own government - in effect, trying to reverse the break up of Darfur into three states. Thomas-Jensen says that move completely diluted 23 the power of Darfur's largest ethnic 24 group, the Fur. Khartoum pushed to keep the region split.

Thomas-Jensen says, to their credit, African Union mediators tried to meet the parties half-way. They offered rebels regional authority, but on a temporary basis, to oversee 25 the implementation of the peace deal. However, to appease 26 rebel demands, the final deal also built in a referendum on turning Darfur back into a single region.

For Thomas-Jensen, one of the accord's most serious weaknesses is how to disarm the warring parties. Rebels, including SLA rebels who ended up agreeing to the provision, are not happy.

"Specifically, the timing 27 for the disarmament of the Janjaweed," noted 28 Colin Thomas-Jensen. "The government wanted these processes of disengagement and disarmament of rebels and Janjaweed forces to occur concurrently 29. The rebels, Minni especially, felt that the Janjaweed should be disarmed 30 completely, or, at least, concrete steps taken towards disarmament before he [the rebel leader] began his own process of standing down."

But that issue, and many others in the deal, have been left to be decided 31 later by special commissions. And, as such, timelines are vague, which leaves open the possibility of more fighting. Already, there have been reports of sporadic 32 fighting and accusations of attacks.

Another potential problem is, the deal envisions a newly unified 33 national army, with former rebel fighters standing alongside their former enemy combatants, the pro-government Janjaweed.

For researcher Thomas-Jensen the most serious concern is enforcement.

"The biggest issue is, in this atmosphere of chronic 34 mistrust, with multiple armed groups roaming around, how do you - with the agreement in place - how do you actually implement 1 it? How do you ensure that those parties that signed live up to their commitments? And the only way that that can really happen is with a large multi-national presence on the ground, with a mandate 35 to protect civilians 36 and with clear guidelines as to what are the punishments for failure to comply with the terms of the agreement," he said.

The United Nations has already begun taking step to deploy 37 such a peacekeeping force to enhance the 7,000 or so African Union troops already in Darfur. But it can only be deployed 38 with the permission of the Khartoum government, which has yet to approve the proposed mission, saying it wants more input 39 into the size and mandate of the force.